* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
@ 2025-10-10 12:35 gregkh
2025-10-13 17:36 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing userspace I/O Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2025-10-10 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: seanjc, jmattson; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e750f85391286a4c8100275516973324b621a269
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025101006-moonwalk-smilingly-3725@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e750f85391286a4c8100275516973324b621a269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 12:06:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing
userspace I/O
When completing emulation of instruction that generated a userspace exit
for I/O, don't recheck L1 intercepts as KVM has already finished that
phase of instruction execution, i.e. has already committed to allowing L2
to perform I/O. If L1 (or host userspace) modifies the I/O permission
bitmaps during the exit to userspace, KVM will treat the access as being
intercepted despite already having emulated the I/O access.
Pivot on EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE to detect that KVM is completing emulation.
Of the three users of EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE, only complete_emulated_io() (the
intended "recipient") can reach the code in question. gp_interception()'s
use is mutually exclusive with is_guest_mode(), and
complete_emulated_insn_gp() unconditionally pairs EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE with
EMULTYPE_SKIP.
The bad behavior was detected by a syzkaller program that toggles port I/O
interception during the userspace I/O exit, ultimately resulting in a WARN
on vcpu->arch.pio.count being non-zero due to KVM no completing emulation
of the I/O instruction.
WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 1083 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:8039 emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 23 UID: 1000 PID: 1083 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-c1610d2d66b1-next-vm #74 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_fast_pio+0xd6/0x1d0 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x149/0x610 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xda8/0x1ac0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x244/0x8c0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xc60
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
Reported-by: syzbot+cc2032ba16cc2018ca25@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68790db4.a00a0220.3af5df.0020.GAE@google.com
Fixes: 8a76d7f25f8f ("KVM: x86: Add x86 callback for intercept check")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250715190638.1899116-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 1349e278cd2a..542d3664afa3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -5107,12 +5107,11 @@ void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
}
-int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool check_intercepts)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int saved_dst_type = ctxt->dst.type;
- bool is_guest_mode = ctxt->ops->is_guest_mode(ctxt);
ctxt->mem_read.pos = 0;
@@ -5160,7 +5159,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
fetch_possible_mmx_operand(&ctxt->dst);
}
- if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && ctxt->intercept) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && ctxt->intercept) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
@@ -5189,7 +5188,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
goto done;
}
- if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
@@ -5243,7 +5242,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
special_insn:
- if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
index c1df5acfacaf..7b5ddb787a25 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -235,7 +235,6 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
void (*set_nmi_mask)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool masked);
bool (*is_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
- bool (*is_guest_mode)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
int (*leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
void (*triple_fault)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
int (*set_xcr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 index, u64 xcr);
@@ -521,7 +520,7 @@ bool x86_page_table_writing_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
#define EMULATION_RESTART 1
#define EMULATION_INTERCEPTED 2
void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
-int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool check_intercepts);
int emulator_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a1c49bc681c4..79057622fa76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -8470,11 +8470,6 @@ static bool emulator_is_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
return is_smm(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
}
-static bool emulator_is_guest_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
-{
- return is_guest_mode(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
-}
-
#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
static int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
@@ -8558,7 +8553,6 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
.guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible = emulator_guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible,
.set_nmi_mask = emulator_set_nmi_mask,
.is_smm = emulator_is_smm,
- .is_guest_mode = emulator_is_guest_mode,
.leave_smm = emulator_leave_smm,
.triple_fault = emulator_triple_fault,
.set_xcr = emulator_set_xcr,
@@ -9143,7 +9137,14 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
ctxt->exception.address = 0;
}
- r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt);
+ /*
+ * Check L1's instruction intercepts when emulating instructions for
+ * L2, unless KVM is re-emulating a previously decoded instruction,
+ * e.g. to complete userspace I/O, in which case KVM has already
+ * checked the intercepts.
+ */
+ r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt, is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+ !(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE));
if (r == EMULATION_INTERCEPTED)
return 1;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5.15.y] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing userspace I/O
2025-10-10 12:35 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
@ 2025-10-13 17:36 ` Sasha Levin
2025-10-17 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-10-13 17:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Sean Christopherson, syzbot+cc2032ba16cc2018ca25, Jim Mattson,
Sasha Levin
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[ Upstream commit e750f85391286a4c8100275516973324b621a269 ]
When completing emulation of instruction that generated a userspace exit
for I/O, don't recheck L1 intercepts as KVM has already finished that
phase of instruction execution, i.e. has already committed to allowing L2
to perform I/O. If L1 (or host userspace) modifies the I/O permission
bitmaps during the exit to userspace, KVM will treat the access as being
intercepted despite already having emulated the I/O access.
Pivot on EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE to detect that KVM is completing emulation.
