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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.8 1/5] x86/mmio: Disable KVM mitigation when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is set
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 12:30:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240313163019.613705-2-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240313163019.613705-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

commit e95df4ec0c0c9791941f112db699fae794b9862a upstream.

Currently MMIO Stale Data mitigation for CPUs not affected by MDS/TAA is
to only deploy VERW at VMentry by enabling mmio_stale_data_clear static
branch. No mitigation is needed for kernel->user transitions. If such
CPUs are also affected by RFDS, its mitigation may set
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF to deploy VERW at kernel->user and VMentry.
This could result in duplicate VERW at VMentry.

Fix this by disabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch when
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 48d049cd74e71..cd6ac89c1a0df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -422,6 +422,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+	/*
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based
+	 * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
+		static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -498,8 +505,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		taa_select_mitigation();
 	}
-	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
-	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+	/*
+	 * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
+	 * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		mmio_select_mitigation();
 	}
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-13 16:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-13 16:30 [PATCH 6.8 0/5] 6.8.1-rc1 review Sasha Levin
2024-03-13 16:30 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2024-03-13 16:30 ` [PATCH 6.8 2/5] Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for RFDS Sasha Levin
2024-03-13 16:30 ` [PATCH 6.8 3/5] x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) Sasha Levin
2024-03-13 16:30 ` [PATCH 6.8 4/5] KVM/x86: Export RFDS_NO and RFDS_CLEAR to guests Sasha Levin
2024-03-13 16:30 ` [PATCH 6.8 5/5] Linux 6.8.1-rc1 Sasha Levin
2024-03-14 11:46   ` Luna Jernberg
2024-03-14 11:54     ` Luna Jernberg
2024-03-14  8:21 ` [PATCH 6.8 0/5] 6.8.1-rc1 review Bagas Sanjaya
2024-03-14 13:02   ` Luna Jernberg
2024-03-14 13:55 ` Ron Economos
2024-03-14 18:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
2024-03-14 21:24 ` Florian Fainelli
2024-03-15 18:21   ` Sasha Levin
2024-03-15 15:42 ` Mark Brown

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