[PATCH v8 1/3] tpm: Return tpm2_sessions_init() when null key creation fails

[PATCH v8 1/3] tpm: Return tpm2_sessions_init() when null key creation fails

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

Do not continue tpm2_sessions_init() further if the null key pair creation
fails.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v8:
- Refine commit message.
v7:
- Add the error message back but fix it up a bit:
  1. Remove 'TPM:' given dev_err().
  2. s/NULL/null/ as this has nothing to do with the macro in libc.
  3. Fix the reasoning: null key creation failed
v6:
- Address:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/69c893e7-6b87-4daa-80db-44d1120e80fe@linux.ibm.com/
  as TPM RC is taken care of at the call site. Add also the missing
  documentation for the return values.
v5:
- Do not print klog messages on error, as tpm2_save_context() already
  takes care of this.
v4:
- Fixed up stable version.
v3:
- Handle TPM and POSIX error separately and return -ENODEV always back
  to the caller.
v2:
- Refined the commit message.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index d3521aadd43e..a0306126e86c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -1347,14 +1347,21 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip)
  *
  * Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the
  * struct tpm_chip for the authorizations.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0		- OK
+ * * -errno	- A system error
+ * * TPM_RC	- A TPM error
  */
 int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip);
-	if (rc)
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key creation failed with %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
 	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!chip->auth)
-- 
2.47.0

Re: [PATCH v8 1/3] tpm: Return tpm2_sessions_init() when null key creation fails

[Stefan Berger]

On 10/28/24 1:49 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Do not continue tpm2_sessions_init() further if the null key pair creation
> fails.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

> ---
> v8:
> - Refine commit message.
> v7:
> - Add the error message back but fix it up a bit:
>    1. Remove 'TPM:' given dev_err().
>    2. s/NULL/null/ as this has nothing to do with the macro in libc.
>    3. Fix the reasoning: null key creation failed
> v6:
> - Address:
>    https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/69c893e7-6b87-4daa-80db-44d1120e80fe@linux.ibm.com/
>    as TPM RC is taken care of at the call site. Add also the missing
>    documentation for the return values.
> v5:
> - Do not print klog messages on error, as tpm2_save_context() already
>    takes care of this.
> v4:
> - Fixed up stable version.
> v3:
> - Handle TPM and POSIX error separately and return -ENODEV always back
>    to the caller.
> v2:
> - Refined the commit message.
> ---
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 11 +++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index d3521aadd43e..a0306126e86c 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -1347,14 +1347,21 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>    *
>    * Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the
>    * struct tpm_chip for the authorizations.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0		- OK
> + * * -errno	- A system error
> + * * TPM_RC	- A TPM error
>    */
>   int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   {
>   	int rc;
>   
>   	rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip);
> -	if (rc)
> -		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key creation failed with %d\n", rc);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
>   
>   	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
>   	if (!chip->auth)

Re: [PATCH v8 1/3] tpm: Return tpm2_sessions_init() when null key creation fails

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 3:00 PM EET, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
>
> On 10/28/24 1:49 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Do not continue tpm2_sessions_init() further if the null key pair creation
> > fails.
> > 
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> > Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Thanks, patch are applied to

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/log/?h=next

I will amend these with any further changes (such as tags).

BR, Jarkko

[PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes")
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v8:
- Fix stray character in a log message.
v7:
- No changes.
v6:
- Address Stefan's remark:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/def4ec2d-584b-405f-9d5e-99267013c3c0@linux.ibm.com/
v5:
- Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context().
v4:
- No changes.
v3:
- Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated
  on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the
  check is done *after* the load operation.
v2:
- Refined the commit message.
- Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if
  tmp_null_key is used as the parameter.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index a0306126e86c..950a3e48293b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth,
 
 static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
 {
-	int rc;
 	unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */
 	u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
+	u32 tmp_null_key;
+	int rc;
 
 	rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
-			       null_key);
-	if (rc != -EINVAL)
-		return rc;
+			       &tmp_null_key);
+	if (rc != -EINVAL) {
+		if (!rc)
+			*null_key = tmp_null_key;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
-	/* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
-	dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
-	/* check the null name against what we know */
-	tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
-	if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
-		/* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */
-		return rc;
-	/*
-	 * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
-	 * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
-	 * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
-	 * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
-	 * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
-	 */
-	dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n");
+	/* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */
+	rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Return null key if the name has not been changed: */
+	if (!memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name))) {
+		*null_key = tmp_null_key;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */
+	dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key integrity check failed\n");
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key);
 	chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE;
 
-	return rc;
+err:
+	return rc ? -ENODEV : 0;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.47.0

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Jarkko,


Thank you for your patch.

