From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3AA2724888A; Tue, 20 May 2025 14:14:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747750442; cv=none; b=XE/iBY7iN7LPr+KYpayE8OiXtWx3K9HkCPIe+eGtLt4q6O9GFxrr+L8sI/1CY3ljLbDKTHGRezT50sZt9JQ5iRserYYMxAPevmd3on6ABlJfZDUJsLlB+kGx7urm6AVjKqhRzS/QMlH4ccgH0h3+z0cckNubZgTyJl3NfXF5a/E= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747750442; c=relaxed/simple; bh=F3KjT2ap9H/i4oSyPzyCRmHtEFiCNs+kw5LCTIoHcmA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ST4Zg9J4GQXWd0EZC7Xz7xcazGCsBth0qC0m6T4kTN2Vad8KzGpZXHp7yTgCfAYecqzhMjAuoG2wF2GtZNb898QPkSMHoFq7FmWnUyPDs0VADiWqxVw1E4kKFmo+j5SE/sWAYjlUBmpQ9JmrEAAligcmabJPRUdHbfyDTpKMwxc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=nCeAR3xx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="nCeAR3xx" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BC625C4CEE9; Tue, 20 May 2025 14:14:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1747750442; bh=F3KjT2ap9H/i4oSyPzyCRmHtEFiCNs+kw5LCTIoHcmA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=nCeAR3xx8UCsiMCsxB9xbZ8P+7bixCvYaBzQDlI4T3zAjZCgrQ+oQJbs2RLEuy160 MOE5vOT2B2qhtDBFq2RivrVKnTcuaYXcBkfG80sm8/1yK7zv59kxu3n03dH7h1HjrF JR2si1fHlnA129GVhRqNNggvfXTFqVtKAyVhJLCk= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Stephen Smalley , Christian Brauner , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.14 002/145] fs/xattr.c: fix simple_xattr_list to always include security.* xattrs Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:49:32 +0200 Message-ID: <20250520125810.639018428@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 In-Reply-To: <20250520125810.535475500@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250520125810.535475500@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Stephen Smalley [ Upstream commit 8b0ba61df5a1c44e2b3cf683831a4fc5e24ea99d ] The vfs has long had a fallback to obtain the security.* xattrs from the LSM when the filesystem does not implement its own listxattr, but shmem/tmpfs and kernfs later gained their own xattr handlers to support other xattrs. Unfortunately, as a side effect, tmpfs and kernfs-based filesystems like sysfs no longer return the synthetic security.* xattr names via listxattr unless they are explicitly set by userspace or initially set upon inode creation after policy load. coreutils has recently switched from unconditionally invoking getxattr for security.* for ls -Z via libselinux to only doing so if listxattr returns the xattr name, breaking ls -Z of such inodes. Before: $ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs $ getfattr -m.* /sys/kernel/fscaps $ setfattr -n user.foo /run/initramfs $ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs user.foo After: $ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs security.selinux $ getfattr -m.* /sys/kernel/fscaps security.selinux $ setfattr -n user.foo /run/initramfs $ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs security.selinux user.foo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNtF8wDyQajPCdGn=iOawX4y77ph0EcfcqcUUj+T87FKyA@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250423175728.3185-2-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250424152822.2719-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com Fixes: b09e0fa4b4ea66266058ee ("tmpfs: implement generic xattr support") Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/xattr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index fabb2a04501ee..8ec5b0204bfdc 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -1428,6 +1428,15 @@ static bool xattr_is_trusted(const char *name) return !strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN); } +static bool xattr_is_maclabel(const char *name) +{ + const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN; + + return !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) && + security_ismaclabel(suffix); +} + /** * simple_xattr_list - list all xattr objects * @inode: inode from which to get the xattrs @@ -1460,6 +1469,17 @@ ssize_t simple_xattr_list(struct inode *inode, struct simple_xattrs *xattrs, if (err) return err; + err = security_inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, remaining_size); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + if (buffer) { + if (remaining_size < err) + return -ERANGE; + buffer += err; + } + remaining_size -= err; + read_lock(&xattrs->lock); for (rbp = rb_first(&xattrs->rb_root); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) { xattr = rb_entry(rbp, struct simple_xattr, rb_node); @@ -1468,6 +1488,10 @@ ssize_t simple_xattr_list(struct inode *inode, struct simple_xattrs *xattrs, if (!trusted && xattr_is_trusted(xattr->name)) continue; + /* skip MAC labels; these are provided by LSM above */ + if (xattr_is_maclabel(xattr->name)) + continue; + err = xattr_list_one(&buffer, &remaining_size, xattr->name); if (err) break; -- 2.39.5