From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4C86334C07; Thu, 27 Nov 2025 14:59:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764255553; cv=none; b=aEnfoEN3jJYLl/QpTHzmX/ulB80Q8M12jo+nRyyNbpWWhzc9JTSyJTO73zmpQ5gollcFDAOdyOLS9Ijme+wdIQuXWwQ53ctwFldOmM0OZQK4oav5g/LzUW1vPsxVkmYn3Q6Socr0E+5xIkfddjbGzeAUwstOCm7Q1XcW9IOUlPc= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764255553; c=relaxed/simple; bh=NAnneL8yCvNhuDvhXIWU49ZJtBvGj8v0YBzsWPaaHeY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=WQ7aqKa52+Hux7idLTGpVzGiffcHQw2+JNx75ylPEeunuYrDWY20uOWvxv2qf96rVmGl9HTEM3FMKk0s8cB2o6TrLrcuXp4S1mNRF7gG/QQORSuo9MYnZW6OwHIkQTFfVvYsVkSDl7QR+CMcfr6gLueTpE1Uykatj/mPxcTjLck= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=hw5wOOcw; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="hw5wOOcw" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EE0E3C113D0; Thu, 27 Nov 2025 14:59:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1764255552; bh=NAnneL8yCvNhuDvhXIWU49ZJtBvGj8v0YBzsWPaaHeY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hw5wOOcw7HSexYn0jXdDLjHeg1+bGTqty5mv+8Z5743jgH5Xltu+zz4N08IigFRMP lBwqlH4nOwQ8CfyxIFx8FJRhlzeqbqnClHJAlZhxNYOP0+uEDN0+erPqd2LqanHPF1 v+gSnIi7OEfMc4TjvsgKbYMTLvwG0IxoHfH5C7FY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Ilia Baryshnikov , Hannes Reinecke , "Martin K. Petersen" , Damien Le Moal , Niklas Cassel Subject: [PATCH 6.17 025/175] ata: libata-scsi: Fix system suspend for a security locked drive Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2025 15:44:38 +0100 Message-ID: <20251127144043.883736331@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251127144042.945669935@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20251127144042.945669935@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Niklas Cassel commit b11890683380a36b8488229f818d5e76e8204587 upstream. Commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") fixed ata_to_sense_error() to properly generate sense key ABORTED COMMAND (without any additional sense code), instead of the previous bogus sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND, for a failed command. However, this broke suspend for Security locked drives (drives that have Security enabled, and have not been Security unlocked by boot firmware). The reason for this is that the SCSI disk driver, for the Synchronize Cache command only, treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command (regardless of ASC / ASCQ). After commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") the code that treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command is no longer applicable, so the command fails, which causes the system suspend to be aborted: sd 1:0:0:0: PM: dpm_run_callback(): scsi_bus_suspend returns -5 sd 1:0:0:0: PM: failed to suspend async: error -5 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected To make suspend work once again, for a Security locked device only, return sense data LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED, the actual sense data which a real SCSI device would have returned if locked. The SCSI disk driver treats this sense data as a successful command. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ilia Baryshnikov Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220704 Fixes: cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/ata.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c @@ -992,6 +992,13 @@ static void ata_gen_ata_sense(struct ata return; } + if (ata_id_is_locked(dev->id)) { + /* Security locked */ + /* LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED */ + ata_scsi_set_sense(dev, cmd, DATA_PROTECT, 0x74, 0x71); + return; + } + if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_RTF_FILLED)) { ata_dev_dbg(dev, "Missing result TF: reporting aborted command\n"); --- a/include/linux/ata.h +++ b/include/linux/ata.h @@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ struct ata_bmdma_prd { #define ata_id_has_ncq(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] & (1 << 8)) #define ata_id_queue_depth(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_QUEUE_DEPTH] & 0x1f) + 1) #define ata_id_removable(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_CONFIG] & (1 << 7)) +#define ata_id_is_locked(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_DLF] & 0x7) == 0x7) #define ata_id_has_atapi_AN(id) \ ((((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0x0000) && \ ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0xffff)) && \