From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21DED17B515; Fri, 27 Sep 2024 12:27:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1727440020; cv=none; b=LNwjuLzuvkn/7ivgRra9qku8W+Y6XjKXmGWoI4eozq5gjlqwGAenVEVe4jE4mMQAkrSeHfHzUgh6bH8HkaDtWjb1TlTfo7nPsFNPstYt/jnqkXCRJI7hyKwX/mmC8QJ2KDBfFliyRA7hIdDBJB5R0O4EG3qIb0J4vElH9glPobs= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1727440020; c=relaxed/simple; bh=bDNNJUTV6b7ho0p1GmRU2kvEB5mpsl7x1i4j/tqdk/Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ud4SIKPdCX2s6dkUGec+DKR+lWB6ZY0fR7vqvbrrGJc0FKUHh0Hfw9ExNHoGiUj2yNNU5Uv9NFkWRn2MPf9DtT3INKwQVCzTL4gCCcF7F+MTc+u6na0wTwetd8R92FeRXKcc2xu82m/kIt/YrP/XDoP+3ZnYYVDSFUiAalmC0ak= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=JADnRwro; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="JADnRwro" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 749CCC4CEC4; Fri, 27 Sep 2024 12:26:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1727440020; bh=bDNNJUTV6b7ho0p1GmRU2kvEB5mpsl7x1i4j/tqdk/Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JADnRwro9BH9S3pYCeHKSnwVze8B0zW9/2SS5IiOR4clH0cAZ23ebBTq1Y3wqUO9A s77vWNGsOqElQaaJJvbR4RzIMGcKPKcPKzzT0jeSyWnUtiII8O9Swe6xBAKh3pkG7m A6QyAyf/s4xNPuAB+DckVfxPTsuD+uAJ2juygfzo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Ferry Meng , Joseph Qi , lei lu , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , Junxiao Bi , Changwei Ge , Gang He , Jun Piao , Andrew Morton , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 37/54] ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 14:23:29 +0200 Message-ID: <20240927121721.240542789@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.2 In-Reply-To: <20240927121719.714627278@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240927121719.714627278@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Ferry Meng [ Upstream commit 9e3041fecdc8f78a5900c3aa51d3d756e73264d6 ] Add a paranoia check to make sure it doesn't stray beyond valid memory region containing ocfs2 xattr entries when scanning for a match. It will prevent out-of-bound access in case of crafted images. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520024024.1976129-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi Reported-by: lei lu Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Stable-dep-of: af77c4fc1871 ("ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index b562cfef888ad..e6220f7f7cf34 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ ssize_t ocfs2_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return i_ret + b_ret; } -static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(int name_index, +static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name, struct ocfs2_xattr_search *xs) { @@ -1076,6 +1076,10 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(int name_index, name_len = strlen(name); entry = xs->here; for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(xs->header->xh_count); i++) { + if ((void *)entry >= xs->end) { + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, "corrupted xattr entries"); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } cmp = name_index - ocfs2_xattr_get_type(entry); if (!cmp) cmp = name_len - entry->xe_name_len; @@ -1166,7 +1170,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, xs->base = (void *)xs->header; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries; - ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs); + ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, name_index, name, xs); if (ret) return ret; size = le64_to_cpu(xs->here->xe_value_size); @@ -2698,7 +2702,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode, /* Find the named attribute. */ if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) { - ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs); + ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, name_index, name, xs); if (ret && ret != -ENODATA) return ret; xs->not_found = ret; @@ -2833,7 +2837,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_block_find(struct inode *inode, xs->end = (void *)(blk_bh->b_data) + blk_bh->b_size; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries; - ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs); + ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, name_index, name, xs); } else ret = ocfs2_xattr_index_block_find(inode, blk_bh, name_index, -- 2.43.0