From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: marten.lindahl@axis.com, chengzhihao1@huawei.com, richard@nod.at
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ubifs: Fix memory leak in do_rename" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
Date: Sat, 06 May 2023 15:55:07 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2023050607-arena-skimmer-cb9c@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 3a36d20e012903f45714df2731261fdefac900cb
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2023050607-arena-skimmer-cb9c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
3a36d20e0129 ("ubifs: Fix memory leak in do_rename")
a0c515657307 ("ubifs: Fix AA deadlock when setting xattr for encrypted file")
278d9a243635 ("ubifs: Rename whiteout atomically")
afd427048047 ("ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent rename whiteout and inode writeback")
40a8f0d5e7b3 ("ubifs: rename_whiteout: Fix double free for whiteout_ui->data")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 3a36d20e012903f45714df2731261fdefac900cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?M=C3=A5rten=20Lindahl?= <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2023 16:40:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ubifs: Fix memory leak in do_rename
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If renaming a file in an encrypted directory, function
fscrypt_setup_filename allocates memory for a file name. This name is
never used, and before returning to the caller the memory for it is not
freed.
When running kmemleak on it we see that it is registered as a leak. The
report below is triggered by a simple program 'rename' that renames a
file in an encrypted directory:
unreferenced object 0xffff888101502840 (size 32):
comm "rename", pid 9404, jiffies 4302582475 (age 435.735s)
backtrace:
__kmem_cache_alloc_node
__kmalloc
fscrypt_setup_filename
do_rename
ubifs_rename
vfs_rename
do_renameat2
To fix this we can remove the call to fscrypt_setup_filename as it's not
needed.
Fixes: 278d9a243635f26 ("ubifs: Rename whiteout atomically")
Reported-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 5f33dbad27f6..ef0499edc248 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ static struct inode *create_whiteout(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
umode_t mode = S_IFCHR | WHITEOUT_MODE;
struct inode *inode;
struct ubifs_info *c = dir->i_sb->s_fs_info;
- struct fscrypt_name nm;
/*
* Create an inode('nlink = 1') for whiteout without updating journal,
@@ -369,10 +368,6 @@ static struct inode *create_whiteout(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
dbg_gen("dent '%pd', mode %#hx in dir ino %lu",
dentry, mode, dir->i_ino);
- err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &nm);
- if (err)
- return ERR_PTR(err);
-
inode = ubifs_new_inode(c, dir, mode, false);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
@@ -395,7 +390,6 @@ static struct inode *create_whiteout(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
make_bad_inode(inode);
iput(inode);
out_free:
- fscrypt_free_filename(&nm);
ubifs_err(c, "cannot create whiteout file, error %d", err);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
reply other threads:[~2023-05-06 7:10 UTC|newest]
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