From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B5247143C67; Thu, 13 Jun 2024 12:02:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1718280156; cv=none; b=FaP8IWZ3TavPEoBbYeA/1qSXkNQElR4ZPPLxXNDESmpfRqFMHcdUVKf8+0RanDAie0teHnv7Of7QBqYcoz/YzRnIjMV0gCoQj949cNP8Jd9KD2pZ1VsGQYc738I8kt/K0H05W+hcGVPg304lL4tMAIKI4Ladz4mcj3UZXZPTJxE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1718280156; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Lvuj3vJbKWqD57qZw09OKK+5OlwQiEstQ+VGXLUdTtE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=evEkm6pvx8AMX0iezcMvndyTeeGz00aLMOgSyrQxzZVn6dg6UWYpbdQO/nfOFhBa9l8q+o33G8Z5slcEEHAbQUwGExGAI/JXnI8BhwyPOuPCrQGd4Vr+to9Oqirhk0k+fJtkK0C7EAHiv2I3XnF3KLqqgLGubwCMMJmZnx7MJrE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=TynUTW8X; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="TynUTW8X" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3D544C2BBFC; Thu, 13 Jun 2024 12:02:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1718280156; bh=Lvuj3vJbKWqD57qZw09OKK+5OlwQiEstQ+VGXLUdTtE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=TynUTW8XVihqZJ752PlvaS5aZoY/BI4MNUiqAUGqagBxfvaujMKenb/6f8R+6fVoG 5rRJNHpAnTOu97seVTnH6cCU22YlAbt69MLyU+OD6xYApoT6+vV7dNCza0oa3BZFUS qjzttGag5SmyFj2+uUeG6jL8tSSns9QUYrdeZuFI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, syzbot+43120c2af6ca2938cc38@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 5.4 162/202] ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 13:34:20 +0200 Message-ID: <20240613113234.002485572@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2 In-Reply-To: <20240613113227.759341286@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240613113227.759341286@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Takashi Iwai commit 4a63bd179fa8d3fcc44a0d9d71d941ddd62f0c4e upstream. Currently ALSA timer doesn't have the lower limit of the start tick time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution for hrtimer. Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall, where the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported by fuzzer. This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set. As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is small enough but can still work somehow. Reported-by: syzbot+43120c2af6ca2938cc38@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000fa00a1061740ab6d@google.com Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514182745.4015-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [ backport note: the error handling is changed, as the original commit is based on the recent cleanup with guard() in commit beb45974dd49 -- tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/timer.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) --- a/sound/core/timer.c +++ b/sound/core/timer.c @@ -524,6 +524,16 @@ static int snd_timer_start1(struct snd_t goto unlock; } + /* check the actual time for the start tick; + * bail out as error if it's way too low (< 100us) + */ + if (start) { + if ((u64)snd_timer_hw_resolution(timer) * ticks < 100000) { + result = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + } + if (start) timeri->ticks = timeri->cticks = ticks; else if (!timeri->cticks)