Of the three users of EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE, only complete_emulated_io() (the
intended "recipient") can reach the code in question. gp_interception()'s
use is mutually exclusive with is_guest_mode(), and
complete_emulated_insn_gp() unconditionally pairs EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE with
EMULTYPE_SKIP.
The bad behavior was detected by a syzkaller program that toggles port I/O
interception during the userspace I/O exit, ultimately resulting in a WARN
on vcpu->arch.pio.count being non-zero due to KVM no completing emulation
of the I/O instruction.
WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 1083 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:8039 emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 23 UID: 1000 PID: 1083 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-c1610d2d66b1-next-vm #74 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_fast_pio+0xd6/0x1d0 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x149/0x610 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xda8/0x1ac0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x244/0x8c0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xc60
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
Reported-by: syzbot+cc2032ba16cc2018ca25@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68790db4.a00a0220.3af5df.0020.GAE@google.com
Fixes: 8a76d7f25f8f ("KVM: x86: Add x86 callback for intercept check")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250715190638.1899116-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[ is_guest_mode() was open coded ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 11 ++++-------
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 98b25a7af8ce8..dae68691f4248 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -5452,12 +5452,11 @@ void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
}
-int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool check_intercepts)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int saved_dst_type = ctxt->dst.type;
- unsigned emul_flags;
ctxt->mem_read.pos = 0;
@@ -5471,8 +5470,6 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
-
- emul_flags = ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt);
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(No64|Undefined|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|Priv|Prot|String))) {
if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & No64)) ||
@@ -5506,7 +5503,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
fetch_possible_mmx_operand(&ctxt->dst);
}
- if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && ctxt->intercept) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && ctxt->intercept) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
@@ -5535,7 +5532,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
goto done;
}
- if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
@@ -5589,7 +5586,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
special_insn:
- if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ if (unlikely(check_intercepts) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
index fb09cd22cb7f5..6507340513cdd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ bool x86_page_table_writing_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
#define EMULATION_RESTART 1
#define EMULATION_INTERCEPTED 2
void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
-int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool check_intercepts);
int emulator_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 2ba297da7bdec..648f80f73e66c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -8209,7 +8209,14 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
ctxt->exception.address = 0;
}
- r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt);
+ /*
+ * Check L1's instruction intercepts when emulating instructions for
+ * L2, unless KVM is re-emulating a previously decoded instruction,
+ * e.g. to complete userspace I/O, in which case KVM has already
+ * checked the intercepts.
+ */
+ r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt, is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+ !(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE));
if (r == EMULATION_INTERCEPTED)
return 1;
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing userspace I/O
2025-10-13 17:36 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing userspace I/O Sasha Levin
@ 2025-10-17 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2025-10-17 22:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sasha Levin; +Cc: stable, syzbot+cc2032ba16cc2018ca25, Jim Mattson
On Mon, Oct 13, 2025, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit e750f85391286a4c8100275516973324b621a269 ]
>
> When completing emulation of instruction that generated a userspace exit
> for I/O, don't recheck L1 intercepts as KVM has already finished that
> phase of instruction execution, i.e. has already committed to allowing L2
> to perform I/O. If L1 (or host userspace) modifies the I/O permission
> bitmaps during the exit to userspace, KVM will treat the access as being
> intercepted despite already having emulated the I/O access.
>
> Pivot on EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE to detect that KVM is completing emulation.
> Of the three users of EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE, only complete_emulated_io() (the
> intended "recipient") can reach the code in question. gp_interception()'s
> use is mutually exclusive with is_guest_mode(), and
> complete_emulated_insn_gp() unconditionally pairs EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE with
> EMULTYPE_SKIP.
>
> The bad behavior was detected by a syzkaller program that toggles port I/O
> interception during the userspace I/O exit, ultimately resulting in a WARN
> on vcpu->arch.pio.count being non-zero due to KVM no completing emulation
> of the I/O instruction.
>
> WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 1083 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:8039 emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
> CPU: 23 UID: 1000 PID: 1083 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-c1610d2d66b1-next-vm #74 NONE
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> RIP: 0010:emulator_pio_in_out+0x154/0x170 [kvm]
> PKRU: 55555554
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> kvm_fast_pio+0xd6/0x1d0 [kvm]
> vmx_handle_exit+0x149/0x610 [kvm_intel]
> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xda8/0x1ac0 [kvm]
> kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x244/0x8c0 [kvm]
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
> do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xc60
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
> </TASK>
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+cc2032ba16cc2018ca25@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68790db4.a00a0220.3af5df.0020.GAE@google.com
> Fixes: 8a76d7f25f8f ("KVM: x86: Add x86 callback for intercept check")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250715190638.1899116-1-seanjc@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> [ is_guest_mode() was open coded ]
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> ---
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-10-17 22:02 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2025-10-10 12:35 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2025-10-13 17:36 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] KVM: x86: Don't (re)check L1 intercepts when completing userspace I/O Sasha Levin
2025-10-17 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
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