From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC4BCC77B7F for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 10:05:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234017AbjEHKFO (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 May 2023 06:05:14 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33406 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234016AbjEHKFO (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 May 2023 06:05:14 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2258730141 for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 03:05:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8885362337 for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 10:05:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 67DADC433A4; Mon, 8 May 2023 10:05:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1683540310; bh=rPqTwewVKgAV3LUJ58k4LYfZP5qcLAfFcBbae+JYG8U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=LWEjSV4LxEKUmwXorahneK0VD8/3kKy4SgTGLAC3wEU0JSpcXj/gtZHHf4HmldzuT W9fqrPwB6EDRPMw+Zf1L5c7YZ27w5GNm2YsxmMRf7Cp6seS6TX9Syp5+Id89wOg8QS yksMK4a1vIn/pl6P+nM9bu0Z0IwwOl+TVUMFAKYw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Luis Gerhorst , Daniel Borkmann , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 283/611] bpf: Remove misleading spec_v1 check on var-offset stack read Date: Mon, 8 May 2023 11:42:05 +0200 Message-Id: <20230508094431.575330498@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.40.1 In-Reply-To: <20230508094421.513073170@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230508094421.513073170@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Luis Gerhorst [ Upstream commit 082cdc69a4651dd2a77539d69416a359ed1214f5 ] For every BPF_ADD/SUB involving a pointer, adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() ensures that the resulting pointer has a constant offset if bypass_spec_v1 is false. This is ensured by calling sanitize_check_bounds() which in turn calls check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(). There, -EACCESS is returned if the register's offset is not constant, thereby rejecting the program. In summary, an unprivileged user must never be able to create stack pointers with a variable offset. That is also the case, because a respective check in check_stack_write() is missing. If they were able to create a variable-offset pointer, users could still use it in a stack-write operation to trigger unsafe speculative behavior [1]. Because unprivileged users must already be prevented from creating variable-offset stack pointers, viable options are to either remove this check (replacing it with a clarifying comment), or to turn it into a "verifier BUG"-message, also adding a similar check in check_stack_write() (for consistency, as a second-level defense). This patch implements the first option to reduce verifier bloat. This check was introduced by commit 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access") which correctly notes that "variable-offset reads and writes are disallowed (they were already disallowed for the indirect access case) because the speculative execution checking code doesn't support them". However, it does not further discuss why the check in check_stack_read() is necessary. The code which made this check obsolete was also introduced in this commit. I have compiled ~650 programs from the Linux selftests, Linux samples, Cilium, and libbpf/examples projects and confirmed that none of these trigger the check in check_stack_read() [2]. Instead, all of these programs are, as expected, already rejected when constructing the variable-offset pointers. Note that the check in check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() also prints "off=%d" while the code removed by this patch does not (the error removed does not appear in the "verification_error" values). For reproducibility, the repository linked includes the raw data and scripts used to create the plot. [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.03757.pdf [2] https://gitlab.cs.fau.de/un65esoq/bpf-spectre/-/raw/53dc19fcf459c186613b1156a81504b39c8d49db/data/plots/23-02-26_23-56_bpftool/bpftool/0004-errors.pdf?inline=false Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access") Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230315165358.23701-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 ++++++---------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8a9f5143bbd1f..32ea9aaa8b8db 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3518,17 +3518,13 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack - * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). + * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in + * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by + * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers + * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, + * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack + * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. */ - if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { - char tn_buf[48]; - - tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", - ptr_regno, tn_buf); - return -EACCES; - } - if (!var_off) { off += reg->var_off.value; err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, -- 2.39.2