FAILED: patch "[PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101412-prowling-snowflake-9fe0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:

532b53cebe58 ("secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map")
f7c5b1aab5ef ("mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value")

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 09:00:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct
 map

Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().  This
is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k
PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is
set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make
semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).

More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
(0) instead of an error.  This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
"work" (e.g.  syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the
direct map.

Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
failure.  Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
affected.

From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between
v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241001080056.784735-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: James Gowans <jgowans@amazon.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 3afb5ad701e1..399552814fd0 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
 	/* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
 
-	if (!secretmem_enable)
+	if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
 	if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
 
 static int __init secretmem_init(void)
 {
-	if (!secretmem_enable)
+	if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
 		return 0;
 
 	secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);

[PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map

[Mike Rapoport]

From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>

Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
large/gigantic pages).

More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
(0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
"work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
the direct map.

Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
affected.

>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
allocations.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/

Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
---
 mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index d1986ce2e7c7..624663a94808 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
 	/* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
 
-	if (!secretmem_enable)
+	if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
 	if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static int secretmem_init(void)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (!secretmem_enable)
+	if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
 		return ret;
 
 	secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map

[Greg KH]

On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> 
> Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
> This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
> 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
> is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
> break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
> large/gigantic pages).
> 
> More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
> set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
> (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
> "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
> but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
> the direct map.
> 
> Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
> where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
> CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
> CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
> failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
> arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
> affected.
> 
> >>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
> series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
> intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
> set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
> SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
> between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
> allocations.
> 
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
> [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
> [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
> 
> Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
> Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> ---
>  mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?

Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map

[Mike Rapoport]

On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > 
> > Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
> > This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
> > 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
> > is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
> > break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
> > large/gigantic pages).
> > 
> > More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
> > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
> > (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
> > "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
> > but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
> > the direct map.
> > 
> > Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
> > where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
> > CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
> > CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
> > failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
> > arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
> > affected.
> > 
> > >>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
> > series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
> > intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
> > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
> > SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
> > between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
> > allocations.
> > 
> > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
> > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
> > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
> > 
> > Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
> > Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >  mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?

532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map

[Greg KH]

On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 07:35:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > > 
> > > Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
> > > This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
> > > 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
> > > is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
> > > break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
> > > large/gigantic pages).
> > > 
> > > More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
> > > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
> > > (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
> > > "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
> > > but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
> > > the direct map.
> > > 
> > > Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
> > > where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
> > > CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
> > > CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
> > > failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
> > > arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
> > > affected.
> > > 
> > > >>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
> > > series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
> > > intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
> > > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
> > > SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
> > > between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
> > > allocations.
> > > 
> > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
> > > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
> > > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
> > > 
> > > Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
> > > Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > > Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > ---
> > >  mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
> > >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
> 
> 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6

Thanks, next time please include that in the original patch so we don't
have to do this back/forth emails :)

now queued up.

greg k-h