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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>,
	Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 20:26:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251230012614.1920692-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025122959-unawake-devious-8898@gregkh>

From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>

[ Upstream commit ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc ]

strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term
string of possibly bigger size.  Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce
memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that
regard.  So if this happens, the following warning is observed:

strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039
 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]
 sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]
 parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]
 __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]
 ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706
 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636
 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]
 path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63
characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer
which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job
properly.  Return with error if the user still managed to provide a
non-NUL-term string here.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[ goto failed_mount instead of return ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/super.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 453e746ba361..41e49fee35e5 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -4282,10 +4282,11 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	}
 
 	if (sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) {
-		char s_mount_opts[65];
+		char s_mount_opts[64];
 
-		strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
-			    sizeof(s_mount_opts));
+		if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
+				sizeof(s_mount_opts)) < 0)
+			goto failed_mount;
 		if (!parse_options(s_mount_opts, sb, &journal_devnum,
 				   &journal_ioprio, 0)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
-- 
2.51.0


      reply	other threads:[~2025-12-30  1:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-29 12:29 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2025-12-30  1:26 ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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