From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huaweicloud.com>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.10 11/14] arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2025 22:34:08 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250608195655-056c0568b54ff326@stable.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250607152521.2828291-12-pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]
Hi,
✅ All tests passed successfully. No issues detected.
No action required from the submitter.
The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 877ace9eab7de032f954533afd5d1ecd0cf62eaf
WARNING: Author mismatch between patch and upstream commit:
Backport author: Pu Lehui<pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
Commit author: Liu Song<liusong@linux.alibaba.com>
Status in newer kernel trees:
6.15.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.14.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.12.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.6.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.1.y | Present (exact SHA1)
5.15.y | Not found
Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1: 877ace9eab7de ! 1: 02dd583c7ea39 arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually
+ [ Upstream commit 877ace9eab7de032f954533afd5d1ecd0cf62eaf ]
+
In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great
impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test,
the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%.
@@ Commit message
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1661514050-22263-1-git-send-email-liusong@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
+ Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
## Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ##
@@
- spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+ nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
- l1tf=off [X86]
- mds=off [X86]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+
+ Exceptions:
@@
vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
option.
-+ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] Disable all mitigations for Spectre-BHB (branch
++ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] Disable all mitigations for Spectre-BHB (branch
+ history injection) vulnerability. System may allow data leaks
+ with this option.
+
@@ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
## arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c ##
-@@ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c: static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
- isb();
- }
+@@ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c: static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_KVM */
+ static bool spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated;
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
@@ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c: static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
-+
+
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
- bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c: void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
---
Results of testing on various branches:
| Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-5.15.y | Success | Success |
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-09 2:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-07 15:25 [PATCH 5.10 00/14] backport for CVE-2025-37948 and CVE-2025-37963 Pu Lehui
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 01/14] arm64: insn: Add barrier encodings Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 02/14] arm64: move AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT into insn-def.h Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 03/14] arm64: insn: add encoders for atomic operations Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 04/14] arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSB Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 05/14] arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 06/14] arm64: errata: Assume that unknown CPUs _are_ vulnerable to Spectre BHB Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 07/14] arm64: errata: Add KRYO 2XX/3XX/4XX silver cores to Spectre BHB safe list Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 08/14] arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 09/14] arm64: errata: Add missing sentinels to Spectre-BHB MIDR arrays Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 10/14] arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 11/14] arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 12/14] arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 13/14] arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-07 15:25 ` [PATCH 5.10 14/14] arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigation Pu Lehui
2025-06-09 2:34 ` Sasha Levin
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