From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E72CEC433EF for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:45:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347578AbiFTNpG (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:45:06 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51582 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349152AbiFTNoO (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:44:14 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32FC42CC86; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 06:16:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 92F44B811C6; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:10:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EC459C36AEA; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:10:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655730645; bh=uUG+JO2pkBTfHGENInvGXPSD7uC8e+wMAg3tib7nqsI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IRcfWNdeAuPsEtj9kV4BZ1PnqK/9m6zhfxZzbjBb1F2ST4ve0+cnUBDhxbdUFQk20 dTaZHRbfRVkulf/lHjaKalbH4u+MrMDf0oQEU1k9OUTCqxYrnb80D5TyxH+RpDCCKa J9i3iV2rzAOT/3huDqCcnzIansQ3Bi+kWYYLn85I= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Theodore Tso , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 5.4 012/240] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:48:33 +0200 Message-Id: <20220620124738.163581928@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Andy Lutomirski commit 48446f198f9adcb499b30332488dfd5bc3f176f6 upstream. The separate blocking pool is going away. Start by ignoring GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2). This should not materially break any API. Any code that worked without this change should work at least as well with this change. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/705c5a091b63cc5da70c99304bb97e0109be0a26.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 3 --- include/uapi/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2230,9 +2230,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * if (count > INT_MAX) count = INT_MAX; - if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) - return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); - if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; --- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct rand_pool_info { * Flags for getrandom(2) * * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead - * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom + * GRND_RANDOM No effect * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes */ #define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001