From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E4DF69950; Tue, 14 May 2024 10:48:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1715683716; cv=none; b=mCS6W1cFogJKxE46nCo18LGaynsDsUj6a7LvxdO/ajVrHBtzpp6ep769JKV/y5M1SH7+ucF2depuAyM6lweE/7RVtHJljA9Aw6XROXaCH5l+VMZIF6g3+nTuCi3D3Oj2OC3X0E3vYG1B7MNI4aSSRYI7FvRhP/RnjOMfG933d3s= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1715683716; c=relaxed/simple; bh=K4lqH1Ki6RmwCqS7blCXVSdOFsuLglIHoQ9B/8El78U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=JOZ1I1qkH/yt05+u2Omm++TmFodzwpwSUpXYoF9UVnoKO6RKJtcA682HlPVCzyCdc1gYkcuCm92eYT/FdernVUKesJM1Vtf21tl+XYgotXMCtsXRU/zGzNb9T2JoepmBc+i1LLAeIZ8X+v1LbJZPH7DTqzyiK2sDYquET0hNDYA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=x8JIoqny; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="x8JIoqny" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DC17DC2BD10; Tue, 14 May 2024 10:48:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1715683716; bh=K4lqH1Ki6RmwCqS7blCXVSdOFsuLglIHoQ9B/8El78U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=x8JIoqnyY/ZjZhlgoLopnwWiIN1suHMzGZLqTmhVbuIbjvmi18r7WLuzCqrpIS7cC 15mJ1PBBSzslVizvbScDl2sLE/62dZRYHBYYhT4dDldhAJ7isMEnA0yMM4Xoheaw9s CUeFd1M3EdmwjeW9CzHWba8icjn3V6yaq8mHTm0s= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Chengming Zhou , Nicolas Bouchinet , Vlastimil Babka Subject: [PATCH 6.8 262/336] mm/slub: avoid zeroing outside-object freepointer for single free Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:17:46 +0200 Message-ID: <20240514101048.507239337@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.0 In-Reply-To: <20240514101038.595152603@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240514101038.595152603@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Nicolas Bouchinet commit 8f828aa48812ced28aa39cb3cfe55ef2444d03dd upstream. Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook(). If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object(). During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after `init_on_free`. For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if `init_on_free` is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow. To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`. dmesg sample log: [ 10.708715] ============================================================================= [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt [ 10.712695] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 10.712695] [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2) [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c [ 10.716698] [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 .... [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed Fixes: 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") Cc: Co-developed-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/slub.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -557,6 +557,26 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struc *(freeptr_t *)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr_encode(s, fp, freeptr_addr); } +/* + * See comment in calculate_sizes(). + */ +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + return s->offset >= s->inuse; +} + +/* + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if + * not overlapping with object. + */ +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + if (freeptr_outside_object(s)) + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *); + else + return s->inuse; +} + /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \ for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \ @@ -845,26 +865,6 @@ static void print_section(char *level, c metadata_access_disable(); } -/* - * See comment in calculate_sizes(). - */ -static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s) -{ - return s->offset >= s->inuse; -} - -/* - * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if - * not overlapping with object. - */ -static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s) -{ - if (freeptr_outside_object(s)) - return s->inuse + sizeof(void *); - else - return s->inuse; -} - static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, enum track_item alloc) { @@ -2107,15 +2107,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s * * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata, * but don't touch the SLAB redzone. + * + * The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the + * object. */ if (unlikely(init)) { int rsize; + unsigned int inuse; + inuse = get_info_end(s); if (!kasan_has_integrated_init()) memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0; - memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0, - s->size - s->inuse - rsize); + memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + inuse, 0, + s->size - inuse - rsize); } /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */ return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init); @@ -3737,7 +3742,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct km static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj) { - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj) + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj && + !freeptr_outside_object(s)) memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset), 0, sizeof(void *)); }