Am 28.10.24 um 06:50 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
> Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().

Could you please elaborate, why this is done, that means the motivation 
for your change?

> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes")
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 8:13 AM EET, Paul Menzel wrote:
> Dear Jarkko,
>
>
> Thank you for your patch.
>
> Am 28.10.24 um 06:50 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
> > Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().
>
> Could you please elaborate, why this is done, that means the motivation 
> for your change?

Which part of "not properly handling a return value" I should explain?

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Jarkko,


Am 28.10.24 um 13:10 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
> On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 8:13 AM EET, Paul Menzel wrote:

>> Am 28.10.24 um 06:50 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
>>> Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().
>>
>> Could you please elaborate, why this is done, that means the motivation
>> for your change?
> 
> Which part of "not properly handling a return value" I should explain?

Sorry, where is your quote from?

Anyway, maybe explaining why a successful call to tpm2_create_primary() 
is needed to continue would at least help me.


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 2:38 PM EET, Paul Menzel wrote:
> Dear Jarkko,
>
>
> Am 28.10.24 um 13:10 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
> > On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 8:13 AM EET, Paul Menzel wrote:
>
> >> Am 28.10.24 um 06:50 schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen:
> >>> Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().
> >>
> >> Could you please elaborate, why this is done, that means the motivation
> >> for your change?
> > 
> > Which part of "not properly handling a return value" I should explain?
>
> Sorry, where is your quote from?
>
> Anyway, maybe explaining why a successful call to tpm2_create_primary() 
> is needed to continue would at least help me.

It's not a void function.

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[James Bottomley]

On Mon, 2024-10-28 at 07:50 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
[...]
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct
> tpm2_auth *auth,
>  
>  static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
>  {
> -       int rc;
>         unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed
> context */
>         u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
> +       u32 tmp_null_key;
> +       int rc;
>  
>         rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
> -                              null_key);
> -       if (rc != -EINVAL)
> -               return rc;
> +                              &tmp_null_key);
> +       if (rc != -EINVAL) {
> +               if (!rc)
> +                       *null_key = tmp_null_key;
> +               goto err;
> +       }
>  
> -       /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
> -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
> -       /* check the null name against what we know */
> -       tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
> -       if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
> -               /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure
> */
> -               return rc;
> -       /*
> -        * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
> -        * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
> -        * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
> -        * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
> -        * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
> -        */
> -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due
> to interference\n");
> +       /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */
> +       rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key,
> name);
> +       if (rc)
> +               goto err;

From a security point of view, this probably isn't such a good idea:
the reason the context load failed above is likely the security
condition we're checking for: the null seed changed because an
interposer did a reset.  That means that if the interposer knows about
this error leg, it would simply error out the create primary here and
the TPM wouldn't be disabled.

Regards,

James

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Wed Oct 30, 2024 at 5:47 PM EET, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-10-28 at 07:50 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> [...]
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > @@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct
> > tpm2_auth *auth,
> >  
> >  static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
> >  {
> > -       int rc;
> >         unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed
> > context */
> >         u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
> > +       u32 tmp_null_key;
> > +       int rc;
> >  
> >         rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
> > -                              null_key);
> > -       if (rc != -EINVAL)
> > -               return rc;
> > +                              &tmp_null_key);
> > +       if (rc != -EINVAL) {
> > +               if (!rc)
> > +                       *null_key = tmp_null_key;
> > +               goto err;
> > +       }
> >  
> > -       /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
> > -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
> > -       /* check the null name against what we know */
> > -       tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
> > -       if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
> > -               /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure
> > */
> > -               return rc;
> > -       /*
> > -        * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
> > -        * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
> > -        * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
> > -        * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
> > -        * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
> > -        */
> > -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due
> > to interference\n");
> > +       /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */
> > +       rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key,
> > name);
> > +       if (rc)
> > +               goto err;
>
> From a security point of view, this probably isn't such a good idea:
> the reason the context load failed above is likely the security
> condition we're checking for: the null seed changed because an
> interposer did a reset.  That means that if the interposer knows about
> this error leg, it would simply error out the create primary here and
> the TPM wouldn't be disabled.

If you think there is something that should be still addressed, or there
is overlooked issue please do send a patch, and we will review that.
There's been plenty of time to comment on patches.

Neither in previous TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLED was set tpm2_load_context()
failed. It went like this:

	rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
			       null_key);
	if (rc != -EINVAL)
		return rc;

If you think that this should be addressed, do send a patch but point
out the fixes-tag to your original patch then.

