* [PATCH 6.1 01/71] eventpoll: add EPOLL_URING_WAKE poll wakeup flag
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/71] eventfd: provide a eventfd_signal_mask() helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jens Axboe, Sasha Levin
From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ Upstream commit caf1aeaffc3b09649a56769e559333ae2c4f1802 ]
We can have dependencies between epoll and io_uring. Consider an epoll
context, identified by the epfd file descriptor, and an io_uring file
descriptor identified by iofd. If we add iofd to the epfd context, and
arm a multishot poll request for epfd with iofd, then the multishot
poll request will repeatedly trigger and generate events until terminated
by CQ ring overflow. This isn't a desired behavior.
Add EPOLL_URING so that io_uring can pass it in as part of the poll wakeup
key, and io_uring can check for that to detect a potential recursive
invocation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 ("io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 52954d4637b5..64659b110973 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -491,7 +491,8 @@ static inline void ep_set_busy_poll_napi_id(struct epitem *epi)
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
-static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
+static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
+ unsigned pollflags)
{
struct eventpoll *ep_src;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -522,16 +523,17 @@ static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
}
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&ep->poll_wait.lock, flags, nests);
ep->nests = nests + 1;
- wake_up_locked_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN);
+ wake_up_locked_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN | pollflags);
ep->nests = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->poll_wait.lock, flags);
}
#else
-static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
+static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
+ unsigned pollflags)
{
- wake_up_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN);
+ wake_up_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN | pollflags);
}
#endif
@@ -742,7 +744,7 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
/* We need to release all tasks waiting for these file */
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
- ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL);
+ ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
/*
* We need to lock this because we could be hit by
@@ -1208,7 +1210,7 @@ static int ep_poll_callback(wait_queue_entry_t *wait, unsigned mode, int sync, v
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
- ep_poll_safewake(ep, epi);
+ ep_poll_safewake(ep, epi, pollflags & EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE))
ewake = 1;
@@ -1553,7 +1555,7 @@ static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, const struct epoll_event *event,
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
- ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL);
+ ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -1629,7 +1631,7 @@ static int ep_modify(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
- ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL);
+ ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h b/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h
index 8a3432d0f0dc..e687658843b1 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h
@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@
#define EPOLLMSG (__force __poll_t)0x00000400
#define EPOLLRDHUP (__force __poll_t)0x00002000
+/*
+ * Internal flag - wakeup generated by io_uring, used to detect recursion back
+ * into the io_uring poll handler.
+ */
+#define EPOLL_URING_WAKE ((__force __poll_t)(1U << 27))
+
/* Set exclusive wakeup mode for the target file descriptor */
#define EPOLLEXCLUSIVE ((__force __poll_t)(1U << 28))
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 02/71] eventfd: provide a eventfd_signal_mask() helper
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/71] eventpoll: add EPOLL_URING_WAKE poll wakeup flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/71] io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jens Axboe, Sasha Levin
From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ Upstream commit 03e02acda8e267a8183e1e0ed289ff1ef9cd7ed8 ]
This is identical to eventfd_signal(), but it allows the caller to pass
in a mask to be used for the poll wakeup key. The use case is avoiding
repeated multishot triggers if we have a dependency between eventfd and
io_uring.
If we setup an eventfd context and register that as the io_uring eventfd,
and at the same time queue a multishot poll request for the eventfd
context, then any CQE posted will repeatedly trigger the multishot request
until it terminates when the CQ ring overflows.
In preparation for io_uring detecting this circular dependency, add the
mentioned helper so that io_uring can pass in EPOLL_URING as part of the
poll wakeup key.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
[axboe: fold in !CONFIG_EVENTFD fix from Zhang Qilong]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 ("io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventfd.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
include/linux/eventfd.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventfd.c b/fs/eventfd.c
index c0ffee99ad23..249ca6c0b784 100644
--- a/fs/eventfd.c
+++ b/fs/eventfd.c
@@ -43,21 +43,7 @@ struct eventfd_ctx {
int id;
};
-/**
- * eventfd_signal - Adds @n to the eventfd counter.
- * @ctx: [in] Pointer to the eventfd context.
- * @n: [in] Value of the counter to be added to the eventfd internal counter.
- * The value cannot be negative.
- *
- * This function is supposed to be called by the kernel in paths that do not
- * allow sleeping. In this function we allow the counter to reach the ULLONG_MAX
- * value, and we signal this as overflow condition by returning a EPOLLERR
- * to poll(2).
- *
- * Returns the amount by which the counter was incremented. This will be less
- * than @n if the counter has overflowed.
- */
-__u64 eventfd_signal(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n)
+__u64 eventfd_signal_mask(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n, unsigned mask)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -78,12 +64,31 @@ __u64 eventfd_signal(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n)
n = ULLONG_MAX - ctx->count;
ctx->count += n;
if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->wqh))
- wake_up_locked_poll(&ctx->wqh, EPOLLIN);
+ wake_up_locked_poll(&ctx->wqh, EPOLLIN | mask);
current->in_eventfd = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->wqh.lock, flags);
return n;
}
+
+/**
+ * eventfd_signal - Adds @n to the eventfd counter.
+ * @ctx: [in] Pointer to the eventfd context.
+ * @n: [in] Value of the counter to be added to the eventfd internal counter.
+ * The value cannot be negative.
+ *
+ * This function is supposed to be called by the kernel in paths that do not
+ * allow sleeping. In this function we allow the counter to reach the ULLONG_MAX
+ * value, and we signal this as overflow condition by returning a EPOLLERR
+ * to poll(2).
+ *
+ * Returns the amount by which the counter was incremented. This will be less
+ * than @n if the counter has overflowed.
+ */
+__u64 eventfd_signal(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n)
+{
+ return eventfd_signal_mask(ctx, n, 0);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(eventfd_signal);
static void eventfd_free_ctx(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx)
diff --git a/include/linux/eventfd.h b/include/linux/eventfd.h
index 3cd202d3eefb..36a486505b08 100644
--- a/include/linux/eventfd.h
+++ b/include/linux/eventfd.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct file *eventfd_fget(int fd);
struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd_ctx_fdget(int fd);
struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd_ctx_fileget(struct file *file);
__u64 eventfd_signal(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n);
+__u64 eventfd_signal_mask(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n, unsigned mask);
int eventfd_ctx_remove_wait_queue(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, wait_queue_entry_t *wait,
__u64 *cnt);
void eventfd_ctx_do_read(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 *cnt);
@@ -66,6 +67,12 @@ static inline int eventfd_signal(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n)
return -ENOSYS;
}
+static inline int eventfd_signal_mask(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx, __u64 n,
+ unsigned mask)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
static inline void eventfd_ctx_put(struct eventfd_ctx *ctx)
{
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 03/71] io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/71] eventpoll: add EPOLL_URING_WAKE poll wakeup flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/71] eventfd: provide a eventfd_signal_mask() helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/71] nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jens Axboe, Sasha Levin
From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ Upstream commit 4464853277d0ccdb9914608dd1332f0fa2f9846f ]
Pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE when signaling eventfd or doing poll related
wakups, so that we can check for a circular event dependency between
eventfd and epoll. If this flag is set when our wakeup handlers are
called, then we know we have a dependency that needs to terminate
multishot requests.
eventfd and epoll are the only such possible dependencies.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 ++--
io_uring/io_uring.h | 15 +++++++++++----
io_uring/poll.c | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 17771cb3c333..71f1cabb9f3d 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static void io_eventfd_ops(struct rcu_head *rcu)
int ops = atomic_xchg(&ev_fd->ops, 0);
if (ops & BIT(IO_EVENTFD_OP_SIGNAL_BIT))
- eventfd_signal(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, 1);
+ eventfd_signal_mask(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, 1, EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
/* IO_EVENTFD_OP_FREE_BIT may not be set here depending on callback
* ordering in a race but if references are 0 we know we have to free
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static void io_eventfd_signal(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
goto out;
if (likely(eventfd_signal_allowed())) {
- eventfd_signal(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, 1);
+ eventfd_signal_mask(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, 1, EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
} else {
atomic_inc(&ev_fd->refs);
if (!atomic_fetch_or(BIT(IO_EVENTFD_OP_SIGNAL_BIT), &ev_fd->ops))
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.h b/io_uring/io_uring.h
index 50bc3af44953..4334cd30c423 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.h
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/eventpoll.h>
#include "io-wq.h"
#include "slist.h"
#include "filetable.h"
@@ -207,12 +208,18 @@ static inline void io_commit_cqring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
static inline void __io_cqring_wake(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
- * wake_up_all() may seem excessive, but io_wake_function() and
- * io_should_wake() handle the termination of the loop and only
- * wake as many waiters as we need to.
+ * Trigger waitqueue handler on all waiters on our waitqueue. This
+ * won't necessarily wake up all the tasks, io_should_wake() will make
+ * that decision.
+ *
+ * Pass in EPOLLIN|EPOLL_URING_WAKE as the poll wakeup key. The latter
+ * set in the mask so that if we recurse back into our own poll
+ * waitqueue handlers, we know we have a dependency between eventfd or
+ * epoll and should terminate multishot poll at that point.
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->cq_wait))
- wake_up_all(&ctx->cq_wait);
+ __wake_up(&ctx->cq_wait, TASK_NORMAL, 0,
+ poll_to_key(EPOLL_URING_WAKE | EPOLLIN));
}
static inline void io_cqring_wake(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
diff --git a/io_uring/poll.c b/io_uring/poll.c
index d9bf1767867e..fded1445a803 100644
--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -429,6 +429,14 @@ static int io_poll_wake(struct wait_queue_entry *wait, unsigned mode, int sync,
return 0;
if (io_poll_get_ownership(req)) {
+ /*
+ * If we trigger a multishot poll off our own wakeup path,
+ * disable multishot as there is a circular dependency between
+ * CQ posting and triggering the event.
+ */
+ if (mask & EPOLL_URING_WAKE)
+ poll->events |= EPOLLONESHOT;
+
/* optional, saves extra locking for removal in tw handler */
if (mask && poll->events & EPOLLONESHOT) {
list_del_init(&poll->wait.entry);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 04/71] nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/71] io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/71] nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Guenter Roeck, Klaus Jensen,
Christoph Hellwig, Sasha Levin
From: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
[ Upstream commit b5f96cb719d8ba220b565ddd3ba4ac0d8bcfb130 ]
When using shadow doorbells, the event index and the doorbell values are
written to host memory. Prior to this patch, the values written would
erroneously be written in host endianness. This causes trouble on
big-endian platforms. Fix this by adding missing endian conversions.
This issue was noticed by Guenter while testing various big-endian
platforms under QEMU[1]. A similar fix required for hw/nvme in QEMU is
up for review as well[2].
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20221209110022.GA3396194@roeck-us.net/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20221212114409.34972-4-its@irrelevant.dk/
Fixes: f9f38e33389c ("nvme: improve performance for virtual NVMe devices")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
index 488ad7dabeb8..4ed8a14e2803 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ struct nvme_dev {
mempool_t *iod_mempool;
/* shadow doorbell buffer support: */
- u32 *dbbuf_dbs;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_dbs;
dma_addr_t dbbuf_dbs_dma_addr;
- u32 *dbbuf_eis;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_eis;
dma_addr_t dbbuf_eis_dma_addr;
/* host memory buffer support: */
@@ -210,10 +210,10 @@ struct nvme_queue {
#define NVMEQ_SQ_CMB 1
#define NVMEQ_DELETE_ERROR 2
#define NVMEQ_POLLED 3
- u32 *dbbuf_sq_db;
- u32 *dbbuf_cq_db;
- u32 *dbbuf_sq_ei;
- u32 *dbbuf_cq_ei;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_sq_db;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_cq_db;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_sq_ei;
+ __le32 *dbbuf_cq_ei;
struct completion delete_done;
};
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ static inline int nvme_dbbuf_need_event(u16 event_idx, u16 new_idx, u16 old)
}
/* Update dbbuf and return true if an MMIO is required */
-static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
- volatile u32 *dbbuf_ei)
+static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db,
+ volatile __le32 *dbbuf_ei)
{
if (dbbuf_db) {
- u16 old_value;
+ u16 old_value, event_idx;
/*
* Ensure that the queue is written before updating
@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
*/
wmb();
- old_value = *dbbuf_db;
- *dbbuf_db = value;
+ old_value = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_db);
+ *dbbuf_db = cpu_to_le32(value);
/*
* Ensure that the doorbell is updated before reading the event
@@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
*/
mb();
- if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(*dbbuf_ei, value, old_value))
+ event_idx = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_ei);
+ if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(event_idx, value, old_value))
return false;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 05/71] nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/71] nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/71] nvme-pci: fix page size checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jens Axboe, Keith Busch,
Kanchan Joshi, Chaitanya Kulkarni, Christoph Hellwig, Sasha Levin
From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c89a529e823d51dd23c7ec0c047c7a454a428541 ]
Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that
calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries.
The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The
code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the
worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the
size provided by the mempool.
While unlikely to occur (you'd need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments
on a queue that doesn't support SGLs), this memory corruption has been
observed by kfence.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Fixes: 943e942e6266f ("nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations")
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
index 4ed8a14e2803..3116a0e2ec27 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
@@ -378,8 +378,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db,
*/
static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
{
- unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_KB_SZ + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE,
- NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
+ unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE;
+ unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8);
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 06/71] nvme-pci: fix page size checks
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/71] nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on XMG Core 15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Keith Busch, Christoph Hellwig,
Sasha Levin
From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 841734234a28fd5cd0889b84bd4d93a0988fa11e ]
The size allocated out of the dma pool is at most NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE,
which may be smaller than the PAGE_SIZE.
Fixes: c61b82c7b7134 ("nvme-pci: fix PRP pool size")
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
index 3116a0e2ec27..115d81def567 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#define SQ_SIZE(q) ((q)->q_depth << (q)->sqes)
#define CQ_SIZE(q) ((q)->q_depth * sizeof(struct nvme_completion))
-#define SGES_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc))
+#define SGES_PER_PAGE (NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc))
/*
* These can be higher, but we need to ensure that any command doesn't
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
{
unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE;
unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
- return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8);
+ return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE - 8);
}
/*
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
static int nvme_pci_npages_sgl(void)
{
return DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_SEGS * sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc),
- PAGE_SIZE);
+ NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
}
static size_t nvme_pci_iod_alloc_size(void)
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static void nvme_pci_sgl_set_seg(struct nvme_sgl_desc *sge,
sge->length = cpu_to_le32(entries * sizeof(*sge));
sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_LAST_SEG_DESC << 4;
} else {
- sge->length = cpu_to_le32(PAGE_SIZE);
+ sge->length = cpu_to_le32(NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_SEG_DESC << 4;
}
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 07/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on XMG Core 15
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/71] nvme-pci: fix page size checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Erik Schumacher, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Sasha Levin
From: Erik Schumacher <ofenfisch@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 7592b79ba4a91350b38469e05238308bcfe1019b ]
The Schenker XMG CORE 15 (M22) is Ryzen-6 based and needs IRQ overriding
for the keyboard to work. Adding an entry for this laptop to the
override_table makes the internal keyboard functional again.
Signed-off-by: Erik Schumacher <ofenfisch@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: f3cb9b740869 ("ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/acpi/resource.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/resource.c b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
index f27914aedbd5..037d1aa10357 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
@@ -446,6 +446,17 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id lenovo_82ra[] = {
{ }
};
+static const struct dmi_system_id schenker_gm_rg[] = {
+ {
+ .ident = "XMG CORE 15 (M22)",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GMxRGxx"),
+ },
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
struct irq_override_cmp {
const struct dmi_system_id *system;
unsigned char irq;
@@ -460,6 +471,7 @@ static const struct irq_override_cmp override_table[] = {
{ asus_laptop, 1, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, false },
{ lenovo_82ra, 6, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
{ lenovo_82ra, 10, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
+ { schenker_gm_rg, 1, ACPI_EDGE_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 1, true },
};
static bool acpi_dev_irq_override(u32 gsi, u8 triggering, u8 polarity,
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 08/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on XMG Core 15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/71] ACPI: resource: Add Asus ExpertBook B2502 to Asus quirks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Adrian Freund, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Sasha Levin
From: Adrian Freund <adrian@freund.io>
[ Upstream commit f3cb9b740869712d448edf3b9ef5952b847caf8b ]
Commit bfcdf58380b1 ("ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on LENOVO IdeaPad")
added an override for Lenovo IdeaPad 5 16ALC7. The 14ALC7 variant also
suffers from a broken touchscreen and trackpad.
Fixes: 9946e39fe8d0 ("ACPI: resource: skip IRQ override on AMD Zen platforms")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216804
Signed-off-by: Adrian Freund <adrian@freund.io>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/acpi/resource.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/resource.c b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
index 037d1aa10357..d0c92422e206 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
@@ -435,7 +435,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id asus_laptop[] = {
{ }
};
-static const struct dmi_system_id lenovo_82ra[] = {
+static const struct dmi_system_id lenovo_laptop[] = {
+ {
+ .ident = "LENOVO IdeaPad Flex 5 14ALC7",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "82R9"),
+ },
+ },
{
.ident = "LENOVO IdeaPad Flex 5 16ALC7",
.matches = {
@@ -469,8 +476,8 @@ struct irq_override_cmp {
static const struct irq_override_cmp override_table[] = {
{ medion_laptop, 1, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, false },
{ asus_laptop, 1, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, false },
- { lenovo_82ra, 6, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
- { lenovo_82ra, 10, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
+ { lenovo_laptop, 6, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
+ { lenovo_laptop, 10, ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 0, true },
{ schenker_gm_rg, 1, ACPI_EDGE_SENSITIVE, ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW, 1, true },
};
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 09/71] ACPI: resource: Add Asus ExpertBook B2502 to Asus quirks
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/71] ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/71] ACPI: video: Fix Apple GMUX backlight detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hans de Goede, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Sasha Levin
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 7203481fd12b1257938519efb2460ea02b9236ee ]
The Asus ExpertBook B2502 has the same keyboard issue as Asus Vivobook
K3402ZA/K3502ZA. The kernel overrides IRQ 1 to Edge_High when it
should be Active_Low.
This patch adds the ExpertBook B2502 model to the existing
quirk list of Asus laptops with this issue.
Fixes: b5f9223a105d ("ACPI: resource: Skip IRQ override on Asus Vivobook S5602ZA")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142574
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/acpi/resource.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/resource.c b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
index d0c92422e206..16dcd31d124f 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
@@ -432,6 +432,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id asus_laptop[] = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "S5602ZA"),
},
},
+ {
+ .ident = "Asus ExpertBook B2502",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "B2502CBA"),
+ },
+ },
{ }
};
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 10/71] ACPI: video: Fix Apple GMUX backlight detection
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/71] ACPI: resource: Add Asus ExpertBook B2502 to Asus quirks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/71] block, bfq: fix uaf for bfqq in bfq_exit_icq_bfqq Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hans de Goede, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Sasha Levin, Aditya Garg
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 3cf3b7f012f3ea8bdc56196e367cf07c10424855 ]
The apple-gmux driver only binds to old GMUX devices which have an
IORESOURCE_IO resource (using inb()/outb()) rather then memory-mapped
IO (IORESOURCE_MEM).
T2 MacBooks use the new style GMUX devices (with IORESOURCE_MEM access),
so these are not supported by the apple-gmux driver. This is not a problem
since they have working ACPI video backlight support.
But the apple_gmux_present() helper only checks if an ACPI device with
the "APP000B" HID is present, causing acpi_video_get_backlight_type()
to return acpi_backlight_apple_gmux disabling the acpi_video backlight
device.
Add a new apple_gmux_backlight_present() helper which checks that
the "APP000B" device actually is an old GMUX device with an IORESOURCE_IO
resource.
This fixes the acpi_video0 backlight no longer registering on T2 MacBooks.
Note people are working to add support for the new style GMUX to Linux:
https://github.com/kekrby/linux-t2/commits/wip/hybrid-graphics
Once this lands this patch should be reverted so that
acpi_video_get_backlight_type() also prefers the gmux on new style GMUX
MacBooks, but for now this is necessary to avoid regressing backlight
control on T2 Macs.
Fixes: 21245df307cb ("ACPI: video: Add Apple GMUX brightness control detection")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
index ffa19d418847..13f10fbcd7f0 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/platform_data/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.h>
+#include <linux/pnp.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <acpi/video.h>
@@ -105,6 +106,26 @@ static bool nvidia_wmi_ec_supported(void)
}
#endif
+static bool apple_gmux_backlight_present(void)
+{
+ struct acpi_device *adev;
+ struct device *dev;
+
+ adev = acpi_dev_get_first_match_dev(GMUX_ACPI_HID, NULL, -1);
+ if (!adev)
+ return false;
+
+ dev = acpi_get_first_physical_node(adev);
+ if (!dev)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * drivers/platform/x86/apple-gmux.c only supports old style
+ * Apple GMUX with an IO-resource.
+ */
+ return pnp_get_resource(to_pnp_dev(dev), IORESOURCE_IO, 0) != NULL;
+}
+
/* Force to use vendor driver when the ACPI device is known to be
* buggy */
static int video_detect_force_vendor(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
@@ -755,7 +776,7 @@ static enum acpi_backlight_type __acpi_video_get_backlight_type(bool native)
if (nvidia_wmi_ec_present)
return acpi_backlight_nvidia_wmi_ec;
- if (apple_gmux_present())
+ if (apple_gmux_backlight_present())
return acpi_backlight_apple_gmux;
/* Chromebooks should always prefer native backlight control. */
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 11/71] block, bfq: fix uaf for bfqq in bfq_exit_icq_bfqq
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/71] ACPI: video: Fix Apple GMUX backlight detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/71] ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yi Zhang, Yu Kuai, Jens Axboe,
Sasha Levin
From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 246cf66e300b76099b5dbd3fdd39e9a5dbc53f02 ]
Commit 64dc8c732f5c ("block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'")
will access 'bic->bfqq' in bic_set_bfqq(), however, bfq_exit_icq_bfqq()
can free bfqq first, and then call bic_set_bfqq(), which will cause uaf.
Fix the problem by moving bfq_exit_bfqq() behind bic_set_bfqq().
Fixes: 64dc8c732f5c ("block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'")
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221226030605.1437081-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
block/bfq-iosched.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
index 3e3bd1a46646..7b894df32e32 100644
--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
+++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
@@ -5383,8 +5383,8 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
- bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync);
+ bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
}
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 12/71] ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/71] block, bfq: fix uaf for bfqq in bfq_exit_icq_bfqq Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/71] nvme: fix the NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Adam Vodopjan, Damien Le Moal,
Sasha Levin
From: Adam Vodopjan <grozzly@protonmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 37e14e4f3715428b809e4df9a9958baa64c77d51 ]
Since kernel 5.3.4 my laptop (ICH8M controller) does not see Kingston
SV300S37A60G SSD disk connected into a SATA connector on wake from
suspend. The problem was introduced in c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop
PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond"): the quirk is not applied on wake
from suspend as it originally was.
It is worth to mention the commit contained another bug: the quirk is
not applied at all to controllers which require it. The fix commit
09d6ac8dc51a ("libata/ahci: Fix PCS quirk application") landed in 5.3.8.
So testing my patch anywhere between commits c312ef176399 and
09d6ac8dc51a is pointless.
Not all disks trigger the problem. For example nothing bad happens with
Western Digital WD5000LPCX HDD.
Test hardware:
- Acer 5920G with ICH8M SATA controller
- sda: some SATA HDD connnected into the DVD drive IDE port with a
SATA-IDE caddy. It is a boot disk
- sdb: Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD connected into the only SATA port
Sample "dmesg --notime | grep -E '^(sd |ata)'" output on wake:
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Starting disk
ata4: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:0c:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:42:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1: FORCE: cable set to 80c
ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3.00: disabled
sd 2:0:0:0: rejecting I/O to offline device
ata3.00: detaching (SCSI 2:0:0:0)
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_NO_CONNECT
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronize Cache(10) failed: Result:
hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Stopping disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
Commit c312ef176399 dropped ahci_pci_reset_controller() which internally
calls ahci_reset_controller() and applies the PCS quirk if needed after
that. It was called each time a reset was required instead of just
ahci_reset_controller(). This patch puts the function back in place.
Fixes: c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond")
Signed-off-by: Adam Vodopjan <grozzly@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/ata/ahci.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/ata/ahci.c b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
index 639de2d75d63..53ab2306da00 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/ahci.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ enum board_ids {
static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
static void ahci_remove_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
static void ahci_shutdown_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
+static void ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv);
static int ahci_vt8251_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
unsigned long deadline);
static int ahci_avn_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
@@ -677,6 +678,25 @@ static void ahci_pci_save_initial_config(struct pci_dev *pdev,
ahci_save_initial_config(&pdev->dev, hpriv);
}
+static int ahci_pci_reset_controller(struct ata_host *host)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(host->dev);
+ struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
+ * them here.
+ */
+ ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void ahci_pci_init_controller(struct ata_host *host)
{
struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
@@ -871,7 +891,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
struct ata_host *host = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
int rc;
- rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+ rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
if (rc)
return rc;
ahci_pci_init_controller(host);
@@ -907,7 +927,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_resume(struct device *dev)
ahci_mcp89_apple_enable(pdev);
if (pdev->dev.power.power_state.event == PM_EVENT_SUSPEND) {
- rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+ rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1785,12 +1805,6 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
/* save initial config */
ahci_pci_save_initial_config(pdev, hpriv);
- /*
- * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
- * them here.
- */
- ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
-
/* prepare host */
if (hpriv->cap & HOST_CAP_NCQ) {
pi.flags |= ATA_FLAG_NCQ;
@@ -1900,7 +1914,7 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+ rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 13/71] nvme: fix the NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK definition
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/71] ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/71] nvmet: dont defer passthrough commands with trivial effects to the workqueue Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christoph Hellwig, Keith Busch,
Sagi Grimberg, Kanchan Joshi, Sasha Levin
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[ Upstream commit 685e6311637e46f3212439ce2789f8a300e5050f ]
3 << 16 does not generate the correct mask for bits 16, 17 and 18.
Use the GENMASK macro to generate the correct mask instead.
Fixes: 84fef62d135b ("nvme: check admin passthru command effects")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/nvme.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme.h b/include/linux/nvme.h
index 050d7d0cd81b..d9fbc5afeaf7 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_NVME_H
#define _LINUX_NVME_H
+#include <linux/bits.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
@@ -639,7 +640,7 @@ enum {
NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_NCC = 1 << 2,
NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_NIC = 1 << 3,
NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CCC = 1 << 4,
- NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK = 3 << 16,
+ NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK = GENMASK(18, 16),
NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_UUID_SEL = 1 << 19,
};
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 14/71] nvmet: dont defer passthrough commands with trivial effects to the workqueue
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/71] nvme: fix the NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christoph Hellwig, Keith Busch,
Sagi Grimberg, Kanchan Joshi, Sasha Levin
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[ Upstream commit 2a459f6933e1c459bffb7cc73fd6c900edc714bd ]
Mask out the "Command Supported" and "Logical Block Content Change" bits
and only defer execution of commands that have non-trivial effects to
the workqueue for synchronous execution. This allows to execute admin
commands asynchronously on controllers that provide a Command Supported
and Effects log page, and will keep allowing to execute Write commands
asynchronously once command effects on I/O commands are taken into
account.
Fixes: c1fef73f793b ("nvmet: add passthru code to process commands")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
index 79af5140af8b..adc0958755d6 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
@@ -334,14 +334,13 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd(struct nvmet_req *req)
}
/*
- * If there are effects for the command we are about to execute, or
- * an end_req function we need to use nvme_execute_passthru_rq()
- * synchronously in a work item seeing the end_req function and
- * nvme_passthru_end() can't be called in the request done callback
- * which is typically in interrupt context.
+ * If a command needs post-execution fixups, or there are any
+ * non-trivial effects, make sure to execute the command synchronously
+ * in a workqueue so that nvme_passthru_end gets called.
*/
effects = nvme_command_effects(ctrl, ns, req->cmd->common.opcode);
- if (req->p.use_workqueue || effects) {
+ if (req->p.use_workqueue ||
+ (effects & ~(NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSUPP | NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_LBCC))) {
INIT_WORK(&req->p.work, nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd_work);
req->p.rq = rq;
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &req->p.work);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 15/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/71] nvmet: dont defer passthrough commands with trivial effects to the workqueue Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 16/71] fs/ntfs3: Add overflow check for attribute size Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, edward lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 0b66046266690454dc04e6307bcff4a5605b42a1 ]
When the NTFS BOOT record_size field < 0, it represents a
shift value. However, there is no sanity check on the shift result
and the sbi->record_bits calculation through blksize_bits() assumes
the size always > 256, which could lead to NPD while mounting a
malformed NTFS image.
[ 318.675159] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158
[ 318.675682] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 318.675869] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 318.676246] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 318.676502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 318.676934] CPU: 0 PID: 259 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0 #5
[ 318.677289] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 318.678136] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0
[ 318.678656] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180
[ 318.679848] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 318.680104] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080
[ 318.680790] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 318.681679] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 318.682577] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080
[ 318.683015] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 318.683618] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 318.684280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 318.684651] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 318.685623] Call Trace:
[ 318.686607] <TASK>
[ 318.686872] ? ntfs_alloc_inode+0x1a/0x60
[ 318.687235] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x2b/0xa0
[ 318.687468] mi_read+0xbb/0x250
[ 318.687576] ntfs_iget5+0x114/0xd90
[ 318.687750] ntfs_fill_super+0x588/0x11b0
[ 318.687953] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130
[ 318.688065] ? snprintf+0x49/0x70
[ 318.688164] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130
[ 318.688256] get_tree_bdev+0x16a/0x260
[ 318.688407] vfs_get_tree+0x20/0xb0
[ 318.688519] path_mount+0x2dc/0x9b0
[ 318.688877] do_mount+0x74/0x90
[ 318.689142] __x64_sys_mount+0x89/0xd0
[ 318.689636] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 318.689998] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 318.690318] RIP: 0033:0x7fd9e133c48a
[ 318.690687] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 318.691357] RSP: 002b:00007ffd374406c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 318.691632] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564d0b051080 RCX: 00007fd9e133c48a
[ 318.691920] RDX: 0000564d0b051280 RSI: 0000564d0b051300 RDI: 0000564d0b0596a0
[ 318.692123] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564d0b0512a0 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 318.692349] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564d0b0596a0
[ 318.692673] R13: 0000564d0b051280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 318.693007] </TASK>
[ 318.693271] Modules linked in:
[ 318.693614] CR2: 0000000000000158
[ 318.694446] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 318.694779] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0
[ 318.694952] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180
[ 318.696042] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 318.696531] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080
[ 318.698114] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 318.699286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 318.699795] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080
[ 318.700236] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 318.700973] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 318.701688] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 318.702190] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 318.726510] mount (259) used greatest stack depth: 13320 bytes left
This patch adds a sanity check.
Signed-off-by: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index adc4f73722b7..a0cea3b7526e 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static int ntfs_init_from_boot(struct super_block *sb, u32 sector_size,
: (u32)boot->record_size
<< sbi->cluster_bits;
- if (record_size > MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_MFT)
+ if (record_size > MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_MFT || record_size < SECTOR_SIZE)
goto out;
sbi->record_bits = blksize_bits(record_size);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 16/71] fs/ntfs3: Add overflow check for attribute size
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 17/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, edward lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit e19c6277652efba203af4ecd8eed4bd30a0054c9 ]
The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an
attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT
attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to
access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize)
[ 32.963847] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff956a83c76067
[ 32.964301] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 32.964526] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 32.964893] PGD 4dc01067 P4D 4dc01067 PUD 0
[ 32.965316] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 32.965727] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #6
[ 32.966050] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 32.966628] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[ 32.967239] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[ 32.968101] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[ 32.968364] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[ 32.968651] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 32.968963] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[ 32.969249] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[ 32.969870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[ 32.970655] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 32.971098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 32.971378] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 32.972098] Call Trace:
[ 32.972842] <TASK>
[ 32.973341] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xda/0xf0
[ 32.974087] ntfs_iget5+0x1db/0xde0
[ 32.974386] ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x270
[ 32.974778] ? ntfs_fill_super+0x4c7/0x12a0
[ 32.975115] ntfs_fill_super+0x5d6/0x12a0
[ 32.975336] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x270
[ 32.975709] ? put_ntfs+0x150/0x150
[ 32.975956] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 32.976191] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0
[ 32.976374] ? capable+0x19/0x20
[ 32.976572] path_mount+0x484/0xaa0
[ 32.977025] ? putname+0x57/0x70
[ 32.977380] do_mount+0x80/0xa0
[ 32.977555] __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
[ 32.978105] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 32.978830] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 32.979311] RIP: 0033:0x7fdab72e948a
[ 32.980015] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 32.981251] RSP: 002b:00007ffd15b87588 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 32.981832] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557de0aaf060 RCX: 00007fdab72e948a
[ 32.982234] RDX: 0000557de0aaf260 RSI: 0000557de0aaf2e0 RDI: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[ 32.982714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557de0aaf280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 32.983046] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[ 32.983494] R13: 0000557de0aaf260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 32.984094] </TASK>
[ 32.984352] Modules linked in:
[ 32.984753] CR2: ffff956a83c76067
[ 32.985911] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 32.986555] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[ 32.987217] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[ 32.988232] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[ 32.988532] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[ 32.988916] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 32.989356] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[ 32.989994] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[ 32.990415] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[ 32.991011] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 32.991524] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 32.991936] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
This patch adds an overflow check
Signed-off-by: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/record.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/record.c b/fs/ntfs3/record.c
index 7d2fac5ee215..9f81944441ae 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/record.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/record.c
@@ -220,6 +220,11 @@ struct ATTRIB *mi_enum_attr(struct mft_inode *mi, struct ATTRIB *attr)
return NULL;
}
+ if (off + asize < off) {
+ /* overflow check */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
attr = Add2Ptr(attr, asize);
off += asize;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 17/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 16/71] fs/ntfs3: Add overflow check for attribute size Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 18/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to attr_load_runs_vcn Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 6db620863f8528ed9a9aa5ad323b26554a17881d ]
This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data
run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may
encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors.
[ 82.940342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.941180] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888008a8487f by task mount/240
[ 82.941670]
[ 82.942069] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #15
[ 82.942482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 82.943720] Call Trace:
[ 82.944204] <TASK>
[ 82.944471] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 82.944908] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x67b
[ 82.945141] ? __wait_on_bit+0x106/0x120
[ 82.945750] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.946626] kasan_report+0xa7/0x120
[ 82.947046] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.947280] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60
[ 82.947483] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.947709] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x70
[ 82.947927] ? run_pack+0x7a0/0x7a0
[ 82.948158] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3f0
[ 82.948399] ? mi_enum_attr+0x14a/0x200
[ 82.948717] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570
[ 82.949072] ? ni_enum_attr_ex+0x1b2/0x1c0
[ 82.949332] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0
[ 82.949611] ? mi_read+0x262/0x2c0
[ 82.949970] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180
[ 82.950249] ntfs_iget5+0x632/0x1870
[ 82.950621] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 82.951192] ? evict+0x223/0x280
[ 82.951525] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 82.951969] ntfs_fill_super+0x1321/0x1e20
[ 82.952436] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 82.952822] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 82.953188] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 82.953379] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 82.954001] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 82.954438] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 82.954700] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 82.955049] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 82.955292] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0
[ 82.955615] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 82.955955] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 82.956310] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390
[ 82.956723] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 82.957023] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 82.957411] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0
[ 82.957638] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 82.957948] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 82.958310] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 82.958719] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 82.959341] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0d1ce948a
[ 82.960193] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 82.961532] RSP: 002b:00007ffe59ff69a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 82.962527] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564dcc107060 RCX: 00007fd0d1ce948a
[ 82.963266] RDX: 0000564dcc107260 RSI: 0000564dcc1072e0 RDI: 0000564dcc10fce0
[ 82.963686] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564dcc107280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 82.964272] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564dcc10fce0
[ 82.964785] R13: 0000564dcc107260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/attrib.c | 13 +++++++++++++
fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c | 5 +++++
fs/ntfs3/frecord.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 9 +++++++++
fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 5 +++++
5 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
index 71f870d497ae..0d354560d323 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static int attr_load_runs(struct ATTRIB *attr, struct ntfs_inode *ni,
asize = le32_to_cpu(attr->size);
run_off = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+
+ if (run_off > asize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err = run_unpack_ex(run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn,
vcn ? *vcn : svcn, Add2Ptr(attr, run_off),
asize - run_off);
@@ -1232,6 +1236,10 @@ int attr_load_runs_vcn(struct ntfs_inode *ni, enum ATTR_TYPE type,
}
ro = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+
+ if (ro > le32_to_cpu(attr->size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err = run_unpack_ex(run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, ro), le32_to_cpu(attr->size) - ro);
if (err < 0)
@@ -1901,6 +1909,11 @@ int attr_collapse_range(struct ntfs_inode *ni, u64 vbo, u64 bytes)
u16 le_sz;
u16 roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+ if (roff > le32_to_cpu(attr->size)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
run_unpack_ex(RUN_DEALLOCATE, sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn,
evcn1 - 1, svcn, Add2Ptr(attr, roff),
le32_to_cpu(attr->size) - roff);
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c b/fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c
index bad6d8a849a2..c0c6bcbc8c05 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ int ntfs_load_attr_list(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct ATTRIB *attr)
run_init(&ni->attr_list.run);
+ if (run_off > le32_to_cpu(attr->size)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
err = run_unpack_ex(&ni->attr_list.run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno,
0, le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn), 0,
Add2Ptr(attr, run_off),
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c
index 381a38a06ec2..b1b476fb7229 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c
@@ -568,6 +568,12 @@ static int ni_repack(struct ntfs_inode *ni)
}
roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+
+ if (roff > le32_to_cpu(attr->size)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
err = run_unpack(&run, sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, roff),
le32_to_cpu(attr->size) - roff);
@@ -1589,6 +1595,9 @@ int ni_delete_all(struct ntfs_inode *ni)
asize = le32_to_cpu(attr->size);
roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+ if (roff > asize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* run==1 means unpack and deallocate. */
run_unpack_ex(RUN_DEALLOCATE, sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, roff), asize - roff);
@@ -2291,6 +2300,11 @@ int ni_decompress_file(struct ntfs_inode *ni)
asize = le32_to_cpu(attr->size);
roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+ if (roff > asize) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*run==1 Means unpack and deallocate. */
run_unpack_ex(RUN_DEALLOCATE, sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, roff), asize - roff);
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
index 0d611a6c5511..a85f5411aa74 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
@@ -2727,6 +2727,9 @@ static inline bool check_attr(const struct MFT_REC *rec,
return false;
}
+ if (run_off > asize)
+ return false;
+
if (run_unpack(NULL, sbi, 0, svcn, evcn, svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, run_off), asize - run_off) < 0) {
return false;
@@ -4771,6 +4774,12 @@ int log_replay(struct ntfs_inode *ni, bool *initialized)
u16 roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
CLST svcn = le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.svcn);
+ if (roff > t32) {
+ kfree(oa->attr);
+ oa->attr = NULL;
+ goto fake_attr;
+ }
+
err = run_unpack(&oa->run0, sbi, inode->i_ino, svcn,
le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn), svcn,
Add2Ptr(attr, roff), t32 - roff);
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
index d5a3afbbbfd8..b0bc9dee2e2b 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
@@ -364,6 +364,11 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode,
attr_unpack_run:
roff = le16_to_cpu(attr->nres.run_off);
+ if (roff > asize) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
t64 = le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.svcn);
err = run_unpack_ex(run, sbi, ino, t64, le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn),
t64, Add2Ptr(attr, roff), asize - roff);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 18/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to attr_load_runs_vcn
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 17/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 19/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak on ntfs_fill_super() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 2681631c29739509eec59cc0b34e977bb04c6cf1 ]
Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer
check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these
metadata files for a malformed NTFS image.
[ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158
[ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ #17
[ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300
[ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f
[ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286
[ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a
[ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60
[ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed
[ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000
[ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 240.200839] Call Trace:
[ 240.201104] <TASK>
[ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830
[ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90
[ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250
[ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0
[ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140
[ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190
[ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90
[ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0
[ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300
[ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180
[ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870
[ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20
[ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0
[ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390
[ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0
[ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a
[ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a
[ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0
[ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0
[ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 240.221256] </TASK>
[ 240.221567] Modules linked in:
[ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158
[ 240.223291] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300
[ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f
[ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286
[ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a
[ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60
[ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed
[ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000
[ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/attrib.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
index 0d354560d323..578c2bcfb1d9 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c
@@ -1221,6 +1221,11 @@ int attr_load_runs_vcn(struct ntfs_inode *ni, enum ATTR_TYPE type,
CLST svcn, evcn;
u16 ro;
+ if (!ni) {
+ /* Is record corrupted? */
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
attr = ni_find_attr(ni, NULL, NULL, type, name, name_len, &vcn, NULL);
if (!attr) {
/* Is record corrupted? */
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 19/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak on ntfs_fill_super() error path
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 18/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to attr_load_runs_vcn Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 20/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check for inode operations Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+9d67170b20e8f94351c8,
Shigeru Yoshida, Konstantin Komarov, Sasha Levin
From: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 51e76a232f8c037f1d9e9922edc25b003d5f3414 ]
syzbot reported kmemleak as below:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880122f1540 (size 32):
comm "a.out", pid 6664, jiffies 4294939771 (age 25.500s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ed ff ed ff 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b16052>] ntfs_init_fs_context+0x22/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8164aaa7>] alloc_fs_context+0x217/0x430
[<ffffffff81626dd4>] path_mount+0x704/0x1080
[<ffffffff81627e7c>] __x64_sys_mount+0x18c/0x1d0
[<ffffffff84593e14>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[<ffffffff84600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
This patch fixes this issue by freeing mount options on error path of
ntfs_fill_super().
Reported-by: syzbot+9d67170b20e8f94351c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/super.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index a0cea3b7526e..170682c2bf67 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -1281,6 +1281,7 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
* Free resources here.
* ntfs_fs_free will be called with fc->s_fs_info = NULL
*/
+ put_mount_options(sbi->options);
put_ntfs(sbi);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 20/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check for inode operations
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 19/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak on ntfs_fill_super() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 21/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate attribute name offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit c1ca8ef0262b25493631ecbd9cb8c9893e1481a1 ]
This adds a sanity check for the i_op pointer of the inode which is
returned after reading Root directory MFT record. We should check the
i_op is valid before trying to create the root dentry, otherwise we may
encounter a NPD while mounting a image with a funny Root directory MFT
record.
[ 114.484325] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 114.484811] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 114.485084] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 114.485606] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 114.485975] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 114.486570] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 6.0.0-rc4 #28
[ 114.486977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 114.488169] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110
[ 114.488816] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241
[ 114.490326] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296
[ 114.490695] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea
[ 114.490986] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020
[ 114.491364] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05
[ 114.491675] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 114.491954] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750
[ 114.492397] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 114.492797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 114.493150] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 114.493671] Call Trace:
[ 114.493890] <TASK>
[ 114.494075] __d_instantiate+0x24/0x1c0
[ 114.494505] d_instantiate.part.0+0x35/0x50
[ 114.494754] d_make_root+0x53/0x80
[ 114.494998] ntfs_fill_super+0x1232/0x1b50
[ 114.495260] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 114.495499] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 114.495723] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 114.495964] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 114.496272] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 114.496502] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 114.496859] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 114.497099] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 114.497507] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 114.497933] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 114.498362] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 114.498571] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 114.498819] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 114.499069] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 114.499343] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 114.499683] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 114.500133] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 114.500592] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 114.500930] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 114.501294] RIP: 0033:0x7fdc898e948a
[ 114.501542] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 114.502716] RSP: 002b:00007ffd793e58f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 114.503175] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564b2228f060 RCX: 00007fdc898e948a
[ 114.503588] RDX: 0000564b2228f260 RSI: 0000564b2228f2e0 RDI: 0000564b22297ce0
[ 114.504925] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564b2228f280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 114.505484] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564b22297ce0
[ 114.505823] R13: 0000564b2228f260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 114.506562] </TASK>
[ 114.506887] Modules linked in:
[ 114.507648] CR2: 0000000000000008
[ 114.508884] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 114.509675] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110
[ 114.510140] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241
[ 114.511762] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296
[ 114.512401] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea
[ 114.513103] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020
[ 114.513512] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05
[ 114.513831] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 114.514757] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750
[ 114.515411] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 114.515794] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 114.516208] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index 170682c2bf67..94f9e4b775a7 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -1260,9 +1260,9 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
ref.low = cpu_to_le32(MFT_REC_ROOT);
ref.seq = cpu_to_le16(MFT_REC_ROOT);
inode = ntfs_iget5(sb, &ref, &NAME_ROOT);
- if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
+ if (IS_ERR(inode) || !inode->i_op) {
ntfs_err(sb, "Failed to load root.");
- err = PTR_ERR(inode);
+ err = IS_ERR(inode) ? PTR_ERR(inode) : -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 21/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate attribute name offset
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 20/71] fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check for inode operations Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 22/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate buffer length while parsing index Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 4f1dc7d9756e66f3f876839ea174df2e656b7f79 ]
Although the attribute name length is checked before comparing it to
some common names (e.g., $I30), the offset isn't. This adds a sanity
check for the attribute name offset, guarantee the validity and prevent
possible out-of-bound memory accesses.
[ 191.720056] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000008
[ 191.721060] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 191.721586] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 191.722079] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 191.722571] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 191.723179] CPU: 0 PID: 244 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #28
[ 191.723749] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 191.724832] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0
[ 191.725870] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069
[ 191.727375] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286
[ 191.727897] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9
[ 191.728531] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040
[ 191.729183] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 191.729628] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040
[ 191.730158] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0
[ 191.730645] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 191.731328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 191.731667] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 191.732568] Call Trace:
[ 191.733231] <TASK>
[ 191.733860] kvfree+0x2c/0x40
[ 191.734632] ni_clear+0x180/0x290
[ 191.735085] ntfs_evict_inode+0x45/0x70
[ 191.735495] evict+0x199/0x280
[ 191.735996] iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 191.736438] iput+0x32/0x50
[ 191.736811] iget_failed+0x23/0x30
[ 191.737270] ntfs_iget5+0x337/0x1890
[ 191.737629] ? ntfs_clear_mft_tail+0x20/0x260
[ 191.738201] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 191.738482] ? ntfs_objid_init+0xf6/0x140
[ 191.738779] ? ntfs_reparse_init+0x140/0x140
[ 191.739266] ntfs_fill_super+0x121b/0x1b50
[ 191.739623] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 191.739984] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
[ 191.740466] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 191.740787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6a/0x80
[ 191.741272] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 191.741829] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 191.742669] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 191.743132] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 191.743457] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 191.743938] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 191.744271] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 191.744582] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 191.745053] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 191.745403] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 191.745616] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 191.745887] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 191.746287] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 191.746582] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 191.746850] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 191.747122] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 191.747517] RIP: 0033:0x7f351fee948a
[ 191.748332] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 191.749341] RSP: 002b:00007ffd51cf3af8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 191.749960] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b903733060 RCX: 00007f351fee948a
[ 191.750589] RDX: 000055b903733260 RSI: 000055b9037332e0 RDI: 000055b90373bce0
[ 191.751115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b903733280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 191.751537] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055b90373bce0
[ 191.751946] R13: 000055b903733260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 191.752519] </TASK>
[ 191.752782] Modules linked in:
[ 191.753785] CR2: ffffebde00000008
[ 191.754937] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 191.755429] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0
[ 191.755725] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069
[ 191.756744] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286
[ 191.757218] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9
[ 191.757580] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040
[ 191.758016] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 191.758570] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040
[ 191.758957] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0
[ 191.759317] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 191.759711] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 191.760118] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
index b0bc9dee2e2b..c18bedaf228d 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode,
rsize = attr->non_res ? 0 : le32_to_cpu(attr->res.data_size);
asize = le32_to_cpu(attr->size);
+ if (le16_to_cpu(attr->name_off) + attr->name_len > asize)
+ goto out;
+
switch (attr->type) {
case ATTR_STD:
if (attr->non_res ||
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 22/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate buffer length while parsing index
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 21/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate attribute name offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 23/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate resident attribute name Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 4d42ecda239cc13738d6fd84d098a32e67b368b9 ]
indx_read is called when we have some NTFS directory operations that
need more information from the index buffers. This adds a sanity check
to make sure the returned index buffer length is legit, or we may have
some out-of-bound memory accesses.
[ 560.897595] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.898321] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888009497238 by task exp/245
[ 560.898760]
[ 560.899129] CPU: 0 PID: 245 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37
[ 560.899505] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 560.900170] Call Trace:
[ 560.900407] <TASK>
[ 560.900732] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 560.901108] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 560.901395] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.901716] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 560.901950] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.902208] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90
[ 560.902427] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.902846] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0
[ 560.903363] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90
[ 560.903883] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190
[ 560.904196] ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x750/0x750
[ 560.904969] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0xe0/0x130
[ 560.905259] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.905599] ? up_read+0x1a/0x90
[ 560.905853] ? indx_read+0x22c/0x380
[ 560.906096] indx_find+0x2ef/0x470
[ 560.906352] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 560.906692] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 560.906977] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 560.907220] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450
[ 560.907464] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.907747] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0
[ 560.907970] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20
[ 560.908214] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0
[ 560.908459] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100
[ 560.908788] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220
[ 560.909050] ? lookup_fast+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 560.909309] ? lookup_fast+0x13f/0x1b0
[ 560.909601] walk_component+0x187/0x230
[ 560.909944] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660
[ 560.910285] ? handle_lookup_down+0x90/0x90
[ 560.910618] ? path_init+0x642/0x6e0
[ 560.911084] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x6e/0xf0
[ 560.912559] ? __alloc_file+0x114/0x170
[ 560.913008] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10
[ 560.913419] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0
[ 560.913815] ? kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x50
[ 560.914125] ? kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 560.914542] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90
[ 560.914924] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0
[ 560.915339] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0
[ 560.915647] ? getname+0x12/0x20
[ 560.916114] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.916460] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x230/0x230
[ 560.916867] ? __isolate_free_page+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 560.917194] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 560.917448] ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 560.917696] ? expand_files+0xa4/0x3a0
[ 560.917923] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.918185] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xdb
[ 560.918409] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100
[ 560.918783] ? _find_next_bit+0x4a/0x130
[ 560.919026] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x40
[ 560.919276] ? alloc_fd+0x14b/0x2d0
[ 560.919635] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0
[ 560.920035] ? file_open_root+0x230/0x230
[ 560.920336] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
[ 560.920813] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0
[ 560.921208] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[ 560.921482] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x49/0x180
[ 560.921867] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.922128] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 560.922369] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 560.923030] RIP: 0033:0x7f7dff2e4469
[ 560.923681] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[ 560.924451] RSP: 002b:00007ffd41a210b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
[ 560.925168] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7dff2e4469
[ 560.925655] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007ffd41a211f0
[ 560.926085] RBP: 00007ffd41a252a0 R08: 00007f7dff60fba0 R09: 00007ffd41a25388
[ 560.926405] R10: 0000000000400b80 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004004e0
[ 560.926867] R13: 00007ffd41a25380 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 560.927241] </TASK>
[ 560.927491]
[ 560.927755] Allocated by task 245:
[ 560.928409] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 560.929271] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 560.929778] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 560.930023] indx_read+0x249/0x380
[ 560.930224] indx_find+0x2a2/0x470
[ 560.930695] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 560.930892] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100
[ 560.931115] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220
[ 560.931323] walk_component+0x187/0x230
[ 560.931570] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660
[ 560.931791] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10
[ 560.932008] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 560.932226] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0
[ 560.932413] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0
[ 560.932709] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.933417] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 560.933776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 560.934235]
[ 560.934486] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009497000
[ 560.934486] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 560.935239] The buggy address is located 56 bytes to the right of
[ 560.935239] 512-byte region [ffff888009497000, ffff888009497200)
[ 560.936153]
[ 560.937326] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 560.938228] page:0000000062a3dfae refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9496
[ 560.939616] head:0000000062a3dfae order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 560.940219] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 560.942702] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000164f80 dead000000000005 ffff888001041c80
[ 560.943932] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 560.944568] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 560.945735]
[ 560.946112] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 560.946870] ffff888009497100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 560.947242] ffff888009497180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 560.947611] >ffff888009497200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 560.947915] ^
[ 560.948249] ffff888009497280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 560.948687] ffff888009497300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/index.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/index.c b/fs/ntfs3/index.c
index 440328147e7e..c27b4fe57513 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/index.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/index.c
@@ -1017,6 +1017,12 @@ int indx_read(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni, CLST vbn,
err = 0;
}
+ /* check for index header length */
+ if (offsetof(struct INDEX_BUFFER, ihdr) + ib->ihdr.used > bytes) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
in->index = ib;
*node = in;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 23/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate resident attribute name
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 22/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate buffer length while parsing index Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 24/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit 54e45702b648b7c0000e90b3e9b890e367e16ea8 ]
Though we already have some sanity checks while enumerating attributes,
resident attribute names aren't included. This patch checks the resident
attribute names are in the valid ranges.
[ 259.209031] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.210770] Write of size 426 at addr ffff88800632f2b2 by task exp/255
[ 259.211551]
[ 259.212035] CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37
[ 259.212955] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 259.214387] Call Trace:
[ 259.214640] <TASK>
[ 259.214895] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 259.215284] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 259.215565] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50
[ 259.215778] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x60
[ 259.215991] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.216270] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 259.216481] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.216719] kasan_check_range+0x15a/0x1d0
[ 259.216939] memcpy+0x3c/0x70
[ 259.217136] ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.217945] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
[ 259.218384] ? ni_remove_attr+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 259.218712] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0
[ 259.219064] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40
[ 259.219434] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
[ 259.219668] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[ 259.219904] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[ 259.220140] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
[ 259.220561] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0
[ 259.220984] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x850/0x850
[ 259.221532] ? run_deallocate+0x120/0x120
[ 259.221972] ? vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.222688] ? setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.222921] ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.223431] ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.223828] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.224417] ? mi_find_attr+0x3c/0xf0
[ 259.224772] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420
[ 259.225216] ? ni_ins_attr_ext+0x5c0/0x5c0
[ 259.225504] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x119/0x450
[ 259.225775] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 259.226316] ? ni_insert_nonresident+0x400/0x400
[ 259.227001] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 259.227468] ? __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 259.227773] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30
[ 259.228216] ? ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x2a/0xb0
[ 259.228494] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.228838] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x450/0x450
[ 259.229098] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x24/0x40
[ 259.229418] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0
[ 259.229681] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40
[ 259.229948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60
[ 259.230271] ? write_profile+0x270/0x270
[ 259.230537] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
[ 259.230836] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0
[ 259.231099] ? ntfs_set_acl_ex+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 259.231529] ? evm_protected_xattr_common+0x6d/0x100
[ 259.231817] ? posix_xattr_acl+0x13/0x80
[ 259.232073] ? evm_protect_xattr+0x1f7/0x440
[ 259.232351] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120
[ 259.232635] ? xattr_resolve_name+0x180/0x180
[ 259.232912] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300
[ 259.233219] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160
[ 259.233492] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50
[ 259.233744] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.234002] ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x160/0x160
[ 259.234837] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170
[ 259.235567] ? vmemdup_user+0x53/0x90
[ 259.236212] setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.236491] ? do_setxattr+0x170/0x170
[ 259.236791] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 259.237232] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x57/0x180
[ 259.237605] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 259.237870] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x1b0
[ 259.238234] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 259.238500] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0
[ 259.238775] ? __mnt_want_write+0xaa/0x100
[ 259.238990] ? mnt_want_write+0x8b/0x150
[ 259.239290] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.239605] ? setxattr+0x140/0x140
[ 259.239849] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 259.240174] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x67/0x80
[ 259.240411] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.240715] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 259.240934] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.241697] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6b26e4469
[ 259.242647] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[ 259.244512] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c7841f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
[ 259.245086] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc6b26e4469
[ 259.246025] RDX: 00007ffc3c784380 RSI: 00007ffc3c7842e0 RDI: 00007ffc3c784238
[ 259.246961] RBP: 00007ffc3c788410 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc3c7884f8
[ 259.247775] R10: 000000000000007f R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004004e0
[ 259.248534] R13: 00007ffc3c7884f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 259.249368] </TASK>
[ 259.249644]
[ 259.249888] Allocated by task 255:
[ 259.250283] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 259.250957] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 259.251826] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 259.252745] ni_create_attr_list+0x11e/0x850
[ 259.253298] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0
[ 259.253685] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420
[ 259.253974] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 259.254311] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30
[ 259.254629] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0
[ 259.254859] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120
[ 259.255155] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300
[ 259.255445] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160
[ 259.255862] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.256251] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170
[ 259.256522] setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.256911] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.257308] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.257637] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 259.257970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.258550]
[ 259.258772] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800632f000
[ 259.258772] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
[ 259.260190] The buggy address is located 690 bytes inside of
[ 259.260190] 1024-byte region [ffff88800632f000, ffff88800632f400)
[ 259.261412]
[ 259.261743] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 259.262354] page:0000000081e8cac9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x632c
[ 259.263722] head:0000000081e8cac9 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 259.264284] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 259.265312] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000060d00 dead000000000004 ffff888001041dc0
[ 259.265772] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 259.266305] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 259.266588]
[ 259.266728] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 259.267225] ffff88800632f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 259.267841] ffff88800632f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 259.269111] >ffff88800632f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 259.269626] ^
[ 259.270162] ffff88800632f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 259.270810] ffff88800632f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/record.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/record.c b/fs/ntfs3/record.c
index 9f81944441ae..af1e4b364ea8 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/record.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/record.c
@@ -265,6 +265,11 @@ struct ATTRIB *mi_enum_attr(struct mft_inode *mi, struct ATTRIB *attr)
if (t16 + t32 > asize)
return NULL;
+ if (attr->name_len &&
+ le16_to_cpu(attr->name_off) + sizeof(short) * attr->name_len > t16) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return attr;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 24/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 23/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate resident attribute name Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 25/71] soundwire: dmi-quirks: add quirk variant for LAPBC710 NUC15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hawkins Jiawei, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin, syzbot+8d6fbb27a6aded64b25b
From: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 887bfc546097fbe8071dac13b2fef73b77920899 ]
Syzkaller reports slab-out-of-bounds bug as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bbdff02 by task syz-executor131/3611
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline]
print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433
kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944
run_unpack_ex+0xb0/0x7c0 fs/ntfs3/run.c:1057
ntfs_read_mft fs/ntfs3/inode.c:368 [inline]
ntfs_iget5+0xc20/0x3280 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:501
ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x124/0x5d0 fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:272
ntfs_fill_super+0x1eff/0x37f0 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1018
get_tree_bdev+0x440/0x760 fs/super.c:1323
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00006ef600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1bbd8
head:ffffea00006ef600 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88801bbdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801bbdfe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801bbdff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88801bbdff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801bbe0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Kernel will tries to read record and parse MFT from disk in
ntfs_read_mft().
Yet the problem is that during enumerating attributes in record,
kernel doesn't check whether run_off field loading from the disk
is a valid value.
To be more specific, if attr->nres.run_off is larger than attr->size,
kernel will passes an invalid argument run_buf_size in
run_unpack_ex(), which having an integer overflow. Then this invalid
argument will triggers the slab-out-of-bounds Read bug as above.
This patch solves it by adding the sanity check between
the offset to packed runs and attribute size.
link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000009145fc05e94bd5c3@google.com/#t
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+8d6fbb27a6aded64b25b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
index c18bedaf228d..d98d047c778c 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
@@ -373,6 +373,13 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode,
}
t64 = le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.svcn);
+
+ /* offset to packed runs is out-of-bounds */
+ if (roff > asize) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
err = run_unpack_ex(run, sbi, ino, t64, le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn),
t64, Add2Ptr(attr, roff), asize - roff);
if (err < 0)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 25/71] soundwire: dmi-quirks: add quirk variant for LAPBC710 NUC15
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 24/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 26/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Introduce port2 SIDDQ quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Pierre-Louis Bossart,
Ranjani Sridharan, Bard Liao, Vinod Koul, Sasha Levin
From: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
[ Upstream commit f74495761df10c25a98256d16ea7465191b6e2cd ]
Some NUC15 LAPBC710 devices don't expose the same DMI information as
the Intel reference, add additional entry in the match table.
BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/issues/3885
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018012500.1592994-1-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c b/drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c
index f81cdd83ec26..7969881f126d 100644
--- a/drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c
@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id adr_remap_quirk_table[] = {
},
.driver_data = (void *)intel_tgl_bios,
},
+ {
+ /* quirk used for NUC15 LAPBC710 skew */
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "LAPBC710"),
+ },
+ .driver_data = (void *)intel_tgl_bios,
+ },
{
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Dell Inc"),
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 26/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Introduce port2 SIDDQ quirk
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 25/71] soundwire: dmi-quirks: add quirk variant for LAPBC710 NUC15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 27/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Add support for the H616 USB PHY Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Andre Przywara, Vinod Koul,
Sasha Levin
From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit b45c6d80325bec2b78c716629a518b6442d8bdc6 ]
At least the Allwinner H616 SoC requires a weird quirk to make most
USB PHYs work: Only port2 works out of the box, but all other ports
need some help from this port2 to work correctly: The CLK_BUS_PHY2 and
RST_USB_PHY2 clock and reset need to be enabled, and the SIDDQ bit in
the PMU PHY control register needs to be cleared. For this register to
be accessible, CLK_BUS_ECHI2 needs to be ungated. Don't ask ....
Instead of disguising this as some generic feature, treat it more like
a quirk (what it really is):
If the quirk bit is set, and we initialise a PHY other than PHY2, ungate
this one special clock, and clear the SIDDQ bit. We also pick the clock
and reset from PHY2 and enable them as well.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221031111358.3387297-4-andre.przywara@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c b/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
index 3a3831f6059a..e39f5ad62cc1 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg {
u8 phyctl_offset;
bool dedicated_clocks;
bool phy0_dual_route;
+ bool needs_phy2_siddq;
int missing_phys;
};
@@ -289,6 +290,50 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_init(struct phy *_phy)
return ret;
}
+ /* Some PHYs on some SoCs need the help of PHY2 to work. */
+ if (data->cfg->needs_phy2_siddq && phy->index != 2) {
+ struct sun4i_usb_phy *phy2 = &data->phys[2];
+
+ ret = clk_prepare_enable(phy2->clk);
+ if (ret) {
+ reset_control_assert(phy->reset);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk2);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = reset_control_deassert(phy2->reset);
+ if (ret) {
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy2->clk);
+ reset_control_assert(phy->reset);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk2);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This extra clock is just needed to access the
+ * REG_HCI_PHY_CTL PMU register for PHY2.
+ */
+ ret = clk_prepare_enable(phy2->clk2);
+ if (ret) {
+ reset_control_assert(phy2->reset);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy2->clk);
+ reset_control_assert(phy->reset);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk2);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (phy2->pmu && data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear) {
+ val = readl(phy2->pmu + REG_HCI_PHY_CTL);
+ val &= ~data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear;
+ writel(val, phy2->pmu + REG_HCI_PHY_CTL);
+ }
+
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk2);
+ }
+
if (phy->pmu && data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear) {
val = readl(phy->pmu + REG_HCI_PHY_CTL);
val &= ~data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear;
@@ -354,6 +399,13 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_exit(struct phy *_phy)
data->phy0_init = false;
}
+ if (data->cfg->needs_phy2_siddq && phy->index != 2) {
+ struct sun4i_usb_phy *phy2 = &data->phys[2];
+
+ clk_disable_unprepare(phy2->clk);
+ reset_control_assert(phy2->reset);
+ }
+
sun4i_usb_phy_passby(phy, 0);
reset_control_assert(phy->reset);
clk_disable_unprepare(phy->clk2);
@@ -785,6 +837,13 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
dev_err(dev, "failed to get clock %s\n", name);
return PTR_ERR(phy->clk2);
}
+ } else {
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "pmu%d_clk", i);
+ phy->clk2 = devm_clk_get_optional(dev, name);
+ if (IS_ERR(phy->clk2)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "failed to get clock %s\n", name);
+ return PTR_ERR(phy->clk2);
+ }
}
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "usb%d_reset", i);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 27/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Add support for the H616 USB PHY
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 26/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Introduce port2 SIDDQ quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 28/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Andre Przywara, Samuel Holland,
Vinod Koul, Sasha Levin
From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit 0f607406525d25019dd9c498bcc0b42734fc59d5 ]
The USB PHY used in the Allwinner H616 SoC inherits some traits from its
various predecessors: it has four full PHYs like the H3, needs some
extra bits to be set like the H6, and puts SIDDQ on a different bit like
the A100. Plus it needs this weird PHY2 quirk.
Name all those properties in a new config struct and assign a new
compatible name to it.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221031111358.3387297-5-andre.przywara@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c b/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
index e39f5ad62cc1..5472db9e87ef 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c
@@ -1032,6 +1032,17 @@ static const struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg sun50i_h6_cfg = {
.missing_phys = BIT(1) | BIT(2),
};
+static const struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg sun50i_h616_cfg = {
+ .num_phys = 4,
+ .type = sun50i_h6_phy,
+ .disc_thresh = 3,
+ .phyctl_offset = REG_PHYCTL_A33,
+ .dedicated_clocks = true,
+ .phy0_dual_route = true,
+ .hci_phy_ctl_clear = PHY_CTL_SIDDQ,
+ .needs_phy2_siddq = true,
+};
+
static const struct of_device_id sun4i_usb_phy_of_match[] = {
{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun4i-a10-usb-phy", .data = &sun4i_a10_cfg },
{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun5i-a13-usb-phy", .data = &sun5i_a13_cfg },
@@ -1047,6 +1058,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id sun4i_usb_phy_of_match[] = {
{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-a64-usb-phy",
.data = &sun50i_a64_cfg},
{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h6-usb-phy", .data = &sun50i_h6_cfg },
+ { .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h616-usb-phy", .data = &sun50i_h616_cfg },
{ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, sun4i_usb_phy_of_match);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 28/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 27/71] phy: sun4i-usb: Add support for the H616 USB PHY Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 29/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at wnd_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Edward Lo, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
[ Upstream commit bfcdbae0523bd95eb75a739ffb6221a37109881e ]
This enhances the sanity check for $SDH and $SII while initializing NTFS
security, guarantees these index root are legit.
[ 162.459513] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.460176] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880037bca99 by task mount/243
[ 162.460851]
[ 162.461252] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7 #42
[ 162.461744] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 162.462609] Call Trace:
[ 162.462954] <TASK>
[ 162.463276] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 162.463822] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 162.464608] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60
[ 162.465766] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.466975] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 162.467506] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xc0/0xf0
[ 162.467998] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.468536] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90
[ 162.468923] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.469282] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0
[ 162.469557] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90
[ 162.469864] ? ni_find_attr+0x214/0x300
[ 162.470217] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 162.470479] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.470931] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190
[ 162.471307] ? indx_get_root+0xe4/0x190
[ 162.471556] ? indx_get_root+0x140/0x190
[ 162.471833] ? indx_init+0x1e0/0x1e0
[ 162.472069] ? fnd_clear+0x115/0x140
[ 162.472363] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100
[ 162.472731] indx_find+0x184/0x470
[ 162.473461] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[ 162.474429] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 162.474704] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.474962] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 162.475381] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450
[ 162.475661] ? ntfs_security_init+0x3d6/0x440
[ 162.475906] ? is_sd_valid+0x180/0x180
[ 162.476191] ntfs_extend_init+0x13f/0x2c0
[ 162.476496] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0x130/0x130
[ 162.476861] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 162.477325] ntfs_fill_super+0x11e0/0x1b50
[ 162.477709] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.477970] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 162.478258] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 162.478538] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 162.478789] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.479038] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 162.479374] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 162.479729] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 162.480124] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.480484] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 162.480894] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.481467] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 162.482280] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.482714] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 162.483264] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 162.484782] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 162.485593] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 162.486024] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.486543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.487141] RIP: 0033:0x7f9d374e948a
[ 162.488324] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 162.489728] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30e73d18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 162.490971] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdb43a060 RCX: 00007f9d374e948a
[ 162.491669] RDX: 0000561cdb43a260 RSI: 0000561cdb43a2e0 RDI: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.492050] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdb43a280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 162.492459] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.493183] R13: 0000561cdb43a260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 162.493644] </TASK>
[ 162.493908]
[ 162.494214] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 162.494761] page:000000003e38a3d5 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x37bc
[ 162.496064] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 162.497278] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffffea00000df1c8 ffffea00000df008 0000000000000000
[ 162.498928] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 162.500542] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 162.501057]
[ 162.501242] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 162.502230] ffff8880037bc980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 162.502977] ffff8880037bca00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 162.503522] >ffff8880037bca80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 162.503963] ^
[ 162.504370] ffff8880037bcb00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 162.504766] ffff8880037bcb80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c b/fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c
index 4ed15f64b17f..b6e22bcb929b 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c
@@ -1849,9 +1849,10 @@ int ntfs_security_init(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi)
goto out;
}
- root_sdh = resident_data(attr);
+ root_sdh = resident_data_ex(attr, sizeof(struct INDEX_ROOT));
if (root_sdh->type != ATTR_ZERO ||
- root_sdh->rule != NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_SECURITY_HASH) {
+ root_sdh->rule != NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_SECURITY_HASH ||
+ offsetof(struct INDEX_ROOT, ihdr) + root_sdh->ihdr.used > attr->res.data_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -1867,9 +1868,10 @@ int ntfs_security_init(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi)
goto out;
}
- root_sii = resident_data(attr);
+ root_sii = resident_data_ex(attr, sizeof(struct INDEX_ROOT));
if (root_sii->type != ATTR_ZERO ||
- root_sii->rule != NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_UINT) {
+ root_sii->rule != NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_UINT ||
+ offsetof(struct INDEX_ROOT, ihdr) + root_sii->ihdr.used > attr->res.data_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 29/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at wnd_init()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 28/71] fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 30/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_fill_super() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzot, Tetsuo Handa,
Konstantin Komarov, Sasha Levin
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[ Upstream commit 0d0f659bf713662fabed973f9996b8f23c59ca51 ]
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at wnd_init() [1], for a crafted
filesystem can become wnd->nwnd close to UINT_MAX. Add __GFP_NOWARN in
order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by
using kvcalloc().
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa4648a5446460b7b963 [1]
Reported-by: syzot <syzbot+fa4648a5446460b7b963@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c b/fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c
index 1930640be31a..45f95c1cb258 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ int wnd_init(struct wnd_bitmap *wnd, struct super_block *sb, size_t nbits)
if (!wnd->bits_last)
wnd->bits_last = wbits;
- wnd->free_bits = kcalloc(wnd->nwnd, sizeof(u16), GFP_NOFS);
+ wnd->free_bits = kcalloc(wnd->nwnd, sizeof(u16), GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!wnd->free_bits)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 30/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_fill_super()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 29/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at wnd_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 31/71] fs/ntfs3: Delete duplicate condition in ntfs_read_mft() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzot, Tetsuo Handa,
Konstantin Komarov, Sasha Levin
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[ Upstream commit 59bfd7a483da36bd202532a3d9ea1f14f3bf3aaf ]
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_fill_super() [1], for a
crafted filesystem can contain bogus inode->i_size. Add __GFP_NOWARN in
order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by
using kvmalloc().
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33f3faaa0c08744f7d40 [1]
Reported-by: syzot <syzbot+33f3faaa0c08744f7d40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index 94f9e4b775a7..8e2fe0f69203 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
goto put_inode_out;
}
bytes = inode->i_size;
- sbi->def_table = t = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_NOFS);
+ sbi->def_table = t = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!t) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto put_inode_out;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 31/71] fs/ntfs3: Delete duplicate condition in ntfs_read_mft()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 30/71] fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_fill_super() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 32/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in r_page Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dan Carpenter, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 658015167a8432b88f5d032e9d85d8fd50e5bf2c ]
There were two patches which addressed the same bug and added the same
condition:
commit 6db620863f85 ("fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset")
commit 887bfc546097 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack")
Delete one condition.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
index d98d047c778c..e352aa37330c 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
@@ -374,12 +374,6 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode,
t64 = le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.svcn);
- /* offset to packed runs is out-of-bounds */
- if (roff > asize) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
err = run_unpack_ex(run, sbi, ino, t64, le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn),
t64, Add2Ptr(attr, roff), asize - roff);
if (err < 0)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 32/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in r_page
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 31/71] fs/ntfs3: Delete duplicate condition in ntfs_read_mft() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 33/71] objtool: Fix SEGFAULT Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yin Xiujiang, Konstantin Komarov,
Sasha Levin
From: Yin Xiujiang <yinxiujiang@kylinos.cn>
[ Upstream commit ecfbd57cf9c5ca225184ae266ce44ae473792132 ]
When PAGE_SIZE is 64K, if read_log_page is called by log_read_rst for
the first time, the size of *buffer would be equal to
DefaultLogPageSize(4K).But for *buffer operations like memcpy,
if the memory area size(n) which being assigned to buffer is larger
than 4K (log->page_size(64K) or bytes(64K-page_off)), it will cause
an out of boundary error.
Call trace:
[...]
kasan_report+0x44/0x130
check_memory_region+0xf8/0x1a0
memcpy+0xc8/0x100
ntfs_read_run_nb+0x20c/0x460
read_log_page+0xd0/0x1f4
log_read_rst+0x110/0x75c
log_replay+0x1e8/0x4aa0
ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x290/0x2d0
ntfs_fill_super+0x508/0xec0
get_tree_bdev+0x1fc/0x34c
[...]
Fix this by setting variable r_page to NULL in log_read_rst.
Signed-off-by: Yin Xiujiang <yinxiujiang@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 26 ++------------------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
index a85f5411aa74..c662d2a51907 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int read_log_page(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 vbo,
return -EINVAL;
if (!*buffer) {
- to_free = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_NOFS);
+ to_free = kmalloc(log->page_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!to_free)
return -ENOMEM;
*buffer = to_free;
@@ -1180,10 +1180,7 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first,
struct restart_info *info)
{
u32 skip, vbo;
- struct RESTART_HDR *r_page = kmalloc(DefaultLogPageSize, GFP_NOFS);
-
- if (!r_page)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct RESTART_HDR *r_page = NULL;
/* Determine which restart area we are looking for. */
if (first) {
@@ -1197,7 +1194,6 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first,
/* Loop continuously until we succeed. */
for (; vbo < l_size; vbo = 2 * vbo + skip, skip = 0) {
bool usa_error;
- u32 sys_page_size;
bool brst, bchk;
struct RESTART_AREA *ra;
@@ -1251,24 +1247,6 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first,
goto check_result;
}
- /* Read the entire restart area. */
- sys_page_size = le32_to_cpu(r_page->sys_page_size);
- if (DefaultLogPageSize != sys_page_size) {
- kfree(r_page);
- r_page = kzalloc(sys_page_size, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!r_page)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (read_log_page(log, vbo,
- (struct RECORD_PAGE_HDR **)&r_page,
- &usa_error)) {
- /* Ignore any errors. */
- kfree(r_page);
- r_page = NULL;
- continue;
- }
- }
-
if (is_client_area_valid(r_page, usa_error)) {
info->valid_page = true;
ra = Add2Ptr(r_page, le16_to_cpu(r_page->ra_off));
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 33/71] objtool: Fix SEGFAULT
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 32/71] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in r_page Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 34/71] iommu/mediatek: Fix crash on isr after kexec() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Naveen N. Rao, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel), Christophe Leroy, Michael Ellerman,
Sasha Levin
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[ Upstream commit efb11fdb3e1a9f694fa12b70b21e69e55ec59c36 ]
find_insn() will return NULL in case of failure. Check insn in order
to avoid a kernel Oops for NULL pointer dereference.
Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114175754.1131267-9-sv@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index a7f1e6c8bb0a..51494c3002d9 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
return false;
insn = find_insn(file, func->sec, func->offset);
- if (!insn->func)
+ if (!insn || !insn->func)
return false;
func_for_each_insn(file, func, insn) {
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 34/71] iommu/mediatek: Fix crash on isr after kexec()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 33/71] objtool: Fix SEGFAULT Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 35/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ricardo Ribalda,
AngeloGioacchino Del Regno, Robin Murphy, Joerg Roedel,
Sasha Levin
From: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
[ Upstream commit 00ef8885a945c37551547d8ac8361cacd20c4e42 ]
If the system is rebooted via isr(), the IRQ handler might
be triggered before the domain is initialized. Resulting on
an invalid memory access error.
Fix:
[ 0.500930] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000070
[ 0.501166] Call trace:
[ 0.501174] report_iommu_fault+0x28/0xfc
[ 0.501180] mtk_iommu_isr+0x10c/0x1c0
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221125-mtk-iommu-v2-0-e168dff7d43e@chromium.org
[ joro: Fixed spelling in commit message ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c
index dad2f238ffbf..56d007582b6f 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mtk_iommu_isr(int irq, void *dev_id)
fault_larb = data->plat_data->larbid_remap[fault_larb][sub_comm];
}
- if (report_iommu_fault(&dom->domain, bank->parent_dev, fault_iova,
+ if (!dom || report_iommu_fault(&dom->domain, bank->parent_dev, fault_iova,
write ? IOMMU_FAULT_WRITE : IOMMU_FAULT_READ)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(
bank->parent_dev,
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 35/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:21 ` [PATCH 6.1 34/71] iommu/mediatek: Fix crash on isr after kexec() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 36/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Piggin,
Andrew Donnellan, Michael Ellerman, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ]
rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple
of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of
which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics
while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could
hang.
Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time,
cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for
"ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it
is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Incorporate suggested change from Nick]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-4-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
index e847f9b1c5b9..6b5f49c9ad79 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
@@ -889,6 +889,7 @@ void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)
/* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */
static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048];
+static s32 ibm_os_term_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
void rtas_os_term(char *str)
{
@@ -900,14 +901,13 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
* this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid
* since it interferes with panic_timeout.
*/
- if (RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,os-term") ||
- RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,extended-os-term"))
+ if (ibm_os_term_token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return;
snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
do {
- status = rtas_call(rtas_token("ibm,os-term"), 1, 1, NULL,
+ status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
__pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
@@ -1277,6 +1277,13 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void)
no_entry = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "linux,rtas-entry", &entry);
rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry;
+ /*
+ * Discover these now to avoid device tree lookups in the
+ * panic path.
+ */
+ if (of_property_read_bool(rtas.dev, "ibm,extended-os-term"))
+ ibm_os_term_token = rtas_token("ibm,os-term");
+
/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for
* the stop-self token if any
*/
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 36/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 35/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 37/71] rtc: msc313: Fix function prototype mismatch in msc313_rtc_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Piggin,
Andrew Donnellan, Michael Ellerman, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]
It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from
the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9
Call Trace:
[c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)
[c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0
[c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0
[c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4
[c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68
[c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50
[c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0
[c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420
[c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200
Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects
whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-5-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
index 6b5f49c9ad79..767ab166933b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
@@ -906,10 +906,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
+ /*
+ * Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status,
+ * but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially
+ * schedules.
+ */
do {
status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
__pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
- } while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
+ } while (rtas_busy_delay_time(status));
if (status != 0)
printk(KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n", status);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 37/71] rtc: msc313: Fix function prototype mismatch in msc313_rtc_probe()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 36/71] powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 38/71] NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, kernel test robot,
Christophe JAILLET, Daniel Palmer, Romain Perier,
Alessandro Zummo, Alexandre Belloni, linux-arm-kernel, linux-rtc,
Kees Cook, Sasha Levin
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[ Upstream commit 21b8a1dd56a163825e5749b303858fb902ebf198 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.
msc313_rtc_probe() was passing clk_disable_unprepare() directly, which
did not have matching prototypes for devm_add_action_or_reset()'s
callback argument. Refactor to use devm_clk_get_enabled() instead.
This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict
flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type,
which only checks for type width mismatches.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202211041527.HD8TLSE1-lkp@intel.com
Suggested-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: Daniel Palmer <daniel@thingy.jp>
Cc: Romain Perier <romain.perier@gmail.com>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-rtc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Palmer <daniel@thingy.jp>
Tested-by: Daniel Palmer <daniel@thingy.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202184525.gonna.423-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c | 12 +-----------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c
index f3fde013c4b8..8d7737e0e2e0 100644
--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c
@@ -212,22 +212,12 @@ static int msc313_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return ret;
}
- clk = devm_clk_get(dev, NULL);
+ clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(dev, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(clk)) {
dev_err(dev, "No input reference clock\n");
return PTR_ERR(clk);
}
- ret = clk_prepare_enable(clk);
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(dev, "Failed to enable the reference clock, %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, (void (*) (void *))clk_disable_unprepare, clk);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
rate = clk_get_rate(clk);
writew(rate & 0xFFFF, priv->rtc_base + REG_RTC_FREQ_CW_L);
writew((rate >> 16) & 0xFFFF, priv->rtc_base + REG_RTC_FREQ_CW_H);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 38/71] NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 37/71] rtc: msc313: Fix function prototype mismatch in msc313_rtc_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 39/71] kprobes: kretprobe events missing on 2-core KVM guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Xingyuan Mo, Dai Ngo, Chuck Lever,
Sasha Levin
From: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 75333d48f92256a0dec91dbf07835e804fc411c0 ]
Problem caused by source's vfsmount being unmounted but remains
on the delayed unmount list. This happens when nfs42_ssc_open()
return errors.
Fixed by removing nfsd4_interssc_connect(), leave the vfsmount
for the laundromat to unmount when idle time expires.
We don't need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive when nfs42_ssc_open
return errors since the file was not opened so nfs_server->active
was not incremented. Same as in nfsd4_copy, if we fail to
launch nfsd4_do_async_copy thread then there's no need to
call nfs_do_sb_deactive
Reported-by: Xingyuan Mo <hdthky0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Xingyuan Mo <hdthky0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 20 +++++---------------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
index 32fe7cbfb28b..34d1cd5883fb 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
@@ -1465,13 +1465,6 @@ nfsd4_interssc_connect(struct nl4_server *nss, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
return status;
}
-static void
-nfsd4_interssc_disconnect(struct vfsmount *ss_mnt)
-{
- nfs_do_sb_deactive(ss_mnt->mnt_sb);
- mntput(ss_mnt);
-}
-
/*
* Verify COPY destination stateid.
*
@@ -1574,11 +1567,6 @@ nfsd4_cleanup_inter_ssc(struct vfsmount *ss_mnt, struct file *filp,
{
}
-static void
-nfsd4_interssc_disconnect(struct vfsmount *ss_mnt)
-{
-}
-
static struct file *nfs42_ssc_open(struct vfsmount *ss_mnt,
struct nfs_fh *src_fh,
nfs4_stateid *stateid)
@@ -1774,7 +1762,7 @@ static int nfsd4_do_async_copy(void *data)
default:
nfserr = nfserr_offload_denied;
}
- nfsd4_interssc_disconnect(copy->ss_mnt);
+ /* ss_mnt will be unmounted by the laundromat */
goto do_callback;
}
nfserr = nfsd4_do_copy(copy, filp, copy->nf_dst->nf_file,
@@ -1855,8 +1843,10 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
if (async_copy)
cleanup_async_copy(async_copy);
status = nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
- if (nfsd4_ssc_is_inter(copy))
- nfsd4_interssc_disconnect(copy->ss_mnt);
+ /*
+ * source's vfsmount of inter-copy will be unmounted
+ * by the laundromat
+ */
goto out;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 39/71] kprobes: kretprobe events missing on 2-core KVM guest
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 38/71] NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 40/71] HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, wuqiang, Solar Designer,
Masami Hiramatsu (Google), Sasha Levin
From: wuqiang <wuqiang.matt@bytedance.com>
[ Upstream commit 3b7ddab8a19aefc768f345fd3782af35b4a68d9b ]
Default value of maxactive is set as num_possible_cpus() for nonpreemptable
systems. For a 2-core system, only 2 kretprobe instances would be allocated
in default, then these 2 instances for execve kretprobe are very likely to
be used up with a pipelined command.
Here's the testcase: a shell script was added to crontab, and the content
of the script is:
#!/bin/sh
do_something_magic `tr -dc a-z < /dev/urandom | head -c 10`
cron will trigger a series of program executions (4 times every hour). Then
events loss would be noticed normally after 3-4 hours of testings.
The issue is caused by a burst of series of execve requests. The best number
of kretprobe instances could be different case by case, and should be user's
duty to determine, but num_possible_cpus() as the default value is inadequate
especially for systems with small number of cpus.
This patch enables the logic for preemption as default, thus increases the
minimum of maxactive to 10 for nonpreemptable systems.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110081502.492289-1-wuqiang.matt@bytedance.com/
Signed-off-by: wuqiang <wuqiang.matt@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst | 3 +--
kernel/kprobes.c | 8 ++------
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst b/Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst
index 48cf778a2468..fc7ce76eab65 100644
--- a/Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst
+++ b/Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst
@@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ For example, if the function is non-recursive and is called with a
spinlock held, maxactive = 1 should be enough. If the function is
non-recursive and can never relinquish the CPU (e.g., via a semaphore
or preemption), NR_CPUS should be enough. If maxactive <= 0, it is
-set to a default value. If CONFIG_PREEMPT is enabled, the default
-is max(10, 2*NR_CPUS). Otherwise, the default is NR_CPUS.
+set to a default value: max(10, 2*NR_CPUS).
It's not a disaster if you set maxactive too low; you'll just miss
some probes. In the kretprobe struct, the nmissed field is set to
diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c
index a35074f0daa1..1c18ecf9f98b 100644
--- a/kernel/kprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/kprobes.c
@@ -2213,13 +2213,9 @@ int register_kretprobe(struct kretprobe *rp)
rp->kp.post_handler = NULL;
/* Pre-allocate memory for max kretprobe instances */
- if (rp->maxactive <= 0) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
+ if (rp->maxactive <= 0)
rp->maxactive = max_t(unsigned int, 10, 2*num_possible_cpus());
-#else
- rp->maxactive = num_possible_cpus();
-#endif
- }
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK
rp->rh = rethook_alloc((void *)rp, kretprobe_rethook_handler);
if (!rp->rh)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 40/71] HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 39/71] kprobes: kretprobe events missing on 2-core KVM guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 41/71] HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Akito, José Expósito,
Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
From: José Expósito <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 4eab1c2fe06c98a4dff258dd64800b6986c101e9 ]
The HID descriptor of this device contains two mouse collections, one
for mouse emulation and the other for the trackpoint.
Both collections get merged and, because the first one defines X and Y,
the movemenent events reported by the trackpoint collection are
ignored.
Set the MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT class for this device to be able
to receive its reports.
This fix is similar to/based on commit 40d5bb87377a ("HID: multitouch:
enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices").
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libinput/libinput/-/issues/825
Reported-by: Akito <the@akito.ooo>
Tested-by: Akito <the@akito.ooo>
Signed-off-by: José Expósito <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
index 91a4d3fc30e0..372cbdd223e0 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
@@ -1967,6 +1967,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x313a) },
+ { .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
+ HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
+ USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x3148) },
+
/* Elitegroup panel */
{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_SERIAL,
MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ELITEGROUP,
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 41/71] HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 40/71] HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 42/71] futex: Fix futex_waitv() hrtimer debug object leak on kcalloc error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Terry Junge, Jiri Kosina,
Sasha Levin
From: Terry Junge <linuxhid@cosmicgizmosystems.com>
[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]
I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have
access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim,
the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220
would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of
the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.
Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)
Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy
Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice
for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics
for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if
it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.
The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect
other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too.
Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the
rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once
in 5 ms.
End quote
Signed-off-by: Terry Junge <linuxhid@cosmicgizmosystems.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 3 +++
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index 8f58c3c1bec3..e27fb27a36bf 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -995,7 +995,10 @@
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_IHOME_IMAC_A210S 0x8003
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS 0x047f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES 0xc055
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES 0xc056
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES 0xc057
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES 0xc058
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC 0x04da
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780 0x1044
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c b/drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c
index e81b7cec2d12..3d414ae194ac 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c
@@ -198,9 +198,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
}
static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = {
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+ USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES),
+ .driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES),
.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+ USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES),
+ .driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+ USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES),
+ .driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS, HID_ANY_ID) },
{ }
};
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 42/71] futex: Fix futex_waitv() hrtimer debug object leak on kcalloc error
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 41/71] HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 43/71] rtmutex: Add acquire semantics for rtmutex lock acquisition slow path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel), Davidlohr Bueso
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
commit 94cd8fa09f5f1ebdd4e90964b08b7f2cc4b36c43 upstream.
In a scenario where kcalloc() fails to allocate memory, the futex_waitv
system call immediately returns -ENOMEM without invoking
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(). When CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y, this
results in leaking a timer debug object.
Fixes: bf69bad38cf6 ("futex: Implement sys_futex_waitv()")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214222008.200393-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/futex/syscalls.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/futex/syscalls.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/syscalls.c
@@ -286,19 +286,22 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(futex_waitv, struct fute
}
futexv = kcalloc(nr_futexes, sizeof(*futexv), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!futexv)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!futexv) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto destroy_timer;
+ }
ret = futex_parse_waitv(futexv, waiters, nr_futexes);
if (!ret)
ret = futex_wait_multiple(futexv, nr_futexes, timeout ? &to : NULL);
+ kfree(futexv);
+
+destroy_timer:
if (timeout) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to.timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to.timer);
}
-
- kfree(futexv);
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 43/71] rtmutex: Add acquire semantics for rtmutex lock acquisition slow path
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 42/71] futex: Fix futex_waitv() hrtimer debug object leak on kcalloc error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 44/71] mm, mremap: fix mremap() expanding vma with addr inside vma Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jan Kara, Mel Gorman,
Thomas Gleixner
From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
commit 1c0908d8e441631f5b8ba433523cf39339ee2ba0 upstream.
Jan Kara reported the following bug triggering on 6.0.5-rt14 running dbench
on XFS on arm64.
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:625!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP
CPU: 11 PID: 6611 Comm: dbench Tainted: G E 6.0.0-rt14-rt+ #1
pc : clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0
lr : clear_inode+0x38/0xc0
Call trace:
clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0
evict+0x160/0x180
iput+0x154/0x240
do_unlinkat+0x184/0x300
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x48/0xc0
el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0xe4/0x2c0
do_el0_svc+0xac/0x100
el0_svc+0x78/0x200
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
It also affects 6.1-rc7-rt5 and affects a preempt-rt fork of 5.14 so this
is likely a bug that existed forever and only became visible when ARM
support was added to preempt-rt. The same problem does not occur on x86-64
and he also reported that converting sb->s_inode_wblist_lock to
raw_spinlock_t makes the problem disappear indicating that the RT spinlock
variant is the problem.
Which in turn means that RT mutexes on ARM64 and any other weakly ordered
architecture are affected by this independent of RT.
Will Deacon observed:
"I'd be more inclined to be suspicious of the slowpath tbh, as we need to
make sure that we have acquire semantics on all paths where the lock can
be taken. Looking at the rtmutex code, this really isn't obvious to me
-- for example, try_to_take_rt_mutex() appears to be able to return via
the 'takeit' label without acquire semantics and it looks like we might
be relying on the caller's subsequent _unlock_ of the wait_lock for
ordering, but that will give us release semantics which aren't correct."
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior prototyped a fix that does work based on that
comment but it was a little bit overkill and added some fences that should
not be necessary.
The lock owner is updated with an IRQ-safe raw spinlock held, but the
spin_unlock does not provide acquire semantics which are needed when
acquiring a mutex.
Adds the necessary acquire semantics for lock owner updates in the slow path
acquisition and the waiter bit logic.
It successfully completed 10 iterations of the dbench workload while the
vanilla kernel fails on the first iteration.
[ bigeasy@linutronix.de: Initial prototype fix ]
Fixes: 700318d1d7b38 ("locking/rtmutex: Use acquire/release semantics")
Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core")
Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202100223.6mevpbl7i6x5udfd@techsingularity.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c | 6 ++--
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -89,15 +89,31 @@ static inline int __ww_mutex_check_kill(
* set this bit before looking at the lock.
*/
-static __always_inline void
-rt_mutex_set_owner(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, struct task_struct *owner)
+static __always_inline struct task_struct *
+rt_mutex_owner_encode(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, struct task_struct *owner)
{
unsigned long val = (unsigned long)owner;
if (rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
val |= RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS;
- WRITE_ONCE(lock->owner, (struct task_struct *)val);
+ return (struct task_struct *)val;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void
+rt_mutex_set_owner(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, struct task_struct *owner)
+{
+ /*
+ * lock->wait_lock is held but explicit acquire semantics are needed
+ * for a new lock owner so WRITE_ONCE is insufficient.
+ */
+ xchg_acquire(&lock->owner, rt_mutex_owner_encode(lock, owner));
+}
+
+static __always_inline void rt_mutex_clear_owner(struct rt_mutex_base *lock)
+{
+ /* lock->wait_lock is held so the unlock provides release semantics. */
+ WRITE_ONCE(lock->owner, rt_mutex_owner_encode(lock, NULL));
}
static __always_inline void clear_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex_base *lock)
@@ -106,7 +122,8 @@ static __always_inline void clear_rt_mut
((unsigned long)lock->owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
}
-static __always_inline void fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex_base *lock)
+static __always_inline void
+fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, bool acquire_lock)
{
unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner;
@@ -172,8 +189,21 @@ static __always_inline void fixup_rt_mut
* still set.
*/
owner = READ_ONCE(*p);
- if (owner & RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS)
- WRITE_ONCE(*p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
+ if (owner & RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS) {
+ /*
+ * See rt_mutex_set_owner() and rt_mutex_clear_owner() on
+ * why xchg_acquire() is used for updating owner for
+ * locking and WRITE_ONCE() for unlocking.
+ *
+ * WRITE_ONCE() would work for the acquire case too, but
+ * in case that the lock acquisition failed it might
+ * force other lockers into the slow path unnecessarily.
+ */
+ if (acquire_lock)
+ xchg_acquire(p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
+ else
+ WRITE_ONCE(*p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
+ }
}
/*
@@ -208,6 +238,13 @@ static __always_inline void mark_rt_mute
owner = *p;
} while (cmpxchg_relaxed(p, owner,
owner | RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS) != owner);
+
+ /*
+ * The cmpxchg loop above is relaxed to avoid back-to-back ACQUIRE
+ * operations in the event of contention. Ensure the successful
+ * cmpxchg is visible.
+ */
+ smp_mb__after_atomic();
}
/*
@@ -1243,7 +1280,7 @@ static int __sched __rt_mutex_slowtryloc
* try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the lock waiters bit
* unconditionally. Clean this up.
*/
- fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+ fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock, true);
return ret;
}
@@ -1604,7 +1641,7 @@ static int __sched __rt_mutex_slowlock(s
* try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit
* unconditionally. We might have to fix that up.
*/
- fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+ fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock, true);
trace_contention_end(lock, ret);
@@ -1719,7 +1756,7 @@ static void __sched rtlock_slowlock_lock
* try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally.
* We might have to fix that up:
*/
- fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+ fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock, true);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&waiter);
trace_contention_end(lock, 0);
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void __sched rt_mutex_init_proxy_locked(
void __sched rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mutex_base *lock)
{
debug_rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(lock);
- rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, NULL);
+ rt_mutex_clear_owner(lock);
}
/**
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(str
* try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
* have to fix that up.
*/
- fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+ fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock, true);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
return ret;
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ bool __sched rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock
* try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
* have to fix that up.
*/
- fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+ fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock, false);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 44/71] mm, mremap: fix mremap() expanding vma with addr inside vma
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 43/71] rtmutex: Add acquire semantics for rtmutex lock acquisition slow path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 45/71] mm/mempolicy: fix memory leak in set_mempolicy_home_node system call Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jiri Slaby, Vlastimil Babka,
Jakub Matěna, Kirill A . Shutemov, Liam Howlett,
Matthew Wilcox, Mel Gorman, Michal Hocko, Andrew Morton
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
commit 6f12be792fde994ed934168f93c2a0d2a0cf0bc5 upstream.
Since 6.1 we have noticed random rpm install failures that were tracked to
mremap() returning -ENOMEM and to commit ca3d76b0aa80 ("mm: add merging
after mremap resize").
The problem occurs when mremap() expands a VMA in place, but using an
starting address that's not vma->vm_start, but somewhere in the middle.
The extension_pgoff calculation introduced by the commit is wrong in that
case, so vma_merge() fails due to pgoffs not being compatible. Fix the
calculation.
By the way it seems that the situations, where rpm now expands a vma from
the middle, were made possible also due to that commit, thanks to the
improved vma merging. Yet it should work just fine, except for the buggy
calculation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221216163227.24648-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1206359
Fixes: ca3d76b0aa80 ("mm: add merging after mremap resize")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jakub Matěna <matenajakub@gmail.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/mremap.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -1016,7 +1016,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, a
long pages = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long extension_start = addr + old_len;
unsigned long extension_end = addr + new_len;
- pgoff_t extension_pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + (old_len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ pgoff_t extension_pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff +
+ ((extension_start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, pages)) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 45/71] mm/mempolicy: fix memory leak in set_mempolicy_home_node system call
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 44/71] mm, mremap: fix mremap() expanding vma with addr inside vma Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 46/71] kmsan: export kmsan_handle_urb Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mathieu Desnoyers, Randy Dunlap,
Huang, Ying, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Michal Hocko, Dave Hansen,
Feng Tang, Michal Hocko, Andrea Arcangeli, Mel Gorman,
Mike Kravetz, Vlastimil Babka, Andi Kleen, Dan Williams,
Andrew Morton
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
commit 38ce7c9bdfc228c14d7621ba36d3eebedd9d4f76 upstream.
When encountering any vma in the range with policy other than MPOL_BIND or
MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, an error is returned without issuing a mpol_put on
the policy just allocated with mpol_dup().
This allows arbitrary users to leak kernel memory.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215194621.202816-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Fixes: c6018b4b2549 ("mm/mempolicy: add set_mempolicy_home_node syscall")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.17+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/mempolicy.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1540,6 +1540,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(set_mempolicy_home_node,
* the home node for vmas we already updated before.
*/
if (new->mode != MPOL_BIND && new->mode != MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY) {
+ mpol_put(new);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 46/71] kmsan: export kmsan_handle_urb
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 45/71] mm/mempolicy: fix memory leak in set_mempolicy_home_node system call Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 47/71] kmsan: include linux/vmalloc.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Arnd Bergmann, Alexander Potapenko,
Dmitry Vyukov, Marco Elver, Andrew Morton
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 7ba594d700998bafa96a75360d2e060aa39156d2 upstream.
USB support can be in a loadable module, and this causes a link failure
with KMSAN:
ERROR: modpost: "kmsan_handle_urb" [drivers/usb/core/usbcore.ko] undefined!
Export the symbol so it can be used by this module.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215162710.3802378-1-arnd@kernel.org
Fixes: 553a80188a5d ("kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 35f6b6e6a908..3807502766a3 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ void kmsan_handle_urb(const struct urb *urb, bool is_out)
urb->transfer_buffer_length,
/*checked*/ false);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kmsan_handle_urb);
static void kmsan_handle_dma_page(const void *addr, size_t size,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 47/71] kmsan: include linux/vmalloc.h
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 46/71] kmsan: export kmsan_handle_urb Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 48/71] pstore: Properly assign mem_type property Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Arnd Bergmann, Alexander Potapenko,
Dmitry Vyukov, Marco Elver, Andrew Morton
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit aaa746ad8b30f38ef89a301faf339ef1c19cf33a upstream.
This is needed for the vmap/vunmap declarations:
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'vmap' is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
^
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:29: error: use of undeclared identifier 'VM_MAP'
vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
^
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:322:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'vunmap' is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
vunmap(vbuf);
^
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215163046.4079767-1-arnd@kernel.org
Fixes: 8ed691b02ade ("kmsan: add tests for KMSAN")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c b/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
index eb44ef3c5f29..088e21a48dc4 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <trace/events/printk.h>
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, per_cpu_var);
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 48/71] pstore: Properly assign mem_type property
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 47/71] kmsan: include linux/vmalloc.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 49/71] pstore/zone: Use GFP_ATOMIC to allocate zone buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Luca Stefani, Kees Cook
From: Luca Stefani <luca@osomprivacy.com>
commit beca3e311a49cd3c55a056096531737d7afa4361 upstream.
If mem-type is specified in the device tree
it would end up overriding the record_size
field instead of populating mem_type.
As record_size is currently parsed after the
improper assignment with default size 0 it
continued to work as expected regardless of the
value found in the device tree.
Simply changing the target field of the struct
is enough to get mem-type working as expected.
Fixes: 9d843e8fafc7 ("pstore: Add mem_type property DT parsing support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luca Stefani <luca@osomprivacy.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222131049.286288-1-luca@osomprivacy.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/pstore/ram.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/pstore/ram.c
+++ b/fs/pstore/ram.c
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static int ramoops_parse_dt(struct platf
field = value; \
}
- parse_u32("mem-type", pdata->record_size, pdata->mem_type);
+ parse_u32("mem-type", pdata->mem_type, pdata->mem_type);
parse_u32("record-size", pdata->record_size, 0);
parse_u32("console-size", pdata->console_size, 0);
parse_u32("ftrace-size", pdata->ftrace_size, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 49/71] pstore/zone: Use GFP_ATOMIC to allocate zone buffer
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 48/71] pstore: Properly assign mem_type property Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 50/71] hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Qiujun Huang, WeiXiong Liao,
Kees Cook
From: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
commit 99b3b837855b987563bcfb397cf9ddd88262814b upstream.
There is a case found when triggering a panic_on_oom, pstore fails to dump
kmsg. Because psz_kmsg_write_record can't get the new buffer.
Handle this by using GFP_ATOMIC to allocate a buffer at lower watermark.
Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
Fixes: 335426c6dcdd ("pstore/zone: Provide way to skip "broken" zone for MTD devices")
Cc: WeiXiong Liao <gmpy.liaowx@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAJRQjofRCF7wjrYmw3D7zd5QZnwHQq+F8U-mJDJ6NZ4bddYdLA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/pstore/zone.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/pstore/zone.c
+++ b/fs/pstore/zone.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static inline int notrace psz_kmsg_write
/* avoid destroying old data, allocate a new one */
len = zone->buffer_size + sizeof(*zone->buffer);
zone->oldbuf = zone->buffer;
- zone->buffer = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ zone->buffer = kzalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!zone->buffer) {
zone->buffer = zone->oldbuf;
return -ENOMEM;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 50/71] hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 49/71] pstore/zone: Use GFP_ATOMIC to allocate zone buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 51/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Force AMD GUID/_REV 2 on HP Elitebook 865 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Aditya Garg, Viacheslav Dubeyko,
Andrew Morton
From: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.
Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID
were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/C0264BF5-059C-45CF-B8DA-3A3BD2C803A2@live.com
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h | 2 ++
fs/hfsplus/inode.c | 4 ++--
fs/hfsplus/options.c | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {
#define HFSPLUS_SB_HFSX 3
#define HFSPLUS_SB_CASEFOLD 4
#define HFSPLUS_SB_NOBARRIER 5
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_UID 6
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_GID 7
static inline struct hfsplus_sb_info *HFSPLUS_SB(struct super_block *sb)
{
--- a/fs/hfsplus/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/inode.c
@@ -192,11 +192,11 @@ static void hfsplus_get_perms(struct ino
mode = be16_to_cpu(perms->mode);
i_uid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->owner));
- if (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode)
+ if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode))
inode->i_uid = sbi->uid;
i_gid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->group));
- if (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode)
+ if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode))
inode->i_gid = sbi->gid;
if (dir) {
--- a/fs/hfsplus/options.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/options.c
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
if (!uid_valid(sbi->uid)) {
pr_err("invalid uid specified\n");
return 0;
+ } else {
+ set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags);
}
break;
case opt_gid:
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
if (!gid_valid(sbi->gid)) {
pr_err("invalid gid specified\n");
return 0;
+ } else {
+ set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags);
}
break;
case opt_part:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 51/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Force AMD GUID/_REV 2 on HP Elitebook 865
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 50/71] hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 52/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Stop using AMD specific codepath for Rembrandt+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mario Limonciello, Rafael J. Wysocki
From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
commit 3ea45390e9c0d35805ef8357ace55594fd4233d0 upstream.
HP Elitebook 865 supports both the AMD GUID w/ _REV 2 and Microsoft
GUID with _REV 0. Both have very similar code but the AMD GUID
has a special workaround that is specific to a problem with
spurious wakeups on systems with Qualcomm WLAN.
This is believed to be a bug in the Qualcomm WLAN F/W (it doesn't
affect any other WLAN H/W). If this WLAN firmware is fixed this
quirk can be dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c b/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
index 5350c73564b6..422415cb14f4 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
@@ -401,6 +401,13 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id amd_hid_ids[] = {
{}
};
+static int lps0_prefer_amd(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
+{
+ pr_debug("Using AMD GUID w/ _REV 2.\n");
+ rev_id = 2;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int lps0_prefer_microsoft(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
{
pr_debug("Preferring Microsoft GUID.\n");
@@ -462,6 +469,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id s2idle_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ROG Flow X16 GV601"),
},
},
+ {
+ /*
+ * AMD Rembrandt based HP EliteBook 835/845/865 G9
+ * Contains specialized AML in AMD/_REV 2 path to avoid
+ * triggering a bug in Qualcomm WLAN firmware. This may be
+ * removed in the future if that firmware is fixed.
+ */
+ .callback = lps0_prefer_amd,
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "HP"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "8990"),
+ },
+ },
{}
};
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 52/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Stop using AMD specific codepath for Rembrandt+
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 51/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Force AMD GUID/_REV 2 on HP Elitebook 865 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 53/71] binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Benjamin Cheng, bilkow, Paul,
Mario Limonciello, Philipp Zabel, Rafael J. Wysocki
From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
commit e555c85792bd5f9828a2fd2ca9761f70efb1c77b upstream.
After we introduced a module parameter and quirk infrastructure for
picking the Microsoft GUID over the SOC vendor GUID we discovered
that lots and lots of systems are getting this wrong.
The table continues to grow, and is becoming unwieldy.
We don't really have any benefit to forcing vendors to populate the
AMD GUID. This is just extra work, and more and more vendors seem
to mess it up. As the Microsoft GUID is used by Windows as well,
it's very likely that it won't be messed up like this.
So drop all the quirks forcing it and the Rembrandt behavior. This
means that Cezanne or later effectively only run the Microsoft GUID
codepath with the exception of HP Elitebook 8*5 G9.
Fixes: fd894f05cf30 ("ACPI: x86: s2idle: If a new AMD _HID is missing assume Rembrandt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1
Reported-by: Benjamin Cheng <ben@bcheng.me>
Reported-by: bilkow@tutanota.com
Reported-by: Paul <paul@zogpog.com>
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2292
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216768
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <philipp.zabel@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Zabel <philipp.zabel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c | 87 ++-------------------------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c b/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
index 422415cb14f4..c7afce465a07 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/x86/s2idle.c
@@ -28,10 +28,6 @@ static bool sleep_no_lps0 __read_mostly;
module_param(sleep_no_lps0, bool, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(sleep_no_lps0, "Do not use the special LPS0 device interface");
-static bool prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid __read_mostly;
-module_param(prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid, bool, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid, "Prefer using Microsoft GUID in LPS0 device _DSM evaluation");
-
static const struct acpi_device_id lps0_device_ids[] = {
{"PNP0D80", },
{"", },
@@ -369,27 +365,15 @@ out:
}
struct amd_lps0_hid_device_data {
- const unsigned int rev_id;
const bool check_off_by_one;
- const bool prefer_amd_guid;
};
static const struct amd_lps0_hid_device_data amd_picasso = {
- .rev_id = 0,
.check_off_by_one = true,
- .prefer_amd_guid = false,
};
static const struct amd_lps0_hid_device_data amd_cezanne = {
- .rev_id = 0,
.check_off_by_one = false,
- .prefer_amd_guid = false,
-};
-
-static const struct amd_lps0_hid_device_data amd_rembrandt = {
- .rev_id = 2,
- .check_off_by_one = false,
- .prefer_amd_guid = true,
};
static const struct acpi_device_id amd_hid_ids[] = {
@@ -397,7 +381,6 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id amd_hid_ids[] = {
{"AMD0005", (kernel_ulong_t)&amd_picasso, },
{"AMDI0005", (kernel_ulong_t)&amd_picasso, },
{"AMDI0006", (kernel_ulong_t)&amd_cezanne, },
- {"AMDI0007", (kernel_ulong_t)&amd_rembrandt, },
{}
};
@@ -407,68 +390,7 @@ static int lps0_prefer_amd(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
rev_id = 2;
return 0;
}
-
-static int lps0_prefer_microsoft(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
-{
- pr_debug("Preferring Microsoft GUID.\n");
- prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid = true;
- return 0;
-}
-
static const struct dmi_system_id s2idle_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
- {
- /*
- * ASUS TUF Gaming A17 FA707RE
- * https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216101
- */
- .callback = lps0_prefer_microsoft,
- .matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ASUS TUF Gaming A17"),
- },
- },
- {
- /* ASUS ROG Zephyrus G14 (2022) */
- .callback = lps0_prefer_microsoft,
- .matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ROG Zephyrus G14 GA402"),
- },
- },
- {
- /*
- * Lenovo Yoga Slim 7 Pro X 14ARH7
- * https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216473 : 82V2
- * https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216438 : 82TL
- */
- .callback = lps0_prefer_microsoft,
- .matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "82"),
- },
- },
- {
- /*
- * ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. ROG Flow X13 GV301RE_GV301RE
- * https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2148
- */
- .callback = lps0_prefer_microsoft,
- .matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ROG Flow X13 GV301"),
- },
- },
- {
- /*
- * ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. ROG Flow X16 GV601RW_GV601RW
- * https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2148
- */
- .callback = lps0_prefer_microsoft,
- .matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ROG Flow X16 GV601"),
- },
- },
{
/*
* AMD Rembrandt based HP EliteBook 835/845/865 G9
@@ -504,16 +426,14 @@ static int lps0_device_attach(struct acpi_device *adev,
if (dev_id->id[0])
data = (const struct amd_lps0_hid_device_data *) dev_id->driver_data;
else
- data = &amd_rembrandt;
- rev_id = data->rev_id;
+ data = &amd_cezanne;
lps0_dsm_func_mask = validate_dsm(adev->handle,
ACPI_LPS0_DSM_UUID_AMD, rev_id, &lps0_dsm_guid);
if (lps0_dsm_func_mask > 0x3 && data->check_off_by_one) {
lps0_dsm_func_mask = (lps0_dsm_func_mask << 1) | 0x1;
acpi_handle_debug(adev->handle, "_DSM UUID %s: Adjusted function mask: 0x%x\n",
ACPI_LPS0_DSM_UUID_AMD, lps0_dsm_func_mask);
- } else if (lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft > 0 && data->prefer_amd_guid &&
- !prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid) {
+ } else if (lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft > 0 && rev_id) {
lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft = -EINVAL;
acpi_handle_debug(adev->handle, "_DSM Using AMD method\n");
}
@@ -521,8 +441,7 @@ static int lps0_device_attach(struct acpi_device *adev,
rev_id = 1;
lps0_dsm_func_mask = validate_dsm(adev->handle,
ACPI_LPS0_DSM_UUID, rev_id, &lps0_dsm_guid);
- if (!prefer_microsoft_dsm_guid)
- lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft = -EINVAL;
+ lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft = -EINVAL;
}
if (lps0_dsm_func_mask < 0 && lps0_dsm_func_mask_microsoft < 0)
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 53/71] binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 52/71] ACPI: x86: s2idle: Stop using AMD specific codepath for Rembrandt+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 54/71] ovl: Use ovl mounters fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Wang Yufen, Kees Cook
From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
commit e7f703ff2507f4e9f496da96cd4b78fd3026120c upstream.
Fix to return a negative error code from create_elf_fdpic_tables()
instead of 0.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1669945261-30271-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
@@ -434,8 +434,9 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct
current->mm->start_stack = current->mm->start_brk + stack_size;
#endif
- if (create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm,
- &exec_params, &interp_params) < 0)
+ retval = create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm, &exec_params,
+ &interp_params);
+ if (retval < 0)
goto error;
kdebug("- start_code %lx", current->mm->start_code);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 54/71] ovl: Use ovl mounters fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link()
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 53/71] binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 55/71] ovl: update ->f_iocb_flags when ovl_change_flags() modifies ->f_flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zhang Tianci, Jiachen Zhang,
Christian Brauner (Microsoft), Miklos Szeredi
From: Zhang Tianci <zhangtianci.1997@bytedance.com>
commit 5b0db51215e895a361bc63132caa7cca36a53d6a upstream.
There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:
$ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
$ mount -t fuse /fuse
$ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
$ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
workdir=work
$ touch /merge/file
$ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
$ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile
Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s
caller is "bin", it denied this request.
In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:
The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which
overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's
owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is
assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the
current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so
the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The
current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable
to use the caller's fsuid.
The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move
inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just
give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid
becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's
mounter! So this is incorrect.
Fix this bug by using ovl mounter's fsuid/fsgid to do underlying
fs's link().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220817102952.xnvesg3a7rbv576x@wittgenstein/T
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220825130552.29587-1-zhangtianci.1997@bytedance.com/t
Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianci <zhangtianci.1997@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Fixes: 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -592,28 +592,42 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct den
goto out_revert_creds;
}
- err = -ENOMEM;
- override_cred = prepare_creds();
- if (override_cred) {
+ if (!attr->hardlink) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ override_cred = prepare_creds();
+ if (!override_cred)
+ goto out_revert_creds;
+ /*
+ * In the creation cases(create, mkdir, mknod, symlink),
+ * ovl should transfer current's fs{u,g}id to underlying
+ * fs. Because underlying fs want to initialize its new
+ * inode owner using current's fs{u,g}id. And in this
+ * case, the @inode is a new inode that is initialized
+ * in inode_init_owner() to current's fs{u,g}id. So use
+ * the inode's i_{u,g}id to override the cred's fs{u,g}id.
+ *
+ * But in the other hardlink case, ovl_link() does not
+ * create a new inode, so just use the ovl mounter's
+ * fs{u,g}id.
+ */
override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
- if (!attr->hardlink) {
- err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
- attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
- override_cred);
- if (err) {
- put_cred(override_cred);
- goto out_revert_creds;
- }
+ err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
+ attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+ override_cred);
+ if (err) {
+ put_cred(override_cred);
+ goto out_revert_creds;
}
put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
put_cred(override_cred);
-
- if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
- err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
- else
- err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
}
+
+ if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
+ err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
+ else
+ err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
+
out_revert_creds:
revert_creds(old_cred);
return err;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 55/71] ovl: update ->f_iocb_flags when ovl_change_flags() modifies ->f_flags
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 54/71] ovl: Use ovl mounters fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 56/71] ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Pierre Labastie, Al Viro,
Miklos Szeredi
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
commit 456b59e757b0c558df550764a4fd5ae6877e93f8 upstream.
ovl_change_flags() is an open-coded variant of fs/fcntl.c:setfl() and it
got missed by commit 164f4064ca81 ("keep iocb_flags() result cached in
struct file"); the same change applies there.
Reported-by: Pierre Labastie <pierre.labastie@neuf.fr>
Fixes: 164f4064ca81 ("keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216738
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int ovl_change_flags(struct file
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
file->f_flags = (file->f_flags & ~OVL_SETFL_MASK) | flags;
+ file->f_iocb_flags = iocb_flags(file);
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 56/71] ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 55/71] ovl: update ->f_iocb_flags when ovl_change_flags() modifies ->f_flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 57/71] ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Artem Egorkine, Takashi Iwai
From: Artem Egorkine <arteme@gmail.com>
commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream.
A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI
messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0
status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.
This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt.
[ tiwai: fixed white spaces ]
Signed-off-by: Artem Egorkine <arteme@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221225105728.1153989-1-arteme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 3 ++-
sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 3 ++-
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h | 5 ++++-
sound/usb/line6/pod.c | 3 ++-
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/usb/line6/driver.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/driver.c
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static void line6_data_received(struct u
for (;;) {
done =
line6_midibuf_read(mb, line6->buffer_message,
- LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN);
+ LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN,
+ LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX);
if (done <= 0)
break;
--- a/sound/usb/line6/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/midi.c
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
for (;;) {
done = line6_midibuf_read(mb, chunk,
- LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
+ LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE,
+ LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX);
if (done == 0)
break;
--- a/sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "midibuf.h"
+
static int midibuf_message_length(unsigned char code)
{
int message_length;
@@ -20,12 +21,7 @@ static int midibuf_message_length(unsign
message_length = length[(code >> 4) - 8];
} else {
- /*
- Note that according to the MIDI specification 0xf2 is
- the "Song Position Pointer", but this is used by Line 6
- to send sysex messages to the host.
- */
- static const int length[] = { -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
+ static const int length[] = { -1, 2, 2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1,
1, 1, 1, -1, 1, 1
};
message_length = length[code & 0x0f];
@@ -125,7 +121,7 @@ int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buff
}
int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *this, unsigned char *data,
- int length)
+ int length, int read_type)
{
int bytes_used;
int length1, length2;
@@ -148,9 +144,22 @@ int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffe
length1 = this->size - this->pos_read;
- /* check MIDI command length */
command = this->buf[this->pos_read];
+ /*
+ PODxt always has status byte lower nibble set to 0010,
+ when it means to send 0000, so we correct if here so
+ that control/program changes come on channel 1 and
+ sysex message status byte is correct
+ */
+ if (read_type == LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX) {
+ if (command == 0xb2 || command == 0xc2 || command == 0xf2) {
+ unsigned char fixed = command & 0xf0;
+ this->buf[this->pos_read] = fixed;
+ command = fixed;
+ }
+ }
+ /* check MIDI command length */
if (command & 0x80) {
midi_length = midibuf_message_length(command);
this->command_prev = command;
--- a/sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
#ifndef MIDIBUF_H
#define MIDIBUF_H
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX 0
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX 1
+
struct midi_buffer {
unsigned char *buf;
int size;
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ extern void line6_midibuf_destroy(struct
extern int line6_midibuf_ignore(struct midi_buffer *mb, int length);
extern int line6_midibuf_init(struct midi_buffer *mb, int size, int split);
extern int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
- int length);
+ int length, int read_type);
extern void line6_midibuf_reset(struct midi_buffer *mb);
extern int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
int length);
--- a/sound/usb/line6/pod.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/pod.c
@@ -159,8 +159,9 @@ static struct line6_pcm_properties pod_p
.bytes_per_channel = 3 /* SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_S24_3LE */
};
+
static const char pod_version_header[] = {
- 0xf2, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
+ 0xf0, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
};
static char *pod_alloc_sysex_buffer(struct usb_line6_pod *pod, int code,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 57/71] ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 56/71] ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 58/71] ALSA: hda/hdmi: Static PCM mapping again with AMD HDMI codecs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Artem Egorkine, Takashi Iwai
From: Artem Egorkine <arteme@gmail.com>
commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream.
Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk
buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex
messages are sent to a PODxt device.
Signed-off-by: Artem Egorkine <arteme@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221225105728.1153989-2-arteme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/usb/line6/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/midi.c
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
int req, done;
for (;;) {
- req = min(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size);
+ req = min3(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size,
+ LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
done = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, chunk, req);
if (done == 0)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 58/71] ALSA: hda/hdmi: Static PCM mapping again with AMD HDMI codecs
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 57/71] ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 59/71] pnode: terminate at peers of source Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 090ddad4c7a9fefd647c762093a555870a19c8b2 upstream.
The recent code refactoring for HD-audio HDMI codec driver caused a
regression on AMD/ATI HDMI codecs; namely, PulseAudioand pipewire
don't recognize HDMI outputs any longer while the direct output via
ALSA raw access still works.
The problem turned out that, after the code refactoring, the driver
assumes only the dynamic PCM assignment, and when a PCM stream that
still isn't assigned to any pin gets opened, the driver tries to
assign any free converter to the PCM stream. This behavior is OK for
Intel and other codecs, as they have arbitrary connections between
pins and converters. OTOH, on AMD chips that have a 1:1 mapping
between pins and converters, this may end up with blocking the open of
the next PCM stream for the pin that is tied with the formerly taken
converter.
Also, with the code refactoring, more PCM streams are exposed than
necessary as we assume all converters can be used, while this isn't
true for AMD case. This may change the PCM stream assignment and
confuse users as well.
This patch fixes those problems by:
- Introducing a flag spec->static_pcm_mapping, and if it's set, the
driver applies the static mapping between pins and converters at the
probe time
- Limiting the number of PCM streams per pins, too; this avoids the
superfluous PCM streams
Fixes: ef6f5494faf6 ("ALSA: hda/hdmi: Use only dynamic PCM device allocation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216836
Co-developed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221228125714.16329-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ struct hdmi_spec {
struct hdmi_ops ops;
bool dyn_pin_out;
+ bool static_pcm_mapping;
/* hdmi interrupt trigger control flag for Nvidia codec */
bool hdmi_intr_trig_ctrl;
bool nv_dp_workaround; /* workaround DP audio infoframe for Nvidia */
@@ -1525,13 +1526,16 @@ static void update_eld(struct hda_codec
*/
pcm_jack = pin_idx_to_pcm_jack(codec, per_pin);
- if (eld->eld_valid) {
- hdmi_attach_hda_pcm(spec, per_pin);
- hdmi_pcm_setup_pin(spec, per_pin);
- } else {
- hdmi_pcm_reset_pin(spec, per_pin);
- hdmi_detach_hda_pcm(spec, per_pin);
+ if (!spec->static_pcm_mapping) {
+ if (eld->eld_valid) {
+ hdmi_attach_hda_pcm(spec, per_pin);
+ hdmi_pcm_setup_pin(spec, per_pin);
+ } else {
+ hdmi_pcm_reset_pin(spec, per_pin);
+ hdmi_detach_hda_pcm(spec, per_pin);
+ }
}
+
/* if pcm_idx == -1, it means this is in monitor connection event
* we can get the correct pcm_idx now.
*/
@@ -2281,8 +2285,8 @@ static int generic_hdmi_build_pcms(struc
struct hdmi_spec *spec = codec->spec;
int idx, pcm_num;
- /* limit the PCM devices to the codec converters */
- pcm_num = spec->num_cvts;
+ /* limit the PCM devices to the codec converters or available PINs */
+ pcm_num = min(spec->num_cvts, spec->num_pins);
codec_dbg(codec, "hdmi: pcm_num set to %d\n", pcm_num);
for (idx = 0; idx < pcm_num; idx++) {
@@ -2379,6 +2383,11 @@ static int generic_hdmi_build_controls(s
struct hdmi_spec_per_pin *per_pin = get_pin(spec, pin_idx);
struct hdmi_eld *pin_eld = &per_pin->sink_eld;
+ if (spec->static_pcm_mapping) {
+ hdmi_attach_hda_pcm(spec, per_pin);
+ hdmi_pcm_setup_pin(spec, per_pin);
+ }
+
pin_eld->eld_valid = false;
hdmi_present_sense(per_pin, 0);
}
@@ -4419,6 +4428,8 @@ static int patch_atihdmi(struct hda_code
spec = codec->spec;
+ spec->static_pcm_mapping = true;
+
spec->ops.pin_get_eld = atihdmi_pin_get_eld;
spec->ops.pin_setup_infoframe = atihdmi_pin_setup_infoframe;
spec->ops.pin_hbr_setup = atihdmi_pin_hbr_setup;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 59/71] pnode: terminate at peers of source
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 58/71] ALSA: hda/hdmi: Static PCM mapping again with AMD HDMI codecs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 60/71] mfd: mt6360: Add bounds checking in Regmap read/write call-backs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ditang Chen,
Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean), Christian Brauner (Microsoft)
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.
The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating
mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all
applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by
@dest_mnt.
Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of
@source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become
masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in
the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.
Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger.
Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged
users.
While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to
unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some
clarifications:
* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount
belongs to a peer group.
* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other.
They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available
in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id.
The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.
* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that
receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts
may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their
master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on
that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.
* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it
denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term
"master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking
in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master
mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a
slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can
be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point
to different masters in the same peer group.
* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists.
Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to
ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the
->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.
* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive
propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with
these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest
peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id
@slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave
mount receives propagation from.
* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also
a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive
propagation from another peer group.
If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same
->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.
* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group
but is not a peer in another peer group.
* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single
peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point
to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts
such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to
@shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a
single propagation level in a propagation tree.
For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and
all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1.
So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer
in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2
together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in
their ->mnt_master.
* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation
starting from a specific shared mount.
For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a
propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that
receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.
With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.
We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a
shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in
attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the
source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't
propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in
attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination
propagation tree.
The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This
copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt()
and doesn't concern us a lot here.
It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called
@source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus,
@source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in
the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its
former parent.
For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a
new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.
propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in
@last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in
@last_source.
Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination
propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination
propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the
source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.
Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy
of the source mount tree. This will become important later.
The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through
the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go
through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a
peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.
After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group
propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the
propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination
propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the
propagation tree.
The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount
tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it
propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW,
it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become
masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree
that become slaves to these masters.
It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to
each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we
create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.
Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree
headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the
source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of
each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly
mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to
create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters
before their slaves.
The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group
of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply
copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the
new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that
in a previous call to propagate_one().
The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave
mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and
mount a copy of the source mount tree on.
For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we
propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies
@child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an
ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of
the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful
but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.
But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree
@m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy
of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the
destination propagation tree @m.
Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.
If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that
@dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the
destination propagation tree.
We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is
simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the
source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group
as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at
the first slave @m:
for (n = m; ; n = p) {
p = n->mnt_master;
if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
break;
}
For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way
up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy
can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the
destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.
Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important.
Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer
group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code
above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.
So the first iteration sets:
n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;
such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one
more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:
n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is
now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group
then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master
outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.
Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount
tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's
peer group:
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
if (last_source == first_source)
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and
@last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to
in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().
Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that
last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we
want to pick.
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to
@last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is
either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation
tree and so does @p. Hence:
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
is trivially true in the base condition.
We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group
that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was
initialized to:
last_dest = dest_mnt;
at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of
@dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the
first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for
peers here as that's important.):
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last
copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group.
The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip
over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.
At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first
master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from
@dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.
By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it
again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount
tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to
@dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we
selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in
the destination propagation tree again.
The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact
that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was
mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest.
What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination
propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m
does.
If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have
mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then
we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know
that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that
@last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source
mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.
IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination
propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead
us to an earlier propagation node @m via
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.
Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted
on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can
also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.
So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous
copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous
propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to
determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.
The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source
mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the
destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a
suitable master in the propagation group.
As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we
create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation
tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is
a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We
store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to
that master in @n
We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the
master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree
stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous
destination propagation node @m.
We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and
by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If
we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount
tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree
we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation
node @m.
If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know
that the closest master they receive propagation from is
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the
closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be
one level higher up.
This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers
in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the
same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the
closest peer group that they receive propagation from.
However, terminating the walk has corner cases.
If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be
found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master
then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy
of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source
mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as
its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that
the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.
We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master
either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it
is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.
So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference
via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the
walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of
slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer
group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then
we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to
@dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount
tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the
propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on
@last_source->mnt_master.
So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses
something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.
If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in
propagate_mnt():
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the
source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will
point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted
on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.
Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore.
Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this
loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently
come last in that peer loop.
So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group
the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of
the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount
tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.
But this means that the termination condition that checks for
@source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by
propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount
tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group
again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.
IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group
isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL
causing the splat below.
For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers
in its peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
\
(@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]: 609 609 shared:218
(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216
\
(P1) mnt_master[218]: 624 607 shared:218
(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216
\
(P2) mnt_master[218]: 625 576 shared:218
(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216
\
(P3) mnt_master[218]: 626 545 shared:218
After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3),
the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we
handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount
on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218
\ /
\/
(P4) mnt_slave 627 483 master:218
will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).
When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master
hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.
We can fix this in multiple ways:
(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers
in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in
propagate_mnt().
(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly
@source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.
(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer
group or some clever variant thereof.
The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix.
The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in
the near future.
This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation
testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of
this issues.
Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm.
There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(),
propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has
been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is
insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's
happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into
fixing this.
Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged
are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users
while namespace_lock() lock is held.
[ 115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[ 115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3
[ 115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[ 115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[ 115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[ 115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[ 115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[ 115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[ 115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 115.856859] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 115.857531] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[ 115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 115.860099] Call Trace:
[ 115.860358] <TASK>
[ 115.860535] propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190
[ 115.860848] attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0
[ 115.861212] path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60
[ 115.861503] __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140
[ 115.861819] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[ 115.862117] ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250
[ 115.862435] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 115.862826] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.863133] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 115.863527] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.863835] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.864144] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.864452] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[ 115.864775] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe
[ 115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff
c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[ 115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000a5
[ 115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe
[ 115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620
[ 115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620
[ 115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076
[ 115.870581] </TASK>
[ 115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6
nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6
nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0
sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr
intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev
soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic
drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic
pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath
[ 115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010
[ 115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[ 115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[ 115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[ 115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[ 115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[ 115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[ 115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 115.881548] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 115.882234] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[ 115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes: f2ebb3a921c1 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Fixes: 5ec0811d3037 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ditang Chen <ditang.c@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
If there are no big objections I'll get this to Linus rather sooner than later.
---
fs/pnode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m
}
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
- if (last_source == first_source)
+ if (peers(last_source, first_source))
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 60/71] mfd: mt6360: Add bounds checking in Regmap read/write call-backs
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 59/71] pnode: terminate at peers of source Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 61/71] md: fix a crash in mempool_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, ChiYuan Huang, Lee Jones
From: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com>
commit 5f4f94e9f26cca6514474b307b59348b8485e711 upstream.
Fix the potential risk of OOB read if bank index is over the maximum.
Refer to the discussion list for the experiment result on mt6370.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220914013345.GA5802@cyhuang-hp-elitebook-840-g3.rt/
If not to check the bound, there is the same issue on mt6360.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3b0850440a06c (mfd: mt6360: Merge different sub-devices I2C read/write)
Signed-off-by: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1664416817-31590-1-git-send-email-u0084500@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/mfd/mt6360-core.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/mfd/mt6360-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/mt6360-core.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int mt6360_regmap_read(void *cont
struct mt6360_ddata *ddata = context;
u8 bank = *(u8 *)reg;
u8 reg_addr = *(u8 *)(reg + 1);
- struct i2c_client *i2c = ddata->i2c[bank];
+ struct i2c_client *i2c;
bool crc_needed = false;
u8 *buf;
int buf_len = MT6360_ALLOC_READ_SIZE(val_size);
@@ -410,6 +410,11 @@ static int mt6360_regmap_read(void *cont
u8 crc;
int ret;
+ if (bank >= MT6360_SLAVE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ i2c = ddata->i2c[bank];
+
if (bank == MT6360_SLAVE_PMIC || bank == MT6360_SLAVE_LDO) {
crc_needed = true;
ret = mt6360_xlate_pmicldo_addr(®_addr, val_size);
@@ -453,13 +458,18 @@ static int mt6360_regmap_write(void *con
struct mt6360_ddata *ddata = context;
u8 bank = *(u8 *)val;
u8 reg_addr = *(u8 *)(val + 1);
- struct i2c_client *i2c = ddata->i2c[bank];
+ struct i2c_client *i2c;
bool crc_needed = false;
u8 *buf;
int buf_len = MT6360_ALLOC_WRITE_SIZE(val_size);
int write_size = val_size - MT6360_REGMAP_REG_BYTE_SIZE;
int ret;
+ if (bank >= MT6360_SLAVE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ i2c = ddata->i2c[bank];
+
if (bank == MT6360_SLAVE_PMIC || bank == MT6360_SLAVE_LDO) {
crc_needed = true;
ret = mt6360_xlate_pmicldo_addr(®_addr, val_size - MT6360_REGMAP_REG_BYTE_SIZE);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 61/71] md: fix a crash in mempool_free
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 60/71] mfd: mt6360: Add bounds checking in Regmap read/write call-backs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 62/71] mm, compaction: fix fast_isolate_around() to stay within boundaries Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mikulas Patocka, Song Liu
From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream.
There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test
shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.
The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and
wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev)
and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing
with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio)
is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing
a crash in mempool_free.
We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.
We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by
Neil Brown.
The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before
we decrement the number of in-progress bios.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay]
RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80
Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8
RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000
R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
__submit_bio+0x76/0x120
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0
flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay]
process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300
worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0
? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
kthread+0xc2/0x100
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd]
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/md.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -509,13 +509,14 @@ static void md_end_flush(struct bio *bio
struct md_rdev *rdev = bio->bi_private;
struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev;
+ bio_put(bio);
+
rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending)) {
/* The pre-request flush has finished */
queue_work(md_wq, &mddev->flush_work);
}
- bio_put(bio);
}
static void md_submit_flush_data(struct work_struct *ws);
@@ -913,10 +914,12 @@ static void super_written(struct bio *bi
} else
clear_bit(LastDev, &rdev->flags);
+ bio_put(bio);
+
+ rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
+
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes))
wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
- rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
- bio_put(bio);
}
void md_super_write(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 62/71] mm, compaction: fix fast_isolate_around() to stay within boundaries
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 61/71] md: fix a crash in mempool_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 63/71] f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, NARIBAYASHI Akira, David Rientjes,
Mel Gorman, Vlastimil Babka, Andrew Morton
From: NARIBAYASHI Akira <a.naribayashi@fujitsu.com>
commit be21b32afe470c5ae98e27e49201158a47032942 upstream.
Depending on the memory configuration, isolate_freepages_block() may scan
pages out of the target range and causes panic.
Panic can occur on systems with multiple zones in a single pageblock.
The reason it is rare is that it only happens in special
configurations. Depending on how many similar systems there are, it
may be a good idea to fix this problem for older kernels as well.
The problem is that pfn as argument of fast_isolate_around() could be out
of the target range. Therefore we should consider the case where pfn <
start_pfn, and also the case where end_pfn < pfn.
This problem should have been addressd by the commit 6e2b7044c199 ("mm,
compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone") but there was
an oversight.
Case1: pfn < start_pfn
<at memory compaction for node Y>
| node X's zone | node Y's zone
+-----------------+------------------------------...
pageblock ^ ^ ^
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
^ ^ ^
^ ^ end_pfn
^ start_pfn = cc->zone->zone_start_pfn
pfn
<---------> scanned range by "Scan After"
Case2: end_pfn < pfn
<at memory compaction for node X>
| node X's zone | node Y's zone
+-----------------+------------------------------...
pageblock ^ ^ ^
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
^ ^ ^
^ ^ pfn
^ end_pfn
start_pfn
<---------> scanned range by "Scan Before"
It seems that there is no good reason to skip nr_isolated pages just after
given pfn. So let perform simple scan from start to end instead of
dividing the scan into "Before" and "After".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221026112438.236336-1-a.naribayashi@fujitsu.com
Fixes: 6e2b7044c199 ("mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone").
Signed-off-by: NARIBAYASHI Akira <a.naribayashi@fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/compaction.c | 18 +++++-------------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/compaction.c
+++ b/mm/compaction.c
@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ move_freelist_tail(struct list_head *fre
}
static void
-fast_isolate_around(struct compact_control *cc, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_isolated)
+fast_isolate_around(struct compact_control *cc, unsigned long pfn)
{
unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
struct page *page;
@@ -1365,21 +1365,13 @@ fast_isolate_around(struct compact_contr
if (!page)
return;
- /* Scan before */
- if (start_pfn != pfn) {
- isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
- if (cc->nr_freepages >= cc->nr_migratepages)
- return;
- }
-
- /* Scan after */
- start_pfn = pfn + nr_isolated;
- if (start_pfn < end_pfn)
- isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, end_pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
+ isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, end_pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
/* Skip this pageblock in the future as it's full or nearly full */
if (cc->nr_freepages < cc->nr_migratepages)
set_pageblock_skip(page);
+
+ return;
}
/* Search orders in round-robin fashion */
@@ -1556,7 +1548,7 @@ fast_isolate_freepages(struct compact_co
return cc->free_pfn;
low_pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
- fast_isolate_around(cc, low_pfn, nr_isolated);
+ fast_isolate_around(cc, low_pfn);
return low_pfn;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 63/71] f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 62/71] mm, compaction: fix fast_isolate_around() to stay within boundaries Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 64/71] f2fs: allow to read node block after shutdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Pavel Machek, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
commit c3db3c2fd9992c08f49aa93752d3c103c3a4f6aa upstream.
The commit introduces another bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c6ad7fd16657e ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/gc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c
@@ -1109,6 +1109,7 @@ static bool is_alive(struct f2fs_sb_info
if (ofs_in_node >= max_addrs) {
f2fs_err(sbi, "Inconsistent ofs_in_node:%u in summary, ino:%u, nid:%u, max:%u",
ofs_in_node, dni->ino, dni->nid, max_addrs);
+ f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
return false;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 64/71] f2fs: allow to read node block after shutdown
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 63/71] f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 65/71] block: Do not reread partition table on exclusively open device Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit e6ecb142429183cef4835f31d4134050ae660032 upstream.
