From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00E7A30CD89 for ; Wed, 31 Dec 2025 20:41:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1767213703; cv=none; b=fzJAjMTGOz7lX+4bET5mIkvxbHeOOFuKU/yvEwB3OoqqVxgIRlZ5NutmA9tj+L284xmeJVElCazQLRH+HucT1mN6LOHD70qq8cyKfeOR7z+JFeyuKNEEdcy7qIb0Kwt9EwyO2xnNuzUDXfxPAHN4j/YaazYnorF98S3aGl5Foc4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1767213703; c=relaxed/simple; bh=3VrN/qXrvLpIhsqXnqK0UlrbXeIPgz5NDB5Q6H/FMQU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lsN6KLulFMClOk/wY/nb1juEWlc+y3+Lr04soNF1mjPhWD1UeHAivxixhCh9ED194KMPdS6YqpQC5DIYq8YlLRBzVdLfiTTUHIjBlqSABjZQMda3J8/v89A0BTA9Ue4xb4C5561jEZBPyGeZMIObheSf1vFOHQ+BKVMrQirR2i0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ushr2eAG; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ushr2eAG" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 235C1C113D0; Wed, 31 Dec 2025 20:41:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1767213702; bh=3VrN/qXrvLpIhsqXnqK0UlrbXeIPgz5NDB5Q6H/FMQU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ushr2eAG2Iynjzi/+AzScZf6jLJyK3elXxcMcv/78V3Hqijj0j4zfiZpC3ur62kQv PCG43SicH4e8cjCYuxq5bWNm3Pm5gOBy9vQP4cBGhQxPgxQ6Vghn3Tn4ATqyasZnZZ UKi/W3j+xcol7AK/AWe/Wnfj6xw3F6iLb70E53QpcfZSh+yLN3ssqJKxNq2c8M2Z/s RnvgFKkK+311RrDXZLglhJlF+KCgkZXbv8UqV++xy3a6p+nX2e4fXFYjdPOadbK2QO uSk+ijOw2ijVq9EoAIpc1HZdi9DICMlCLFudXr39rQQJWRXiaJEX6960pyKUA3sD3k q2OdukvV0/3fg== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Shivani Agarwal , Herbert Xu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y] crypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmalloc Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 15:41:40 -0500 Message-ID: <20251231204140.3475630-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.51.0 In-Reply-To: <2025122930-sinner-squad-c6cd@gregkh> References: <2025122930-sinner-squad-c6cd@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Shivani Agarwal [ Upstream commit 6f6e309328d53a10c0fe1f77dec2db73373179b6 ] Several crypto user API contexts and requests allocated with sock_kmalloc() were left uninitialized, relying on callers to set fields explicitly. This resulted in the use of uninitialized data in certain error paths or when new fields are added in the future. The ACVP patches also contain two user-space interface files: algif_kpp.c and algif_akcipher.c. These too rely on proper initialization of their context structures. A particular issue has been observed with the newly added 'inflight' variable introduced in af_alg_ctx by commit: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Because the context is not memset to zero after allocation, the inflight variable has contained garbage values. As a result, af_alg_alloc_areq() has incorrectly returned -EBUSY randomly when the garbage value was interpreted as true: https://github.com/gregkh/linux/blame/master/crypto/af_alg.c#L1209 The check directly tests ctx->inflight without explicitly comparing against true/false. Since inflight is only ever set to true or false later, an uninitialized value has triggered -EBUSY failures. Zero-initializing memory allocated with sock_kmalloc() ensures inflight and other fields start in a known state, removing random issues caused by uninitialized data. Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations") Fixes: 5afdfd22e6ba ("crypto: algif_rng - add random number generator support") Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code") Fixes: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/af_alg.c | 5 ++--- crypto/algif_hash.c | 3 +-- crypto/algif_rng.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 25cf2fa3dde7..3d622904f4c3 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -1127,14 +1127,13 @@ struct af_alg_async_req *af_alg_alloc_areq(struct sock *sk, if (unlikely(!areq)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + memset(areq, 0, areqlen); + ctx->inflight = true; areq->areqlen = areqlen; areq->sk = sk; - areq->last_rsgl = NULL; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&areq->rsgl_list); - areq->tsgl = NULL; - areq->tsgl_entries = 0; return areq; } diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c index be21cfdc6dbc..a48fc7c24341 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c @@ -423,9 +423,8 @@ static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk) if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; - ctx->result = NULL; + memset(ctx, 0, len); ctx->len = len; - ctx->more = false; crypto_init_wait(&ctx->wait); ask->private = ctx; diff --git a/crypto/algif_rng.c b/crypto/algif_rng.c index 407408c43730..38a8f20a02e2 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_rng.c +++ b/crypto/algif_rng.c @@ -250,9 +250,8 @@ static int rng_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk) if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; + memset(ctx, 0, len); ctx->len = len; - ctx->addtl = NULL; - ctx->addtl_len = 0; /* * No seeding done at that point -- if multiple accepts are -- 2.51.0