From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D490C31690D for ; Thu, 16 Oct 2025 13:23:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760620999; cv=none; b=pDRMJEXVUT4M3ZYixOzx+AOpIVSF94fw7J+sq4g9kgqHvmxI1j901m1CtuZaJ42bL4eLJWcOwS3k2xHlgJ5IwO33Awar0w6JrVWH24OCLRU/X9/4aYQ4pIbuwhzkM4IXuEIUyHISaWofabYxA8rw71lRWT2lkgx0G9eRt5xJti8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760620999; c=relaxed/simple; bh=0eIdgOrlqFIr+rvY747EPxCUc2toxLHKAKS1amScNfw=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=jG4JGfr41+oomg3gQ+0HATVGB46TypUliFdre8kUOU4xVX3ZiRK/BVzHcxkhnrDpmDiMnaK5zLPSTF3EbHvEugUcFhez1AXinC3N9loLkliQFN9zMD/Pa6iULtcPtoPE2OcMuwJOpdvFTQoQdfG72g1CjCXFm2m56zp3rDhaqvA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Ot8W8tGD; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Ot8W8tGD" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 23B36C4CEF1; Thu, 16 Oct 2025 13:23:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1760620999; bh=0eIdgOrlqFIr+rvY747EPxCUc2toxLHKAKS1amScNfw=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:From; b=Ot8W8tGDbhHsZ4UUGCs9zap+kNZD856qtEgQ3WBzDG+KMP1Oqecwdia1BojpU0h4h 8FRFLSeMwzikgBfS9MAp6WyFTLrHOv2wCPUur1lU7oRB+LsBlg/nwD1HHq0HY0QytU CzfYD8/nodJ6KQRoV+bslRyBS3lmtBzFspSkCO7g= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nfsd: decouple the xprtsec policy check from" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree To: smayhew@redhat.com,chuck.lever@oracle.com Cc: From: Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 15:23:10 +0200 Message-ID: <2025101610-ranch-sincerity-0fc4@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e4f574ca9c6dfa66695bb054ff5df43ecea873ec # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2025101610-ranch-sincerity-0fc4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From e4f574ca9c6dfa66695bb054ff5df43ecea873ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Scott Mayhew Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 15:15:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: decouple the xprtsec policy check from check_nfsd_access() A while back I had reported that an NFSv3 client could successfully mount using '-o xprtsec=none' an export that had been exported with 'xprtsec=tls:mtls'. By "successfully" I mean that the mount command would succeed and the mount would show up in /proc/mount. Attempting to do anything futher with the mount would be met with NFS3ERR_ACCES. This was fixed (albeit accidentally) by commit bb4f07f2409c ("nfsd: Fix NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS and NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT") and was subsequently re-broken by commit 0813c5f01249 ("nfsd: fix access checking for NLM under XPRTSEC policies"). Transport Layer Security isn't an RPC security flavor or pseudo-flavor, so we shouldn't be conflating them when determining whether the access checks can be bypassed. Split check_nfsd_access() into two helpers, and have __fh_verify() call the helpers directly since __fh_verify() has logic that allows one or both of the checks to be skipped. All other sites will continue to call check_nfsd_access(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/ZjO3Qwf_G87yNXb2@aion/ Fixes: 9280c5774314 ("NFSD: Handle new xprtsec= export option") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.c b/fs/nfsd/export.c index cadfc2bae60e..95b5681152c4 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/export.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/export.c @@ -1082,50 +1082,62 @@ static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd, } /** - * check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. + * check_xprtsec_policy - check if access to export is allowed by the + * xprtsec policy * @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. - * @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp (will be NULL for LOCALIO). - * @may_bypass_gss: reduce strictness of authorization check + * @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp. + * + * Helper function for check_nfsd_access(). Note that callers should be + * using check_nfsd_access() instead of calling this function directly. The + * one exception is __fh_verify() since it has logic that may result in one + * or both of the helpers being skipped. * * Return values: * %nfs_ok if access is granted, or * %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied */ -__be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - bool may_bypass_gss) +__be32 check_xprtsec_policy(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { - struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; - struct svc_xprt *xprt; - - /* - * If rqstp is NULL, this is a LOCALIO request which will only - * ever use a filehandle/credential pair for which access has - * been affirmed (by ACCESS or OPEN NFS requests) over the - * wire. So there is no need for further checks here. - */ - if (!rqstp) - return