From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: liboti <hoshimi10mang@163.com>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: fix insecure config of eBPF generated by Kconfig
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:08:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024011625-hula-tag-b94d@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240116153414.14230-1-hoshimi10mang@163.com>
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 11:34:14PM +0800, liboti wrote:
> In stable linux (4.19~5.15), if “CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y” is set,
> the .config generated by Kconfig does not set
> “CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON” and “CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF”.
> If the kernel is compiled with such .config, a normal user
> without any capabilities at all can load eBPF programs
> (SOCKET_FILTER type), and uses the interpreter.
> Due to the threat of side-channel attacks and inextirpable
> mistakes in the verifier, this is considered insecure.
> We have report this issue to maintainers of architectures.
> RISCV and s390 maintainers have confirmed and advise us to
> patch the Kconfig so that all architectures can be fixed.
> So this patch add "default y" to these config entries.
>
> On the other hand, we found that such configs facilitate kernel
> bug exploitation. Specifically, an attacker can leverage existing
> CVEs to corrupt eBPF prog-array map, hijacking a bpf_prog pointer
> (ptrs[xx]) to point to a forged BPF program. In this way, arbitrary
> bytecode execution can be achieved, we have proved this concept with
> various CVEs(e.g. CVE-2018-18445). Such an attack enhances the
> exploitability of CVEs, and is more dangerous than side-channel
> threats.
>
> Signed-off-by: liboti <hoshimi10mang@163.com>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/Kconfig
<formletter>
This is not the correct way to submit patches for inclusion in the
stable kernel tree. Please read:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/stable-kernel-rules.html
for how to do this properly.
</formletter>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-16 17:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-16 15:34 [PATCH] kernel: fix insecure config of eBPF generated by Kconfig liboti
2024-01-16 17:08 ` Greg KH [this message]
2024-01-16 17:08 ` Greg KH
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