From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D3966358C for ; Tue, 12 Dec 2023 20:04:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ZncvbNx8" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 23DC2C433C7; Tue, 12 Dec 2023 20:04:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1702411481; bh=W9wTDyIOJ5Q8acGZqrIiS3PovLd/eJYGI4ioYT2c55Q=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=ZncvbNx8TRPl14qPCZAQjWdhI7qJtM3M5uE/+GYO0VTzdPea8LMVgTHp8UxzKSW8l 0s3n4n5wmvpzTUbPQgz/gEUhDmdYFnbUzp8U1cmICO8By2spwx/ezUuo/h4f/v2vt2 co11cGe/0hEi6KGdQR8mW6XRv4PpJEh2ORk42IKI= Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 21:04:38 +0100 From: Greg KH To: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Namjae Jeon , Steve French , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/1] RFC: linux-5.15.y ksmbd backport for CVE-2023-38431 Message-ID: <2023121241-pope-fragility-edad@gregkh> References: <20231212184745.2245187-1-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20231212184745.2245187-1-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 01:47:44PM -0500, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com wrote: > From: Paul Gortmaker > > This is a bit long, but I've never touched this code and all I can do is > compile test it. So the below basically represents a capture of my > thought process in fixing this for the v5.15.y-stable branch. Nice work, but really, given that there are _SO_ many ksmb patches that have NOT been backported to 5.15.y, I would strongly recommend that we just mark the thing as depending on BROKEN there for now as your one backport here is not going to make a dent in the fixes that need to be applied there to resolve the known issues that the codebase currently has resolved in newer kernels. Do you use this codebase on 5.15.y? What drove you to want to backport this, just the presence of a random CVE identifier? If that's all it takes to get companies to actually do backports, maybe I should go allocate more of them :) thanks, greg k-h