From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F3D61419AE; Tue, 27 Feb 2024 13:51:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709041884; cv=none; b=tp+E891fPpjyu2V/th5NgKeRa2sLwqgPseIjWF2b26RxtCezJg1vjLSIWj5IINQIjuALOHqemkbOcImziDWXyFOAiCDI26SroeGu3+nEWZd0SQKkQXBrnQ9jF9RKIfs1lLFUgL225eJaUUsisZ84aFrLFhGIQJS7tuREnES3mJU= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709041884; c=relaxed/simple; bh=l1endiXnyGbBIWnhJWsASqrtkHWI3Ci4a6aDqQHm7P4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=kqjnZXWAkonXGZKLchuKeqdP3VU4GrzrBKedW0Y6bbLtoBdSZ5eFnvudAE1oOjJ/P0/c29KYZnx5EP+AXKX/nplHYCHXFMOpdgBp8iDE0RCRnzuMMj11/XAW77MNAOTitt1n/Bke25FIhnZjLeZ8Y+aYI85kgHY56f/MvAv63LM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=IM02fJen; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="IM02fJen" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C37F2C433C7; Tue, 27 Feb 2024 13:51:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1709041884; bh=l1endiXnyGbBIWnhJWsASqrtkHWI3Ci4a6aDqQHm7P4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IM02fJenheRB0aa1nfxFGqkxSyuqeCXTIH9JIW7H5VODWrRWJ2aYI7OTuEfRkmA2/ WEd08ud7vea1dgMpJhwaIm6Fd3ln6yrPFys48hyWLybVGhM3nfM9dXfwZ4PUBUHvIM kP5weah6zyUhox1oDyVG2uLTRF2WaWlmlrSVc++U= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Masahiro Yamada , Huacai Chen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 103/299] LoongArch: Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP to use the common SECCOMP menu Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 14:23:34 +0100 Message-ID: <20240227131629.201727257@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240227131625.847743063@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240227131625.847743063@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Masahiro Yamada [ Upstream commit 6b79ecd084c99b31c8b4d0beda08893716d5558e ] LoongArch missed the refactoring made by commit 282a181b1a0d ("seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") because LoongArch was not mainlined at that time. The 'depends on PROC_FS' statement is stale as described in that commit. Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP, and remove the duplicated config entry. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index f29a0f2a4f187..9fd8644a9a4c6 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ config LOONGARCH select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE @@ -604,23 +605,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET This is limited by the size of the lower address memory, 256MB. -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - depends on PROC_FS - default y - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via /proc//seccomp, it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - - If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. - endmenu config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL -- 2.43.0