From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BDF8A524DE; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 10:19:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711707563; cv=none; b=anC7bDZEAyOTRsEqWtY3AKYuHgjK6mK3wC64t8jeCLWMJOxR2ACSgACr1eloQIAki/8DqfjMftiuwRKLHkZbzin/EvMXys/j8EkmzgjqVxXQgZFPnb+cy2z68ndCXbPhvsGQCXgIh12EHknn4Bgrpa6qZRldGm/9kJdbYjzTeWY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711707563; c=relaxed/simple; bh=YKi4gOrn9DGeJgVs3gZWjPTkOjRhWQkQ0AhfqNFExlg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=cHleFajYUVRZhDhLtbxF6Y50WhOKm+0SEfbDEhJ65IplIWssjwZHEHhARajAR/BBJ8/reY+RQvmYict+v5yAwqmm9rkfrpjT4rQxiLrOH+A+t06v04L8DaTQJOolM6/xN0/m5kWtuB+KH/cBUcqRomvVjXQy6wvY93tSJwAj9Ng= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Z8R+Vk9A; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Z8R+Vk9A" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EA8B3C433C7; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 10:19:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1711707563; bh=YKi4gOrn9DGeJgVs3gZWjPTkOjRhWQkQ0AhfqNFExlg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Z8R+Vk9AaVETwWhRaEMlScRY8lYNj5Vjj5HXh5+UfgzyDFzsNyncqajG1/O+QJ4+q UiqGM7PveSSoOuk4zROteC9zZMoQ49sxqIGCp9U1CD7P/eNV24eFABJm2R3108fX0r rkdpJuStXtuOyvOmJ0FwjFlEDS3fwfgoq6hRGTmE= Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 11:19:15 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Andrew Paniakin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Maximilian Heyne , Boris Ostrovsky , Juergen Gross , Stefano Stabellini , Sasha Levin , Julien Grall , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4] xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup Message-ID: <2024032905-divisibly-unarmored-f080@gregkh> References: <20240303044539.2673085-1-apanyaki@amazon.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240303044539.2673085-1-apanyaki@amazon.com> On Sat, Mar 02, 2024 at 08:45:39PM -0800, Andrew Paniakin wrote: > From: Andrew Panyakin > > From: Maximilian Heyne > > Commit fa765c4b4aed2d64266b694520ecb025c862c5a9 upstream > > shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the > irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both > are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order, > however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock. > > This opens multiple races: > - shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event > channel: > > CPU0 CPU1 > shutdown_pirq { > xen_evtchn_close(e) > __startup_pirq { > EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq > -> returns just freed evtchn e > set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq) > } > xen_irq_info_cleanup() { > set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1) > } > } > > Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel > number. > After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1). > > - __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because > __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the > evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In > this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can > be unset in evtchn_to_irq. > > The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event > channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's > potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already. > This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event > channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup. > > On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal > [un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe > devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq > is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq. > With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during > boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and > startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel. > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled > kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499! > invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI > CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1 > Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006 > Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work > RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 > Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 > RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006 > RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff > RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 > ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 > ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0 > ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd > ? die+0x2b/0x50 > ? do_trap+0x90/0x110 > ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 > ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 > ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 > ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 > ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 > ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 > ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 > ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc5/0xf0 > set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0 > irq_do_set_affinity+0x1d7/0x1f0 > irq_setup_affinity+0xd6/0x1a0 > irq_startup+0x8a/0xf0 > __setup_irq+0x639/0x6d0 > ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150 > request_threaded_irq+0x10c/0x180 > ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150 > pci_request_irq+0xa8/0xf0 > ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x74/0xa0 > queue_request_irq+0x6f/0x80 > nvme_create_queue+0x1af/0x200 > nvme_create_io_queues+0xbd/0xf0 > nvme_setup_io_queues+0x246/0x320 > ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30 > nvme_reset_work+0x1c8/0x400 > process_one_work+0x1b0/0x350 > worker_thread+0x49/0x310 > ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350 > kthread+0x11b/0x140 > ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60 > ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 > Modules linked in: > ---[ end trace a11715de1eee1873 ]--- > > Fixes: d46a78b05c0e ("xen: implement pirq type event channels") > Co-debugged-by: Andrew Panyakin > Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne > [apanyaki: backport to v5.4-stable] > Signed-off-by: Andrew Paniakin > --- > Compare to upstream patch this one does not have close_evtchn flag > because there is no need to handle static event channels. > This feature was added only in 58f6259b7a08f ("xen/evtchn: Introduce new > IOCTL to bind static evtchn") All now qeued up, thanks. greg k-h