From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 199AAC433EF for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:38:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346675AbiFTNiA (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:38:00 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37064 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346925AbiFTNhF (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:37:05 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B8E22871B; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 06:14:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C84B60FEF; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:13:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 432A5C3411B; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:13:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655730814; bh=UQJ6FlovxwQc5SOGJLgNN+YfADKK5QP7JctfBCH+YzA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=sTOFSXqm9bMUOvBq99Z1GHxj7tA3QmxkDuQT+l/WXUNA6soHMCIumqc0B6nTTsXAy 1AI5t8QuJpsmL+EUth/7t6qrK4XTchY6nhLhVFSp9V315Eg1ena+BVj6Az1wGZ5ZU+ +/7/AefcionLI02WtsfthqrDDSxQmPQS+Mktuxew= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Dominik Brodowski Subject: [PATCH 5.4 062/240] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:49:23 +0200 Message-Id: <20220620124740.133004351@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Dominik Brodowski commit c321e907aa4803d562d6e70ebed9444ad082f953 upstream. The rngd kernel thread may sleep indefinitely if the entropy count is kept above random_write_wakeup_bits by other entropy sources. To make best use of multiple sources of randomness, mix entropy from hardware RNGs into the pool at least once within CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL. Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2195,13 +2195,15 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch return; } - /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. + /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, - * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. + * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed. */ - wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, + wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits); + POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy); }