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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.15 v3 12/16] x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
Date: Sat, 17 May 2025 09:08:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250516220441-136d622f4b1cb00d@stable.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250516-its-5-15-v3-12-16fcdaaea544@linux.intel.com>

[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]

Hi,

✅ All tests passed successfully. No issues detected.
No action required from the submitter.

The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a

Status in newer kernel trees:
6.14.y | Present (different SHA1: 06c937efb63f)
6.12.y | Present (different SHA1: 301637f1f8ed)
6.6.y | Present (different SHA1: 6bea1c7c2ca4)
6.1.y | Present (different SHA1: ee9a8754703e)

Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1:  2665281a07e19 ! 1:  0d02405d66808 x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
    @@ Metadata
      ## Commit message ##
         x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
     
    +    commit 2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a upstream.
    +
         Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
         ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
         new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
    @@ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
     
      ## arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ##
     @@
    - #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET	   	X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
    - #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER		X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "spectre_v2_user" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack between user processes */
    - #define X86_BUG_ITS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
    -+#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY		X86_BUG(1*32 + 7) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
    + #define X86_BUG_BHI			X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
    + #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET		X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
    + #define X86_BUG_ITS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
    ++#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY		X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
      #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
     
      ## arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ##
    @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
      	ITS_MITIGATION_OFF,
     +	ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
      	ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS,
    - 	ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF,
      };
      
      static const char * const its_strings[] = {
      	[ITS_MITIGATION_OFF]			= "Vulnerable",
     +	[ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY]		= "Mitigation: Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected",
      	[ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS]		= "Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks",
    - 	[ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF]	= "Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB",
      };
    + 
     @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static int __init its_parse_cmdline(char *str)
      	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
      		its_cmd = ITS_CMD_ON;
    @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vul
     +#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY	BIT(9)
      
      static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
     @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		      0xc,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RETBLEED),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,		      0x0,	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
    --	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    -+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
    - 	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xc),	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
    +-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
    ++	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
    + 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
     @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
      	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
      		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
---

Results of testing on various branches:

| Branch                    | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-6.1.y        |  Success    |  Success   |

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-17 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-16 23:59 [PATCH 5.15 v3 00/16] ITS mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-05-16 23:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 01/16] x86,nospec: Simplify {JMP,CALL}_NOSPEC Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-16 23:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 02/16] x86/speculation: Simplify and make CALL_NOSPEC consistent Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 03/16] x86/speculation: Add a conditional CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 04/16] x86/speculation: Remove the extra #ifdef around CALL_NOSPEC Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 05/16] Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:01 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 06/16] x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:01 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 07/16] x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunk Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:01 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 08/16] x86/alternative: Optimize returns patching Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:01 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 09/16] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:02 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 10/16] x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe return thunk Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:02 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 11/16] x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:02 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 12/16] x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-05-17  0:02 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 13/16] x86/its: Align RETs in BHB clear sequence to avoid thunking Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:03 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 14/16] x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:03 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 15/16] x86/its: Fix build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=n Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-05-17  0:03 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 16/16] x86/its: FineIBT-paranoid vs ITS Pawan Gupta
2025-05-17 13:08   ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07  9:34 ` [PATCH 5.15 v3 00/16] ITS mitigation Salvatore Bonaccorso
2025-06-09 13:31   ` Pawan Gupta

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