nfs_ok; - - xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; + struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt; if (exp->ex_xprtsec_modes & NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_NONE) { if (!test_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION, &xprt->xpt_flags)) - goto ok; + return nfs_ok; } if (exp->ex_xprtsec_modes & NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_TLS) { if (test_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION, &xprt->xpt_flags) && !test_bit(XPT_PEER_AUTH, &xprt->xpt_flags)) - goto ok; + return nfs_ok; } if (exp->ex_xprtsec_modes & NFSEXP_XPRTSEC_MTLS) { if (test_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION, &xprt->xpt_flags) && test_bit(XPT_PEER_AUTH, &xprt->xpt_flags)) - goto ok; + return nfs_ok; } - if (!may_bypass_gss) - goto denied; + return nfserr_wrongsec; +} + +/** + * check_security_flavor - check if access to export is allowed by the + * security flavor + * @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. + * @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp. + * @may_bypass_gss: reduce strictness of authorization check + * + * Helper function for check_nfsd_access(). Note that callers should be + * using check_nfsd_access() instead of calling this function directly. The + * one exception is __fh_verify() since it has logic that may result in one + * or both of the helpers being skipped. + * + * Return values: + * %nfs_ok if access is granted, or + * %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied + */ +__be32 check_security_flavor(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + bool may_bypass_gss) +{ + struct exp_flavor_info *f, *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors; -ok: /* legacy gss-only clients are always OK: */ if (exp->ex_client == rqstp->rq_gssclient) return nfs_ok; @@ -1167,10 +1179,30 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, } } -denied: return nfserr_wrongsec; } +/** + * check_nfsd_access - check if access to export is allowed. + * @exp: svc_export that is being accessed. + * @rqstp: svc_rqst attempting to access @exp. + * @may_bypass_gss: reduce strictness of authorization check + * + * Return values: + * %nfs_ok if access is granted, or + * %nfserr_wrongsec if access is denied + */ +__be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + bool may_bypass_gss) +{ + __be32 status; + + status = check_xprtsec_policy(exp, rqstp); + if (status != nfs_ok) + return status; + return check_security_flavor(exp, rqstp, may_bypass_gss); +} + /* * Uses rq_client and rq_gssclient to find an export; uses rq_client (an * auth_unix client) if it's available and has secinfo information; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.h b/fs/nfsd/export.h index b9c0adb3ce09..ef5581911d5b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/export.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/export.h @@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ struct svc_expkey { struct svc_cred; int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_cred *cred, struct svc_export *exp); +__be32 check_xprtsec_policy(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp); +__be32 check_security_flavor(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + bool may_bypass_gss); __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, bool may_bypass_gss); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c index f4c2fb3dd5d0..062cfc18d8c6 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c @@ -364,10 +364,30 @@ __fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, if (error) goto out; + /* + * If rqstp is NULL, this is a LOCALIO request which will only + * ever use a filehandle/credential pair for which access has + * been affirmed (by ACCESS or OPEN NFS requests) over the + * wire. Skip both the xprtsec policy and the security flavor + * checks. + */ + if (!rqstp) + goto check_permissions; + if ((access & NFSD_MAY_NLM) && (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOAUTHNLM)) /* NLM is allowed to fully bypass authentication */ goto out; + /* + * NLM is allowed to bypass the xprtsec policy check because lockd + * doesn't support xprtsec. + */ + if (!(access & NFSD_MAY_NLM)) { + error = check_xprtsec_policy(exp, rqstp); + if (error) + goto out; + } + if (access & NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS) may_bypass_gss = true; /* @@ -379,13 +399,15 @@ __fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, && exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry) may_bypass_gss = true; - error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp, may_bypass_gss); + error = check_security_flavor(exp, rqstp, may_bypass_gss); if (error) goto out; + /* During LOCALIO call to fh_verify will be called with a NULL rqstp */ if (rqstp) svc_xprt_set_valid(rqstp->rq_xprt); +check_permissions: /* Finally, check access permissions. */ error = nfsd_permission(cred, exp, dentry, access); out: