From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 10:47:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024101853-margin-clumsily-6239@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zw1IN_Gm8LZjWEO4@kernel.org>
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 07:35:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > >
> > > Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
> > > This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
> > > 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
> > > is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
> > > break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
> > > large/gigantic pages).
> > >
> > > More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
> > > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
> > > (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
> > > "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
> > > but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
> > > the direct map.
> > >
> > > Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
> > > where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
> > > CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
> > > CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
> > > failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
> > > arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
> > > affected.
> > >
> > > >>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
> > > series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
> > > intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
> > > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
> > > SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
> > > between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
> > > allocations.
> > >
> > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
> > > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
> > > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
> > >
> > > Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
> > > Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > > Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > ---
> > > mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
> > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
>
> 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
Thanks, next time please include that in the original patch so we don't
have to do this back/forth emails :)
now queued up.
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-18 8:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-14 11:57 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2024-10-14 15:21 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Mike Rapoport
2024-10-14 15:55 ` Greg KH
2024-10-14 16:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2024-10-18 8:47 ` Greg KH [this message]
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