* [PATCH 6.17.y 2/4] kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Sasha Levin
@ 2025-11-22 4:52 ` Sasha Levin
2025-11-27 13:17 ` Greg KH
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 3/4] kho: increase metadata bitmap size to PAGE_SIZE Sasha Levin
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-11-22 4:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Pasha Tatashin, Mike Rapoport, Pratyush Yadav, Alexander Graf,
Christian Brauner, David Matlack, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan Corbet, Masahiro Yamada, Miguel Ojeda, Randy Dunlap,
Samiullah Khawaja, Tejun Heo, Andrew Morton, Sasha Levin
From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
[ Upstream commit e38f65d317df1fd2dcafe614d9c537475ecf9992 ]
Patch series "KHO: kfence + KHO memory corruption fix", v3.
This series fixes a memory corruption bug in KHO that occurs when KFENCE
is enabled.
The root cause is that KHO metadata, allocated via kzalloc(), can be
randomly serviced by kfence_alloc(). When a kernel boots via KHO, the
early memblock allocator is restricted to a "scratch area". This forces
the KFENCE pool to be allocated within this scratch area, creating a
conflict. If KHO metadata is subsequently placed in this pool, it gets
corrupted during the next kexec operation.
Google is using KHO and have had obscure crashes due to this memory
corruption, with stacks all over the place. I would prefer this fix to be
properly backported to stable so we can also automatically consume it once
we switch to the upstream KHO.
Patch 1/3 introduces a debug-only feature (CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG)
that adds checks to detect and fail any operation that attempts to place
KHO metadata or preserved memory within the scratch area. This serves as
a validation and diagnostic tool to confirm the problem without affecting
production builds.
Patch 2/3 Increases bitmap to PAGE_SIZE, so buddy allocator can be used.
Patch 3/3 Provides the fix by modifying KHO to allocate its metadata
directly from the buddy allocator instead of slab. This bypasses the
KFENCE interception entirely.
This patch (of 3):
It is invalid for KHO metadata or preserved memory regions to be located
within the KHO scratch area, as this area is overwritten when the next
kernel is loaded, and used early in boot by the next kernel. This can
lead to memory corruption.
Add checks to kho_preserve_* and KHO's internal metadata allocators
(xa_load_or_alloc, new_chunk) to verify that the physical address of the
memory does not overlap with any defined scratch region. If an overlap is
detected, the operation will fail and a WARN_ON is triggered. To avoid
performance overhead in production kernels, these checks are enabled only
when CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG is selected.
[rppt@kernel.org: fix KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG Kconfig dependency]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aQHUyyFtiNZhx8jo@kernel.org
[pasha.tatashin@soleen.com: build fix]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+CK2bBnorfsTymKtv4rKvqGBHs=y=MjEMMRg_tE-RME6n-zUw@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021000852.2924827-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021000852.2924827-2-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Fixes: fc33e4b44b27 ("kexec: enable KHO support for memory preservation")
Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: fa759cd75bce ("kho: allocate metadata directly from the buddy allocator")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/Kconfig.kexec | 9 +++++
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/kexec_handover.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
kernel/kexec_handover_debug.c | 25 ++++++++++++++
kernel/kexec_handover_internal.h | 20 +++++++++++
5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/kexec_handover_debug.c
create mode 100644 kernel/kexec_handover_internal.h
diff --git a/kernel/Kconfig.kexec b/kernel/Kconfig.kexec
index 1224dd937df0c..e60225e3b40c1 100644
--- a/kernel/Kconfig.kexec
+++ b/kernel/Kconfig.kexec
@@ -109,6 +109,15 @@ config KEXEC_HANDOVER
to keep data or state alive across the kexec. For this to work,
both source and target kernels need to have this option enabled.
+config KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG
+ bool "Enable Kexec Handover debug checks"
+ depends on KEXEC_HANDOVER
+ help
+ This option enables extra sanity checks for the Kexec Handover
+ subsystem. Since, KHO performance is crucial in live update
+ scenarios and the extra code might be adding overhead it is
+ only optionally enabled.
+
config CRASH_DUMP
bool "kernel crash dumps"
default ARCH_DEFAULT_CRASH_DUMP
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index c60623448235f..bfca6dfe335a4 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += kexec_file.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_ELF) += kexec_elf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER) += kexec_handover.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG) += kexec_handover_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BACKTRACE_SELF_TEST) += backtracetest.o
obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += cgroup/
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_handover.c b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
index 4e5774a6f0738..492e40b6b8023 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_handover.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "KHO: " fmt
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/cma.h>
#include <linux/count_zeros.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
+#include "kexec_handover_internal.h"
/*
* KHO is tightly coupled with mm init and needs access to some of mm
* internal APIs.
