From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7EED223DD6; Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:19:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759245570; cv=none; b=Qcz5V9fCrTW7U8ytnbXayADk7VUjlNUt52K7r/NTodD7zWU8o8ekkeDv3rTIdi4oQkcb5/307pRQ/y7afGbp9vbyLOgRf0yil4o9O4lNI+hL5j0pDl50NdMcirsULm9iK7DRT0GB4wh6gFaRxt2iIuJjGvFdGQbghMXs6z0ixlQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759245570; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ZffQflqysoIE+QNUxuYAYG6D+I4cvO3xCM/IhMrzwlc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=gpS9UVusD/lH96QPo17CyGVS7IA8T+xjY4YWItLsvFCq1qHL2E68tdrvXlcRTjQCsorcfQ2DbKxzK5OEZZ8LIVJyMz7Woj7oqvUTLTxKzLoAU8CN/ahXxm0G+SB78wCX6tm9K+f18dR1F0Z1xskqJLs5e5D3v72Fev8DydzgNEU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ykM8VXG+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ykM8VXG+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 44C32C4CEF0; Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:19:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1759245570; bh=ZffQflqysoIE+QNUxuYAYG6D+I4cvO3xCM/IhMrzwlc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ykM8VXG+/LzsvSkZWfeV7MWeR4hh3R+dfonjQAaqA1bIgTU4E5pamA20xeZ6pG2Gb mQWn891Ww6me9L6EVsHF6QGXEUggV5T4fO0uYBlmKWefuR3lQ28re1v0fmi4ERJut5 amhDFV+naoyK5uMrSdPzosqYvl0FiR0t89+YoZuo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vincent Mailhol , Marc Kleine-Budde , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 30/73] can: hi311x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 16:47:34 +0200 Message-ID: <20250930143821.832537566@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.51.0 In-Reply-To: <20250930143820.537407601@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250930143820.537407601@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Vincent Mailhol [ Upstream commit ac1c7656fa717f29fac3ea073af63f0b9919ec9a ] Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further checks. This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on this line: memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF, frame->data, frame->len); Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-2-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c index b757555ed4c4f..57ea7dfe8a596 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c @@ -813,6 +813,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops hi3110_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = hi3110_open, .ndo_stop = hi3110_stop, .ndo_start_xmit = hi3110_hard_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops hi3110_ethtool_ops = { -- 2.51.0