From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44F8EC433EF for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 16:53:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232314AbiFWQxG (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:53:06 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49332 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233910AbiFWQvw (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:51:52 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6302C2656B; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 09:51:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBCC961FC2; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 16:51:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A2A6AC3411B; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 16:51:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1656003107; bh=05Y6AWTeW8ezSzmEjPC+H7znKCnSHRPXCjLjCPqM9cQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dxFRNb3U5LK8ZNPLxkKYVKv8IgxBXUnOWrDRYMovkf3MfLvOnx11oUxsLKjoy+f4f 1slGCyI6nr44wLzVQpdoT6NtvDne8kIiboty3zj8GLSNdNtDcZ8NK1PVRNvC2v5vbI 4fCSyTt1yJopombvnmfsDH/2H/4Dlf++Qod9FyYw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso , Ard Biesheuvel , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.9 091/264] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164346.646040605@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164344.053938039@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164344.053938039@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit 2ee25b6968b1b3c66ffa408de23d023c1bce81cf upstream. RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead. Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2). This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND is going to alleviate things. And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in crng_init_try_arch_early(). Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by 370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of RDRAND. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) { - unsigned long v, flags, init_time; + unsigned long flags, init_time; if (crng_ready()) { init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); @@ -1084,8 +1084,6 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st &input_pool : NULL); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) - crng->state[14] ^= v; chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); if (crng->state[12] == 0) crng->state[13]++;