@@ -116,26 +118,26 @@ static struct kho_out kho_out = {
static void *xa_load_or_alloc(struct xarray *xa, unsigned long index, size_t sz)
{
- void *elm, *res;
+ void *res = xa_load(xa, index);
- elm = xa_load(xa, index);
- if (elm)
- return elm;
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+
+ void *elm __free(kfree) = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
- elm = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elm)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(elm), sz)))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
res = xa_cmpxchg(xa, index, NULL, elm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (xa_is_err(res))
- res = ERR_PTR(xa_err(res));
-
- if (res) {
- kfree(elm);
+ return ERR_PTR(xa_err(res));
+ else if (res)
return res;
- }
- return elm;
+ return no_free_ptr(elm);
}
static void __kho_unpreserve(struct kho_mem_track *track, unsigned long pfn,
@@ -289,15 +291,19 @@ static_assert(sizeof(struct khoser_mem_chunk) == PAGE_SIZE);
static struct khoser_mem_chunk *new_chunk(struct khoser_mem_chunk *cur_chunk,
unsigned long order)
{
- struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk;
+ struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk __free(kfree) = NULL;
chunk = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chunk)
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(chunk), PAGE_SIZE)))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
chunk->hdr.order = order;
if (cur_chunk)
KHOSER_STORE_PTR(cur_chunk->hdr.next, chunk);
- return chunk;
+ return no_free_ptr(chunk);
}
static void kho_mem_ser_free(struct khoser_mem_chunk *first_chunk)
@@ -318,14 +324,17 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_serialization *ser)
struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk = NULL;
struct kho_mem_phys *physxa;
unsigned long order;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
xa_for_each(&ser->track.orders, order, physxa) {
struct kho_mem_phys_bits *bits;
unsigned long phys;
chunk = new_chunk(chunk, order);
- if (!chunk)
+ if (IS_ERR(chunk)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(chunk);
goto err_free;
+ }
if (!first_chunk)
first_chunk = chunk;
@@ -335,8 +344,10 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_serialization *ser)
if (chunk->hdr.num_elms == ARRAY_SIZE(chunk->bitmaps)) {
chunk = new_chunk(chunk, order);
- if (!chunk)
+ if (IS_ERR(chunk)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(chunk);
goto err_free;
+ }
}
elm = &chunk->bitmaps[chunk->hdr.num_elms];
@@ -353,7 +364,7 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_serialization *ser)
err_free:
kho_mem_ser_free(first_chunk);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return err;
}
static void __init deserialize_bitmap(unsigned int order,
@@ -406,8 +417,8 @@ static void __init kho_mem_deserialize(const void *fdt)
* area for early allocations that happen before page allocator is
* initialized.
*/
-static struct kho_scratch *kho_scratch;
-static unsigned int kho_scratch_cnt;
+struct kho_scratch *kho_scratch;
+unsigned int kho_scratch_cnt;
/*
* The scratch areas are scaled by default as percent of memory allocated from
@@ -684,6 +695,9 @@ int kho_preserve_folio(struct folio *folio)
const unsigned int order = folio_order(folio);
struct kho_mem_track *track = &kho_out.ser.track;
+ if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_SIZE << order)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return __kho_preserve_order(track, pfn, order);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kho_preserve_folio);
@@ -710,6 +724,11 @@ int kho_preserve_phys(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(phys) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(size))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT))) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
while (pfn < end_pfn) {
const unsigned int order =
min(count_trailing_zeros(pfn), ilog2(end_pfn - pfn));
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_handover_debug.c b/kernel/kexec_handover_debug.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..6efb696f54261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kexec_handover_debug.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * kexec_handover_debug.c - kexec handover optional debug functionality
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Google LLC, Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "KHO: " fmt
+
+#include "kexec_handover_internal.h"
+
+bool kho_scratch_overlap(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
+{
+ phys_addr_t scratch_start, scratch_end;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kho_scratch_cnt; i++) {
+ scratch_start = kho_scratch[i].addr;
+ scratch_end = kho_scratch[i].addr + kho_scratch[i].size;
+
+ if (phys < scratch_end && (phys + size) > scratch_start)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_handover_internal.h b/kernel/kexec_handover_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3c3c7148ceed4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kexec_handover_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef LINUX_KEXEC_HANDOVER_INTERNAL_H
+#define LINUX_KEXEC_HANDOVER_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/kexec_handover.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+extern struct kho_scratch *kho_scratch;
+extern unsigned int kho_scratch_cnt;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG
+bool kho_scratch_overlap(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size);
+#else
+static inline bool kho_scratch_overlap(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG */
+
+#endif /* LINUX_KEXEC_HANDOVER_INTERNAL_H */
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.17.y 2/4] kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 2/4] kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area Sasha Levin
@ 2025-11-27 13:17 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2025-11-27 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sasha Levin
Cc: stable, Pasha Tatashin, Mike Rapoport, Pratyush Yadav,
Alexander Graf, Christian Brauner, David Matlack, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan Corbet, Masahiro Yamada, Miguel Ojeda, Randy Dunlap,
Samiullah Khawaja, Tejun Heo, Andrew Morton
On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 11:52:20PM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit e38f65d317df1fd2dcafe614d9c537475ecf9992 ]
Oops, it's this one really that breaks the build, not patch 1/4.
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.17.y 3/4] kho: increase metadata bitmap size to PAGE_SIZE
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Sasha Levin
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 2/4] kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area Sasha Levin
@ 2025-11-22 4:52 ` Sasha Levin
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 4/4] kho: allocate metadata directly from the buddy allocator Sasha Levin
2025-11-27 13:15 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Greg KH
3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-11-22 4:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Pasha Tatashin, Mike Rapoport (Microsoft), Pratyush Yadav,
Alexander Graf, Christian Brauner, David Matlack, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan Corbet, Masahiro Yamada, Miguel Ojeda, Randy Dunlap,
Samiullah Khawaja, Tejun Heo, Andrew Morton, Sasha Levin
From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
[ Upstream commit a2fff99f92dae9c0eaf0d75de3def70ec68dad92 ]
KHO memory preservation metadata is preserved in 512 byte chunks which
requires their allocation from slab allocator. Slabs are not safe to be
used with KHO because of kfence, and because partial slabs may lead leaks
to the next kernel. Change the size to be PAGE_SIZE.
The kfence specifically may cause memory corruption, where it randomly
provides slab objects that can be within the scratch area. The reason for
that is that kfence allocates its objects prior to KHO scratch is marked
as CMA region.
While this change could potentially increase metadata overhead on systems
with sparsely preserved memory, this is being mitigated by ongoing work to
reduce sparseness during preservation via 1G guest pages. Furthermore,
this change aligns with future work on a stateless KHO, which will also
use page-sized bitmaps for its radix tree metadata.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021000852.2924827-3-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Fixes: fc33e4b44b27 ("kexec: enable KHO support for memory preservation")
Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: fa759cd75bce ("kho: allocate metadata directly from the buddy allocator")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/kexec_handover.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_handover.c b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
index 492e40b6b8023..040cfeb1d3fab 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_handover.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ early_param("kho", kho_parse_enable);
* Keep track of memory that is to be preserved across KHO.
*
* The serializing side uses two levels of xarrays to manage chunks of per-order
- * 512 byte bitmaps. For instance if PAGE_SIZE = 4096, the entire 1G order of a
- * 1TB system would fit inside a single 512 byte bitmap. For order 0 allocations
- * each bitmap will cover 16M of address space. Thus, for 16G of memory at most
- * 512K of bitmap memory will be needed for order 0.
+ * PAGE_SIZE byte bitmaps. For instance if PAGE_SIZE = 4096, the entire 1G order
+ * of a 8TB system would fit inside a single 4096 byte bitmap. For order 0
+ * allocations each bitmap will cover 128M of address space. Thus, for 16G of
+ * memory at most 512K of bitmap memory will be needed for order 0.
*
* This approach is fully incremental, as the serialization progresses folios
* can continue be aggregated to the tracker. The final step, immediately prior
@@ -63,12 +63,14 @@ early_param("kho", kho_parse_enable);
* successor kernel to parse.
*/
-#define PRESERVE_BITS (512 * 8)
+#define PRESERVE_BITS (PAGE_SIZE * 8)
struct kho_mem_phys_bits {
DECLARE_BITMAP(preserve, PRESERVE_BITS);
};
+static_assert(sizeof(struct kho_mem_phys_bits) == PAGE_SIZE);
+
struct kho_mem_phys {
/*
* Points to kho_mem_phys_bits, a sparse bitmap array. Each bit is sized
@@ -116,19 +118,19 @@ static struct kho_out kho_out = {
.finalized = false,
};
-static void *xa_load_or_alloc(struct xarray *xa, unsigned long index, size_t sz)
+static void *xa_load_or_alloc(struct xarray *xa, unsigned long index)
{
void *res = xa_load(xa, index);
if (res)
return res;
- void *elm __free(kfree) = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ void *elm __free(kfree) = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elm)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(elm), sz)))
+ if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(elm), PAGE_SIZE)))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
res = xa_cmpxchg(xa, index, NULL, elm, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -201,8 +203,7 @@ static int __kho_preserve_order(struct kho_mem_track *track, unsigned long pfn,
}
}
- bits = xa_load_or_alloc(&physxa->phys_bits, pfn_high / PRESERVE_BITS,
- sizeof(*bits));
+ bits = xa_load_or_alloc(&physxa->phys_bits, pfn_high / PRESERVE_BITS);
if (IS_ERR(bits))
return PTR_ERR(bits);
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.17.y 4/4] kho: allocate metadata directly from the buddy allocator
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Sasha Levin
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 2/4] kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area Sasha Levin
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 3/4] kho: increase metadata bitmap size to PAGE_SIZE Sasha Levin
@ 2025-11-22 4:52 ` Sasha Levin
2025-11-27 13:15 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Greg KH
3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-11-22 4:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Pasha Tatashin, Pratyush Yadav, Mike Rapoport (Microsoft),
David Matlack, Alexander Graf, Christian Brauner, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan Corbet, Masahiro Yamada, Miguel Ojeda, Randy Dunlap,
Samiullah Khawaja, Tejun Heo, Andrew Morton, Sasha Levin
From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
[ Upstream commit fa759cd75bce5489eed34596daa53f721849a86f ]
KHO allocates metadata for its preserved memory map using the slab
allocator via kzalloc(). This metadata is temporary and is used by the
next kernel during early boot to find preserved memory.
A problem arises when KFENCE is enabled. kzalloc() calls can be randomly
intercepted by kfence_alloc(), which services the allocation from a
dedicated KFENCE memory pool. This pool is allocated early in boot via
memblock.
When booting via KHO, the memblock allocator is restricted to a "scratch
area", forcing the KFENCE pool to be allocated within it. This creates a
conflict, as the scratch area is expected to be ephemeral and
overwriteable by a subsequent kexec. If KHO metadata is placed in this
KFENCE pool, it leads to memory corruption when the next kernel is loaded.
To fix this, modify KHO to allocate its metadata directly from the buddy
allocator instead of slab.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021000852.2924827-4-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Fixes: fc33e4b44b27 ("kexec: enable KHO support for memory preservation")
Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/gfp.h | 3 +++
kernel/kexec_handover.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index 5ebf26fcdcfa3..1c599cf9b4af7 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/mmzone.h>
#include <linux/topology.h>
#include <linux/alloc_tag.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
struct vm_area_struct;
@@ -463,4 +464,6 @@ static inline struct folio *folio_alloc_gigantic_noprof(int order, gfp_t gfp,
/* This should be paired with folio_put() rather than free_contig_range(). */
#define folio_alloc_gigantic(...) alloc_hooks(folio_alloc_gigantic_noprof(__VA_ARGS__))
+DEFINE_FREE(free_page, void *, free_page((unsigned long)_T))
+
#endif /* __LINUX_GFP_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_handover.c b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
index 040cfeb1d3fab..d23855283faa4 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_handover.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_handover.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void *xa_load_or_alloc(struct xarray *xa, unsigned long index)
if (res)
return res;
- void *elm __free(kfree) = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ void *elm __free(free_page) = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elm)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -292,9 +292,9 @@ static_assert(sizeof(struct khoser_mem_chunk) == PAGE_SIZE);
static struct khoser_mem_chunk *new_chunk(struct khoser_mem_chunk *cur_chunk,
unsigned long order)
{
- struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk __free(free_page) = NULL;
- chunk = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ chunk = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chunk)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order()
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/4] kho: check if kho is finalized in __kho_preserve_order() Sasha Levin
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 4:52 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 4/4] kho: allocate metadata directly from the buddy allocator Sasha Levin
@ 2025-11-27 13:15 ` Greg KH
3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2025-11-27 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sasha Levin
Cc: stable, Mike Rapoport (Microsoft), Pratyush Yadav, Alexander Graf,
Baoquan He, Changyuan Lyu, Chris Li, Jason Gunthorpe,
Pasha Tatashin, Andrew Morton
On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 11:52:19PM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: "Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)" <rppt@kernel.org>
>
> [ Upstream commit 469661d0d3a55a7ba1e7cb847c26baf78cace086 ]
Still breaks the build :(
I've dropped this and the other kho patches from the queue again.
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread