From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C63C0C54EBE for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2023 16:25:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233122AbjAPQZS (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Jan 2023 11:25:18 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42902 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233081AbjAPQYs (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Jan 2023 11:24:48 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8655035264 for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2023 08:13:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 264CC61041 for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2023 16:13:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3A90DC433EF; Mon, 16 Jan 2023 16:13:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1673885611; bh=VQG2A0tN62AWabydY8b2hsHvQDQINRdtNid1RP0hI1A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=TrGWVhZH9jTcCDRC8wvx87vjAPEg+FuALE+HKRMXE7/Vmnj2SWXp1pIjGixd8lBK8 WTbQv/Y3C+IqU3DBbCxwKriO7l1jWE7PaRoRQgOPlubK8/OffmPggK0ync+XHer/Vd qeq/CMJPzT4Gi4gwm8oZkE2V0GRrOlLap4QqPMD8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Tyler Hicks , Casey Schaufler , Mimi Zohar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.4 117/658] ima: Rename internal filter rule functions Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 16:43:25 +0100 Message-Id: <20230116154914.854597313@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.0 In-Reply-To: <20230116154909.645460653@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230116154909.645460653@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Tyler Hicks [ Upstream commit b8867eedcf76caef8ae6412da97cd9abfd092ff8 ] Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*() to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace, which is typically reserved for general security subsystem infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler [zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Stable-dep-of: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 16 +++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 5fae6cfe8d91..146154e333e6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -361,24 +361,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES -#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init -#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free -#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match +#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init +#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free +#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match #else -static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } -static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 14aef74d3588..6cd2f663643c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { - security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); } kfree(entry); @@ -286,10 +286,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p) goto out_err; - security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, + nentry->lsm[i].args_p, + &nentry->lsm[i].rule); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -425,18 +424,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule); default: break; } @@ -821,10 +818,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, return -ENOMEM; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; - result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, - Audit_equal, - entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", (char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); -- 2.35.1