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 1:44 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed Oct 30, 2024 at 5:47 PM EET, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-10-28 at 07:50 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > [...]
> > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > > @@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct
> > > tpm2_auth *auth,
> > >  
> > >  static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
> > >  {
> > > -       int rc;
> > >         unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed
> > > context */
> > >         u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
> > > +       u32 tmp_null_key;
> > > +       int rc;
> > >  
> > >         rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
> > > -                              null_key);
> > > -       if (rc != -EINVAL)
> > > -               return rc;
> > > +                              &tmp_null_key);
> > > +       if (rc != -EINVAL) {
> > > +               if (!rc)
> > > +                       *null_key = tmp_null_key;
> > > +               goto err;
> > > +       }
> > >  
> > > -       /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
> > > -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
> > > -       /* check the null name against what we know */
> > > -       tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
> > > -       if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
> > > -               /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure
> > > */
> > > -               return rc;
> > > -       /*
> > > -        * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
> > > -        * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
> > > -        * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
> > > -        * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
> > > -        * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
> > > -        */
> > > -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due
> > > to interference\n");
> > > +       /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */
> > > +       rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key,
> > > name);
> > > +       if (rc)
> > > +               goto err;
> >
> > From a security point of view, this probably isn't such a good idea:
> > the reason the context load failed above is likely the security
> > condition we're checking for: the null seed changed because an
> > interposer did a reset.  That means that if the interposer knows about
> > this error leg, it would simply error out the create primary here and
> > the TPM wouldn't be disabled.
>
> If you think there is something that should be still addressed, or there
> is overlooked issue please do send a patch, and we will review that.
> There's been plenty of time to comment on patches.
>
> Neither in previous TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLED was set tpm2_load_context()
> failed. It went like this:
>
> 	rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
> 			       null_key);
> 	if (rc != -EINVAL)
> 		return rc;
>
> If you think that this should be addressed, do send a patch but point
> out the fixes-tag to your original patch then.

Also want to denotat that I specifically did not set flag because I
thought you had good reasons not to disable TPM. So it was left like
that knowingly, definitely not by ignorance. Good that it became now
apparent and I'm happy to take a fix in (with correct fixes tag).

BR, Jarkko

[PATCH v8 3/3] tpm: Lazily flush the auth session

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

Move the allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that this
field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.

Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every transaction
separately, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used.

Reported-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()")
Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v8:
- Since auth session and null key are flushed at a same time, only
  either needs to be checked. Addresses and a remark from James
  Bottomley few revisions ago.
- kfree_sensitive()
- Effectively squash top three patches given the simplifications.
v7:
- No changes.
v6:
- No changes.
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- Changed as bug.
v3:
- Refined the commit message.
- Removed the conditional for applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION only when
  /dev/tpm0 is open. It is not required as the auth session is flushed,
  not saved.
v2:
- A new patch.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c       | 10 +++++++
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c |  3 +++
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c  |  6 +++--
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c  | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 854546000c92..1ff99a7091bb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -674,6 +674,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register);
  */
 void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (!rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		tpm_put_ops(chip);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip);
 	if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip))
 		hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 30b4c288c1bb..c7a88fa7b0fc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
 	struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf;
 	ssize_t ret, len;
 
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+
 	ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz);
 	/* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a
 	 * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space.
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 5da134f12c9a..8134f002b121 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -379,10 +379,12 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 
 	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
 	if (!rc) {
-		if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+			tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
 			tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE);
-		else
+		} else {
 			rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr);
+		}
 
 		tpm_put_ops(chip);
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 950a3e48293b..03145a465b5d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	/* The first write to /dev/tpm{rm0} will flush the session. */
+	attributes |= TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION;
+
 	/*
 	 * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
 	 * before computing the HMAC
@@ -484,7 +487,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
 	sha256_final(&sctx, out);
 }
 
-static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
+static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+				struct tpm2_auth *auth)
 {
 	struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
 	struct kpp_request *req;
@@ -543,7 +547,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
 	sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
 	kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
-	sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
 	kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
 	crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
 	kpp_request_free(req);
@@ -554,8 +558,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	 * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
 	 * writes the salt
 	 */
-	tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
-		  chip->auth->salt);
+	tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt);
 
  out:
 	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
@@ -853,7 +856,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 		if (rc)
 			/* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
 			tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
-		memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+
+		kfree_sensitive(auth);
+		chip->auth = NULL;
 	} else {
 		/* reset for next use  */
 		auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -881,7 +886,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		return;
 
 	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
-	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+	kfree_sensitive(auth);
+	chip->auth = NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
 
@@ -962,16 +968,20 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
  */
 int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
-	int rc;
 	u32 null_key;
+	int rc;
 
-	if (!auth) {
-		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
+	if (chip->auth) {
+		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!auth)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
@@ -992,7 +1002,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
 
