From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30C35C43334 for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:45:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345462AbiFNSpc (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:45:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59286 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1357602AbiFNSns (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:43:48 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B9F734C7A3; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 11:42:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 20B3AB81AF7; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:42:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 73654C3411D; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:42:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655232160; bh=3dsMAznn1B6DoeOIvyo2p957q7i+qY4LOqwKuKo6vpY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=zVkfRh/CTpv9BHx9lnlh2fYPhJAQdbLpSZSZo+oxQiNF56wdESSOFZY0lcs6sCCiL i+k05tMcmnnyMuJ8U7UfcPAdU225lhse/W6lBmyb2tB5TBQVLRIVk0APOXqF8tvczn sv6TRMHM1KeVtSUPoO49fbVgGggrq3CDewdQMeSc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Pawan Gupta , Borislav Petkov , Thomas Gleixner , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Subject: [PATCH 4.14 17/20] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:08 +0200 Message-Id: <20220614183727.515024248@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220614183723.328825625@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220614183723.328825625@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Pawan Gupta commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data. Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -578,11 +578,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati return; /* - * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting - * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that + * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected + * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;