If block address is still alive, we should give a valid node block even after
shutdown. Otherwise, we can see zero data when reading out a file.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 83a3bfdb5a8a ("f2fs: indicate shutdown f2fs to allow unmount successfully")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1360,8 +1360,7 @@ static int read_node_page(struct page *p
return err;
/* NEW_ADDR can be seen, after cp_error drops some dirty node pages */
- if (unlikely(ni.blk_addr == NULL_ADDR || ni.blk_addr == NEW_ADDR) ||
- is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_IS_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ if (unlikely(ni.blk_addr == NULL_ADDR || ni.blk_addr == NEW_ADDR)) {
ClearPageUptodate(page);
return -ENOENT;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 65/71] block: Do not reread partition table on exclusively open device
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 64/71] f2fs: allow to read node block after shutdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 66/71] mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jan Kara, Jens Axboe
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
commit 36369f46e91785688a5f39d7a5590e3f07981316 upstream.
Since commit 10c70d95c0f2 ("block: remove the bd_openers checks in
blk_drop_partitions") we allow rereading of partition table although
there are users of the block device. This has an undesirable consequence
that e.g. if sda and sdb are assembled to a RAID1 device md0 with
partitions, BLKRRPART ioctl on sda will rescan partition table and
create sda1 device. This partition device under a raid device confuses
some programs (such as libstorage-ng used for initial partitioning for
distribution installation) leading to failures.
Fix the problem refusing to rescan partitions if there is another user
that has the block device exclusively open.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221130135344.2ul4cyfstfs3znxg@quack3
Fixes: 10c70d95c0f2 ("block: remove the bd_openers checks in blk_drop_partitions")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130175653.24299-1-jack@suse.cz
[axboe: fold in followup fix]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
block/blk.h | 2 +-
block/genhd.c | 7 +++++--
block/ioctl.c | 12 +++++++-----
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/block/blk.h
+++ b/block/blk.h
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *blk_get
}
struct request_queue *blk_alloc_queue(int node_id, bool alloc_srcu);
-int disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode);
+int disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode, void *owner);
int disk_alloc_events(struct gendisk *disk);
void disk_add_events(struct gendisk *disk);
--- a/block/genhd.c
+++ b/block/genhd.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void disk_uevent(struct gendisk *disk, e
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(disk_uevent);
-int disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
+int disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode, void *owner)
{
struct block_device *bdev;
@@ -366,6 +366,9 @@ int disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk
return -EINVAL;
if (disk->open_partitions)
return -EBUSY;
+ /* Someone else has bdev exclusively open? */
+ if (disk->part0->bd_holder && disk->part0->bd_holder != owner)
+ return -EBUSY;
set_bit(GD_NEED_PART_SCAN, &disk->state);
bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(disk_devt(disk), mode, NULL);
@@ -500,7 +503,7 @@ int __must_check device_add_disk(struct
bdev_add(disk->part0, ddev->devt);
if (get_capacity(disk))
- disk_scan_partitions(disk, FMODE_READ);
+ disk_scan_partitions(disk, FMODE_READ, NULL);
/*
* Announce the disk and partitions after all partitions are
--- a/block/ioctl.c
+++ b/block/ioctl.c
@@ -467,9 +467,10 @@ static int blkdev_bszset(struct block_de
* user space. Note the separate arg/argp parameters that are needed
* to deal with the compat_ptr() conversion.
*/
-static int blkdev_common_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
- unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg, void __user *argp)
+static int blkdev_common_ioctl(struct file *file, fmode_t mode, unsigned cmd,
+ unsigned long arg, void __user *argp)
{
+ struct block_device *bdev = I_BDEV(file->f_mapping->host);
unsigned int max_sectors;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -527,7 +528,8 @@ static int blkdev_common_ioctl(struct bl
return -EACCES;
if (bdev_is_partition(bdev))
return -EINVAL;
- return disk_scan_partitions(bdev->bd_disk, mode & ~FMODE_EXCL);
+ return disk_scan_partitions(bdev->bd_disk, mode & ~FMODE_EXCL,
+ file);
case BLKTRACESTART:
case BLKTRACESTOP:
case BLKTRACETEARDOWN:
@@ -605,7 +607,7 @@ long blkdev_ioctl(struct file *file, uns
break;
}
- ret = blkdev_common_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg, argp);
+ ret = blkdev_common_ioctl(file, mode, cmd, arg, argp);
if (ret != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
return ret;
@@ -674,7 +676,7 @@ long compat_blkdev_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
}
- ret = blkdev_common_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg, argp);
+ ret = blkdev_common_ioctl(file, mode, cmd, arg, argp);
if (ret == -ENOIOCTLCMD && disk->fops->compat_ioctl)
ret = disk->fops->compat_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 66/71] mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 65/71] block: Do not reread partition table on exclusively open device Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 67/71] tpm: acpi: Call acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Deren Wu, Ulf Hansson
From: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
commit 4a44cd249604e29e7b90ae796d7692f5773dd348 upstream.
vub300_enable_sdio_irq() works with mutex and need TASK_RUNNING here.
Ensure that we mark current as TASK_RUNNING for sleepable context.
[ 77.554641] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff92a72c1d>] sdio_irq_thread+0x17d/0x5b0
[ 77.554652] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1983 at kernel/sched/core.c:9813 __might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[ 77.554905] CPU: 2 PID: 1983 Comm: ksdioirqd/mmc1 Tainted: G OE 6.1.0-rc5 #1
[ 77.554910] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0081.2020.0504.1834 05/04/2020
[ 77.554912] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[ 77.554920] RSP: 0018:ffff888107b7fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 77.554923] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888118c1b740 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 77.554926] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed1020f6ffa9
[ 77.554928] RBP: ffff888107b7fde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1043ea60ba
[ 77.554930] R10: ffff88821f5305cb R11: ffffed1043ea60b9 R12: ffffffff93aa3a60
[ 77.554932] R13: 000000000000011b R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: ffffffffc0558660
[ 77.554934] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88821f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 77.554937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 77.554939] CR2: 00007f8a44010d68 CR3: 000000024421a003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 77.554942] Call Trace:
[ 77.554944] <TASK>
[ 77.554952] mutex_lock+0x78/0xf0
[ 77.554973] vub300_enable_sdio_irq+0x103/0x3c0 [vub300]
[ 77.554981] sdio_irq_thread+0x25c/0x5b0
[ 77.555006] kthread+0x2b8/0x370
[ 77.555017] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 77.555023] </TASK>
[ 77.555025] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: 88095e7b473a ("mmc: Add new VUB300 USB-to-SD/SDIO/MMC driver")
Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87dc45b122d26d63c80532976813c9365d7160b3.1670140888.git.deren.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c
@@ -2049,6 +2049,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
return;
kref_get(&vub300->kref);
if (enable) {
+ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
mutex_lock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
if (vub300->irqs_queued) {
vub300->irqs_queued -= 1;
@@ -2064,6 +2065,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
vub300_queue_poll_work(vub300, 0);
}
mutex_unlock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
} else {
vub300->irq_enabled = 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 67/71] tpm: acpi: Call acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 66/71] mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 68/71] tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hanjun Guo, Jarkko Sakkinen
From: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
commit 8740a12ca2e2959531ad253bac99ada338b33d80 upstream.
The start and length of the event log area are obtained from
TPM2 or TCPA table, so we call acpi_get_table() to get the
ACPI information, but the acpi_get_table() should be coupled with
acpi_put_table() to release the ACPI memory, add the acpi_put_table()
properly to fix the memory leak.
While we are at it, remove the redundant empty line at the
end of the tpm_read_log_acpi().
Fixes: 0bfb23746052 ("tpm: Move eventlog files to a subdirectory")
Fixes: 85467f63a05c ("tpm: Add support for event log pointer found in TPM2 ACPI table")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c
@@ -90,16 +90,21 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *c
return -ENODEV;
if (tbl->header.length <
- sizeof(*tbl) + sizeof(struct acpi_tpm2_phy))
+ sizeof(*tbl) + sizeof(struct acpi_tpm2_phy)) {
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl);
return -ENODEV;
+ }
tpm2_phy = (void *)tbl + sizeof(*tbl);
len = tpm2_phy->log_area_minimum_length;
start = tpm2_phy->log_area_start_address;
- if (!start || !len)
+ if (!start || !len) {
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl);
return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl);
format = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
} else {
/* Find TCPA entry in RSDT (ACPI_LOGICAL_ADDRESSING) */
@@ -120,8 +125,10 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *c
break;
}
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)buff);
format = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
}
+
if (!len) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: TCPA log area empty\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
@@ -156,5 +163,4 @@ err:
kfree(log->bios_event_log);
log->bios_event_log = NULL;
return ret;
-
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 68/71] tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 67/71] tpm: acpi: Call acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 69/71] tpm: tpm_tis: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hanjun Guo, Jarkko Sakkinen
From: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
commit 37e90c374dd11cf4919c51e847c6d6ced0abc555 upstream.
In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information
like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the
TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call
acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak.
Fixes: 30fc8d138e91 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -676,12 +676,16 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
/* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */
sm = buf->start_method;
- if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
- return -ENODEV;
+ if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct crb_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!priv)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!priv) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC) {
if (buf->header.length < (sizeof(*buf) + sizeof(*crb_smc))) {
@@ -689,7 +693,8 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table has wrong size %u for start method type %d\n",
buf->header.length,
ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC);
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
crb_smc = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct tpm2_crb_smc, buf, sizeof(*buf));
priv->smc_func_id = crb_smc->smc_func_id;
@@ -700,17 +705,23 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
rc = crb_map_io(device, priv, buf);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto out;
chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb);
- if (IS_ERR(chip))
- return PTR_ERR(chip);
+ if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(chip);
+ goto out;
+ }
dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
- return tpm_chip_register(chip);
+ rc = tpm_chip_register(chip);
+
+out:
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)buf);
+ return rc;
}
static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 69/71] tpm: tpm_tis: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 68/71] tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 70/71] SUNRPC: Dont leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hanjun Guo, Jarkko Sakkinen
From: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
commit db9622f762104459ff87ecdf885cc42c18053fd9 upstream.
In check_acpi_tpm2(), we get the TPM2 table just to make
sure the table is there, not used after the init, so the
acpi_put_table() should be added to release the ACPI memory.
Fixes: 4cb586a188d4 ("tpm_tis: Consolidate the platform and acpi probe flow")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
const struct acpi_device_id *aid = acpi_match_device(tpm_acpi_tbl, dev);
struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl;
acpi_status st;
+ int ret = 0;
if (!aid || aid->driver_data != DEVICE_IS_TPM2)
return 0;
@@ -132,8 +133,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
/* If the ACPI TPM2 signature is matched then a global ACPI_SIG_TPM2
* table is mandatory
*/
- st =
- acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl);
+ st = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(st) || tbl->header.length < sizeof(*tbl)) {
dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
/* The tpm2_crb driver handles this device */
if (tbl->start_method != ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
- return -ENODEV;
+ ret = -ENODEV;
- return 0;
+ acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl);
+ return ret;
}
#else
static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device *dev)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 70/71] SUNRPC: Dont leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 69/71] tpm: tpm_tis: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 71/71] kcsan: Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove with newer Clang Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Chuck Lever, Jeff Layton
From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
commit da522b5fe1a5f8b7c20a0023e87b52a150e53bf5 upstream.
Fixes: 030d794bf498 ("SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server RPCGSS authentication.")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -1162,18 +1162,23 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct sv
return res;
inlen = svc_getnl(argv);
- if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len))
+ if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len)) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!in_token->pages)
+ if (!in_token->pages) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
in_token->page_base = 0;
in_token->page_len = inlen;
for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in_token->pages[i]) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token);
return SVC_DENIED;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.1 71/71] kcsan: Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove with newer Clang
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 70/71] SUNRPC: Dont leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 11:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-02 23:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Rudi Heitbaum
` (11 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2023-01-02 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Marco Elver, Paul E. McKenney
From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
commit 7c201739beef1a586d806463f1465429cdce34c5 upstream.
With Clang version 16+, -fsanitize=thread will turn
memcpy/memset/memmove calls in instrumented functions into
__tsan_memcpy/__tsan_memset/__tsan_memmove calls respectively.
Add these functions to the core KCSAN runtime, so that we (a) catch data
races with mem* functions, and (b) won't run into linker errors with
such newer compilers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/kcsan/core.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/kcsan/core.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "encoding.h"
@@ -1308,3 +1310,51 @@ noinline void __tsan_atomic_signal_fence
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_atomic_signal_fence);
+
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET
+void *__tsan_memset(void *s, int c, size_t count);
+noinline void *__tsan_memset(void *s, int c, size_t count)
+{
+ /*
+ * Instead of not setting up watchpoints where accessed size is greater
+ * than MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE, truncate checked size to MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE.
+ */
+ size_t check_len = min_t(size_t, count, MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE);
+
+ check_access(s, check_len, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE, _RET_IP_);
+ return memset(s, c, count);
+}
+#else
+void *__tsan_memset(void *s, int c, size_t count) __alias(memset);
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_memset);
+
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
+void *__tsan_memmove(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);
+noinline void *__tsan_memmove(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t check_len = min_t(size_t, len, MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE);
+
+ check_access(dst, check_len, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE, _RET_IP_);
+ check_access(src, check_len, 0, _RET_IP_);
+ return memmove(dst, src, len);
+}
+#else
+void *__tsan_memmove(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len) __alias(memmove);
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_memmove);
+
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY
+void *__tsan_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);
+noinline void *__tsan_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t check_len = min_t(size_t, len, MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE);
+
+ check_access(dst, check_len, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE, _RET_IP_);
+ check_access(src, check_len, 0, _RET_IP_);
+ return memcpy(dst, src, len);
+}
+#else
+void *__tsan_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len) __alias(memcpy);
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_memcpy);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 11:22 ` [PATCH 6.1 71/71] kcsan: Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove with newer Clang Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2023-01-02 23:14 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2023-01-03 0:25 ` Shuah Khan
` (10 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Rudi Heitbaum @ 2023-01-02 23:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
On Mon, Jan 02, 2023 at 12:21:25PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Hi Greg,
6.1.3-rc1 tested.
Run tested on:
- Allwinner H6 (Tanix TX6)
- Intel Alder Lake x86_64 (nuc12 i7-1260P)
- SolidRun Cubox-i Dual/Quad - NXP iMX6 (Cubox-i4Pro)
In addition - build tested for:
- Allwinner A64
- Allwinner H3
- Allwinner H5
- NXP iMX8
- Qualcomm Dragonboard
- Rockchip RK3288
- Rockchip RK3328
- Rockchip RK3399pro
- Samsung Exynos
Tested-by: Rudi Heitbaum <rudi@heitbaum.com>
--
Rudi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-02 23:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Rudi Heitbaum
@ 2023-01-03 0:25 ` Shuah Khan
2023-01-03 1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
` (9 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2023-01-03 0:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee, srw,
rwarsow, Shuah Khan
On 1/2/23 04:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 0:25 ` Shuah Khan
@ 2023-01-03 1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-01-03 7:24 ` Fenil Jain
` (8 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2023-01-03 1:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee, srw,
rwarsow
On Mon, Jan 02, 2023 at 12:21:25PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 500 pass: 500 fail: 0
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2023-01-03 7:24 ` Fenil Jain
2023-01-03 8:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
` (7 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Fenil Jain @ 2023-01-03 7:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman; +Cc: stable
Hey Greg,
Ran tests and boot tested on my system, no regressions found
Tested-by: Fenil Jain <fkjainco@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 7:24 ` Fenil Jain
@ 2023-01-03 8:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-01-03 8:45 ` Naresh Kamboju
` (6 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2023-01-03 8:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
On Mon, 2 Jan 2023 at 16:53, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
## Build
* kernel: 6.1.3-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-6.1.y
* git commit: 6b5c4463f777f449d7e177fd1aa608e0b69f33db
* git describe: v6.1.2-72-g6b5c4463f777
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.1.y/build/v6.1.2-72-g6b5c4463f777
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Test result summary
total: 166702, pass: 148814, fail: 3210, skip: 14678, xfail: 0
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 151 total, 146 passed, 5 failed
* arm64: 51 total, 50 passed, 1 failed
* i386: 39 total, 36 passed, 3 failed
* mips: 30 total, 28 passed, 2 failed
* parisc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 38 total, 32 passed, 6 failed
* riscv: 16 total, 15 passed, 1 failed
* s390: 16 total, 14 passed, 2 failed
* sh: 14 total, 12 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 44 total, 44 passed, 0 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cv
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 8:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2023-01-03 8:45 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-01-03 8:59 ` Ron Economos
` (5 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2023-01-03 8:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
On Mon, 2 Jan 2023 at 16:53, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
## Build
* kernel: 6.1.3-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-6.1.y
* git commit: 6b5c4463f777f449d7e177fd1aa608e0b69f33db
* git describe: v6.1.2-72-g6b5c4463f777
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.1.y/build/v6.1.2-72-g6b5c4463f777
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.1.1-1141-g9c94d2e408ab)
## Test result summary
total: 166702, pass: 148814, fail: 3210, skip: 14678, xfail: 0
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 151 total, 146 passed, 5 failed
* arm64: 51 total, 50 passed, 1 failed
* i386: 39 total, 36 passed, 3 failed
* mips: 30 total, 28 passed, 2 failed
* parisc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 38 total, 32 passed, 6 failed
* riscv: 16 total, 15 passed, 1 failed
* s390: 16 total, 14 passed, 2 failed
* sh: 14 total, 12 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 44 total, 44 passed, 0 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cv
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 8:45 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2023-01-03 8:59 ` Ron Economos
2023-01-03 10:34 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
` (4 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Ron Economos @ 2023-01-03 8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee, srw,
rwarsow
On 1/2/23 3:21 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 8:59 ` Ron Economos
@ 2023-01-03 10:34 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2023-01-03 12:08 ` Bagas Sanjaya
` (3 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink) @ 2023-01-03 10:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, srw, rwarsow
Hi Greg,
On Mon, Jan 02, 2023 at 12:21:25PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build test (gcc version 12.2.1 20221127):
mips: 52 configs -> no failure
arm: 100 configs -> no failure
arm64: 3 configs -> no failure
x86_64: 4 configs -> no failure
alpha allmodconfig -> no failure
csky allmodconfig -> no failure
powerpc allmodconfig -> no failure
riscv allmodconfig -> no failure
s390 allmodconfig -> no failure
xtensa allmodconfig -> no failure
Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
arm64: Booted on rpi4b (4GB model). No regression. [2]
mips: Booted on ci20 board. No regression. [3]
[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/2542
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/2543
[3]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/2544
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk>
--
Regards
Sudip
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 10:34 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
@ 2023-01-03 12:08 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-01-03 13:22 ` Allen Pais
` (2 subsequent siblings)
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Bagas Sanjaya @ 2023-01-03 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee, srw,
rwarsow
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 538 bytes --]
On Mon, Jan 02, 2023 at 12:21:25PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0)
and
powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.2.0).
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
--
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 228 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 12:08 ` Bagas Sanjaya
@ 2023-01-03 13:22 ` Allen Pais
2023-01-03 19:33 ` Florian Fainelli
2023-01-04 1:39 ` Justin Forbes
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Allen Pais @ 2023-01-03 13:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my x86_64 and ARM64 test systems. No errors or
regressions.
Tested-by: Allen Pais <apais@linux.microsoft.com>
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 13:22 ` Allen Pais
@ 2023-01-03 19:33 ` Florian Fainelli
2023-01-04 1:39 ` Justin Forbes
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2023-01-03 19:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
On 1/2/23 03:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on
BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
--
Florian
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review
2023-01-02 11:21 [PATCH 6.1 00/71] 6.1.3-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-03 19:33 ` Florian Fainelli
@ 2023-01-04 1:39 ` Justin Forbes
82 siblings, 0 replies; 84+ messages in thread
From: Justin Forbes @ 2023-01-04 1:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, srw, rwarsow
On Mon, Jan 02, 2023 at 12:21:25PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.3 release.
> There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jan 2023 11:05:34 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.3-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Tested rc1 against the Fedora build system (aarch64, armv7, ppc64le,
s390x, x86_64), and boot tested x86_64. No regressions noted.
Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 84+ messages in thread