stable.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Christian Bricart <christian@bricart.de>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 09/15] x86/static_call: Fix __static_call_fixup()
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 16:15:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230824141447.611980994@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230824141447.155846739@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 54097309620ef0dc2d7083783dc521c6a5fef957 upstream.

Christian reported spurious module load crashes after some of Song's
module memory layout patches.

Turns out that if the very last instruction on the very last page of the
module is a 'JMP __x86_return_thunk' then __static_call_fixup() will
trip a fault and die.

And while the module rework made this slightly more likely to happen,
it's always been possible.

Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Reported-by: Christian Bricart <christian@bricart.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230816104419.GA982867@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -184,6 +184,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_trans
  */
 bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest)
 {
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)tramp;
+	/*
+	 * Not all .return_sites are a static_call trampoline (most are not).
+	 * Check if the 3 bytes after the return are still kernel text, if not,
+	 * then this definitely is not a trampoline and we need not worry
+	 * further.
+	 *
+	 * This avoids the memcmp() below tripping over pagefaults etc..
+	 */
+	if (((addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) != ((addr + 7) >> PAGE_SHIFT)) &&
+	    !kernel_text_address(addr + 7))
+		return false;
+
 	if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
 		/* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */
 		return false;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-24 14:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-24 14:14 [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/15] x86/cpu: Fix __x86_return_thunk symbol type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/15] x86/cpu: Fix up srso_safe_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/15] x86/alternative: Make custom return thunk unconditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/15] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/15] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed methods Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/15] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/15] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/15] x86/srso: Explain the untraining sequences a bit more Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/15] x86/retpoline: Dont clobber RFLAGS during srso_safe_ret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/15] x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/15] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/15] x86/retpoline,kprobes: Fix position of thunk sections with CONFIG_LTO_CLANG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/15] objtool/x86: Fixup frame-pointer vs rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/15] x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 21:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25  3:05   ` Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25  1:30 ` SeongJae Park
2023-08-25  2:40 ` Joel Fernandes
2023-08-25  7:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  7:15   ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25  7:45   ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-25  8:10   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-25  8:48     ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 16:29       ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25  9:33     ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2023-08-26  8:45   ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2023-08-25  9:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 10:15 ` Jon Hunter
2023-08-25 12:16 ` Conor Dooley
2023-08-25 12:33 ` Takeshi Ogasawara
2023-08-25 15:40 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-08-25 18:12 ` Shuah Khan
2023-08-26  1:23 ` Bagas Sanjaya

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20230824141447.611980994@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=christian@bricart.de \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=patches@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).