From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B4242AF07; Mon, 28 Oct 2024 06:54:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730098444; cv=none; b=K4XTNniDhhoMX4JkvlGmnK2ntXv56vOAJCvJ3zmz/kbppPtQ9bjpX1gYQCSRjqs7ORMZ9ZP4CwqXWi7FEKShATwfy9oKpuAgvpEdsLgGQsDZYjAjNdgnilW5RyG0Pl8fFlumczQQJ7jhNwsWg9IGv6QbNHxBBc6akHDpjKKIgiA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730098444; c=relaxed/simple; bh=DcZYgM+9ofrP6umrC9sPglkyGeaIcvKl5Xd3k/PPlno=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Rkq/gbZ+Q35AsOR3gk1HvsdJoZEkSU7zNMLdDz2hKlyazrMQN8FnBf6Gc2IBa7AL5SwgTERDDQKafmnZyocXhQoelGe5g1SxuR7PcXyNBAY26Dy6QSd+Wc7MQPPzFj/5Y+bWHERZQV41+EA/fo/P3A7rp0dqxWUZ9edBV6xiZFE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=w1ME5P2E; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="w1ME5P2E" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CE4A3C4CEC7; Mon, 28 Oct 2024 06:54:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1730098444; bh=DcZYgM+9ofrP6umrC9sPglkyGeaIcvKl5Xd3k/PPlno=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=w1ME5P2EAM2/JV7nFfU1RkcLXvvAcQRbz4jW0Jp0syFXlB0RjI6xDn1hGv3WJkCJi 4Q5sFu1JUnF0/a4+7swAWT+AcIdAzgpBGW5FC4DLWUc48BV3q95Qg6dXHGLjo9S4ds jKrROf3fAv9eYJg+RSlzrouKWh3JJLwK8fKlzHlM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Boris Tonofa , Petr Vaganov , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 6.11 230/261] xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 07:26:12 +0100 Message-ID: <20241028062317.879202457@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.0 In-Reply-To: <20241028062312.001273460@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20241028062312.001273460@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.11-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Petr Vaganov commit 6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2 upstream. During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30 _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30 __skb_datagram_iter+0x168/0x1060 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x220 netlink_recvmsg+0x362/0x1700 sock_recvmsg+0x2dc/0x390 __sys_recvfrom+0x381/0x6d0 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x130/0x200 x64_sys_call+0x32c8/0x3cc0 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81 Uninit was stored to memory at: copy_to_user_state_extra+0xcc1/0x1e00 dump_one_state+0x28c/0x5f0 xfrm_state_walk+0x548/0x11e0 xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e0/0x840 netlink_dump+0x943/0x1c40 __netlink_dump_start+0x746/0xdb0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x429/0xc00 netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0 netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280 netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560 x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81 Uninit was created at: __kmalloc+0x571/0xd30 attach_auth+0x106/0x3e0 xfrm_add_sa+0x2aa0/0x4230 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x832/0xc00 netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0 netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280 netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560 x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81 Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000 Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0 CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random data of the structure fields can end up in userspace. Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve) data and should never be given directly to user-space. A similar issue was resolved in the commit 8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap") Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1102,7 +1102,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm if (!nla) return -EMSGSIZE; ap = nla_data(nla); - memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth)); + strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(ap->alg_name)); + ap->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len; + ap->alg_trunc_len = auth->alg_trunc_len; if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len) memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8); else