From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers@kernel.org,jarkko@kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 14:48:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025101624-attitude-destruct-3559@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025101624-attitude-destruct-3559@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2025 10:19:39 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
[For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp().
It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug
at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.]
Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d1800..e73f2c6c817a 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
@@ -241,7 +242,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
@@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -343,7 +344,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
next reply other threads:[~2025-10-16 12:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-16 12:48 gregkh [this message]
2025-10-20 16:27 ` [PATCH 5.4.y] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time Sasha Levin
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