 	/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
-	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
+	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
 	/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
 	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
 
@@ -1014,10 +1024,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+		chip->auth = auth;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
- out:
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(auth);
 	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session);
@@ -1367,10 +1380,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		return rc;
 	}
 
-	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!chip->auth)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
-- 
2.47.0

Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] tpm: Lazily flush the auth session

[Stefan Berger]

On 10/28/24 1:50 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Move the allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that this
> field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.
> 
> Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every transaction
> separately, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used.
> 
> Reported-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()")
> Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

> ---
> v8:
> - Since auth session and null key are flushed at a same time, only
>    either needs to be checked. Addresses and a remark from James
>    Bottomley few revisions ago.
> - kfree_sensitive()
> - Effectively squash top three patches given the simplifications.
> v7:
> - No changes.
> v6:
> - No changes.
> v5:
> - No changes.
> v4:
> - Changed as bug.
> v3:
> - Refined the commit message.
> - Removed the conditional for applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION only when
>    /dev/tpm0 is open. It is not required as the auth session is flushed,
>    not saved.
> v2:
> - A new patch.
> ---
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c       | 10 +++++++
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c |  3 +++
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c  |  6 +++--
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c  | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
>   4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> index 854546000c92..1ff99a7091bb 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> @@ -674,6 +674,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register);
>    */
>   void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> +	if (!rc) {
> +		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
> +		tpm_put_ops(chip);
> +	}
> +#endif
> +
>   	tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip);
>   	if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip))
>   		hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng);
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> index 30b4c288c1bb..c7a88fa7b0fc 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
>   	struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf;
>   	ssize_t ret, len;
>   
> +	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
> +		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
> +
>   	ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz);
>   	/* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a
>   	 * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space.
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> index 5da134f12c9a..8134f002b121 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -379,10 +379,12 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
>   
>   	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
>   	if (!rc) {
> -		if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
> +		if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
> +			tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
>   			tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE);
> -		else
> +		} else {
>   			rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr);
> +		}
>   
>   		tpm_put_ops(chip);
>   	}
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 950a3e48293b..03145a465b5d 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>   	}
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> +	/* The first write to /dev/tpm{rm0} will flush the session. */
> +	attributes |= TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION;
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
>   	 * before computing the HMAC
> @@ -484,7 +487,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
>   	sha256_final(&sctx, out);
>   }
>   
> -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
> +				struct tpm2_auth *auth)
>   {
>   	struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
>   	struct kpp_request *req;
> @@ -543,7 +547,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
> -	sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
> +	sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
>   	kpp_request_free(req);
> @@ -554,8 +558,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	 * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
>   	 * writes the salt
>   	 */
> -	tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
> -		  chip->auth->salt);
> +	tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt);
>   
>    out:
>   	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
> @@ -853,7 +856,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>   		if (rc)
>   			/* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
>   			tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
> -		memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> +
> +		kfree_sensitive(auth);
> +		chip->auth = NULL;
>   	} else {
>   		/* reset for next use  */
>   		auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> @@ -881,7 +886,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   		return;
>   
>   	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
> -	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> +	kfree_sensitive(auth);
> +	chip->auth = NULL;
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
>   
> @@ -962,16 +968,20 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
>    */
>   int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   {
> +	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
>   	struct tpm_buf buf;
> -	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> -	int rc;
>   	u32 null_key;
> +	int rc;
>   
> -	if (!auth) {
> -		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
> +	if (chip->auth) {
> +		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n");
>   		return 0;
>   	}
>   
> +	auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!auth)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
>   	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
>   	if (rc)
>   		goto out;
> @@ -992,7 +1002,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
>   
>   	/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
> -	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
> +	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
>   	/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
>   	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
>   
> @@ -1014,10 +1024,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   
>   	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
>   
> -	if (rc)
> -		goto out;
> +	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
> +		chip->auth = auth;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
>   
> - out:
> +out:
> +	kfree_sensitive(auth);
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session);
> @@ -1367,10 +1380,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   		return rc;
>   	}
>   
> -	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!chip->auth)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */

Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] tpm: Lazily flush the auth session

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon Oct 28, 2024 at 7:52 PM EET, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 10/28/24 1:50 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Move the allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that this
> > field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.
> > 
> > Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every transaction
> > separately, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used.
> > 
> > Reported-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
> > Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> > Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()")
> > Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Thanks!

Next after this: tpm2_get_random() issues reported.

I think biggest problem with that in general, and independent of bugs,
is that it does not pool random but instead pulls random small chunks.
This is more like performance issue exposed by bus encryption than
introducing a new issue (not formally but with better implementation
would not be necessarily a problem).

BR, Jarkko