From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 31/51] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 13:32:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221005113211.719262757@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221005113210.255710920@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream.
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1126,32 +1126,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
- BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-05 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-05 11:31 [PATCH 5.4 00/51] 5.4.217-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/51] Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/51] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/51] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/51] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/51] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/51] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/51] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 08/51] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/51] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/51] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:31 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/51] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/51] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/51] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/51] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/51] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 16/51] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 17/51] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 18/51] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 19/51] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 20/51] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 21/51] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 22/51] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 23/51] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 24/51] KVM/VMX: Use TEST %REG,%REG instead of CMP $0,%REG in vmenter.S Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 25/51] KVM/nVMX: Use __vmx_vcpu_run in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 26/51] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 27/51] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 28/51] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 29/51] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 30/51] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 32/51] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 33/51] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 34/51] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 35/51] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 36/51] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 37/51] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 38/51] xfs: fix misuse of the XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 39/51] xfs: introduce XFS_MAX_FILEOFF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 40/51] xfs: truncate should remove all blocks, not just to the end of the page cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 41/51] xfs: fix s_maxbytes computation on 32-bit kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 42/51] xfs: fix IOCB_NOWAIT handling in xfs_file_dio_aio_read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 43/51] xfs: refactor remote attr value buffer invalidation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 44/51] xfs: fix memory corruption during " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 45/51] xfs: move incore structures out of xfs_da_format.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 46/51] xfs: streamline xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 47/51] xfs: fix uninitialized variable in xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 48/51] xfs: remove unused variable done Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 49/51] Revert "drm/amdgpu: use dirty framebuffer helper" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 50/51] Makefile.extrawarn: Move -Wcast-function-type-strict to W=1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 11:32 ` [PATCH 5.4 51/51] docs: update mediator information in CoC docs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-05 19:12 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/51] 5.4.217-rc1 review Daniel Díaz
2022-10-05 19:29 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-05 19:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-10-06 9:32 ` Jon Hunter
2022-10-06 19:02 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-10-06 19:39 ` Slade Watkins
2022-10-06 20:01 ` Allen Pais
2022-10-07 14:35 ` zhouzhixiu
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