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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@amazon.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 20/30] arm/mm: Convert to using lock_mm_and_find_vma()
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:43:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230629184152.487485224@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230629184151.651069086@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 8b35ca3e45e35a26a21427f35d4093606e93ad0a upstream.

arm has an additional check for address < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS before
expanding the stack.  Since FIRST_USER_ADDRESS is defined everywhere
(generally as 0), move that check to the generic expand_downwards().

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/Kconfig    |    1 
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c |   63 +++++++++++-----------------------------------------
 mm/mmap.c           |    2 -
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_UID16
 	select HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
+	select LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
 	select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE if OF
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -231,37 +231,11 @@ static inline bool is_permission_fault(u
 	return false;
 }
 
-static vm_fault_t __kprobes
-__do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags,
-		unsigned long vma_flags, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
-	if (unlikely(!vma))
-		return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-
-	if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr)) {
-		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-		if (addr < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS)
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-		if (expand_stack(vma, addr))
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, check the
-	 * permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which occurred.
-	 */
-	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vma_flags))
-		return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
-
-	return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, flags, regs);
-}
-
 static int __kprobes
 do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	int sig, code;
 	vm_fault_t fault;
 	unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
@@ -300,31 +274,21 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsign
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
 
-	/*
-	 * As per x86, we may deadlock here.  However, since the kernel only
-	 * validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
-	 * we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
-	 */
-	if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm)) {
-		if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
-			goto no_context;
 retry:
-		mmap_read_lock(mm);
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
-		 * which case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
-		 * down_read()
-		 */
-		might_sleep();
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
-		if (!user_mode(regs) &&
-		    !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
-			goto no_context;
-#endif
+	vma = lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, regs);
+	if (unlikely(!vma)) {
+		fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
+		goto bad_area;
 	}
 
-	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, flags, vm_flags, regs);
+	/*
+	 * ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, check the
+	 * permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which occurred.
+	 */
+	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags))
+		fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	else
+		fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, flags, regs);
 
 	/* If we need to retry but a fatal signal is pending, handle the
 	 * signal first. We do not need to release the mmap_lock because
@@ -355,6 +319,7 @@ retry:
 	if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP | VM_FAULT_BADACCESS))))
 		return 0;
 
+bad_area:
 	/*
 	 * If we are in kernel mode at this point, we
 	 * have no context to handle this fault with.
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_stru
 	int error = 0;
 
 	address &= PAGE_MASK;
-	if (address < mmap_min_addr)
+	if (address < mmap_min_addr || address < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-29 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-29 18:43 [PATCH 6.1 00/30] 6.1.37-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/30] mm/mmap: Fix error path in do_vmi_align_munmap() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/30] mm/mmap: Fix error return " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/30] mptcp: ensure listener is unhashed before updating the sk status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/30] mm, hwpoison: try to recover from copy-on write faults Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/30] mm, hwpoison: when copy-on-write hits poison, take page offline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/30] x86/microcode/AMD: Load late on both threads too Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/30] x86/smp: Make stop_other_cpus() more robust Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/30] x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/30] x86/smp: Remove pointless wmb()s from native_stop_other_cpus() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/30] x86/smp: Use dedicated cache-line for mwait_play_dead() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/30] x86/smp: Cure kexec() vs. mwait_play_dead() breakage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/30] can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error fix on TX path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/30] maple_tree: fix potential out-of-bounds access in mas_wr_end_piv() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/30] mm: introduce new lock_mm_and_find_vma() page fault helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/30] mm: make the page fault mmap locking killable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 16/30] arm64/mm: Convert to using lock_mm_and_find_vma() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 17/30] powerpc/mm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 18/30] mips/mm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 19/30] riscv/mm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 21/30] mm/fault: convert remaining simple cases to lock_mm_and_find_vma() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 22/30] powerpc/mm: convert coprocessor fault " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 23/30] mm: make find_extend_vma() fail if write lock not held Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 24/30] execve: expand new process stack manually ahead of time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 25/30] mm: always expand the stack with the mmap write lock held Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 26/30] fbdev: fix potential OOB read in fast_imageblit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 27/30] HID: hidraw: fix data race on device refcount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 28/30] HID: wacom: Use ktime_t rather than int when dealing with timestamps Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 29/30] HID: logitech-hidpp: add HIDPP_QUIRK_DELAYED_INIT for the T651 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 18:43 ` [PATCH 6.1 30/30] Revert "thermal/drivers/mediatek: Use devm_of_iomap to avoid resource leak in mtk_thermal_probe" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-29 21:56 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/30] 6.1.37-rc1 review ogasawara takeshi
2023-06-29 22:25 ` Daniel Díaz
2023-06-30  5:18   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-06-30  5:21     ` Daniel Díaz
2023-06-30  5:30       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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