FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks

tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does
not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA
payload.

Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return
name and name size for all handle types back to the caller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -11,8 +11,11 @@
  * used by the kernel internally.
  */
 
+#include "linux/dev_printk.h"
+#include "linux/tpm.h"
 #include "tpm.h"
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
 
 static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
 module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
 	}
 }
 
-static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
 {
-	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
 	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
-	int ret;
-	u32 val;
-
-	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
-	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-
-	/* skip public */
-	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-	if (val > tot_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	offset += val;
-	/* name */
-	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-	ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if (val != ret)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
-	/* forget the rest */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
-{
+	int rc, name_size_alg;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	int rc;
+
+	if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
+	    mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+		memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+		return sizeof(u32);
+	}
 
 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
-	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
-		rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
 
-	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+	}
 
-	return rc;
+	/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
+	offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
+	 * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes).
+	 */
+	if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+	name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]);
+
+	if (name_size_alg < 0)
+		return name_size_alg;
+
+	if (rc != name_size_alg) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc);
+	return name_size_alg;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
 
@@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
 	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
 	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
+	u16 name_size_alg;
 	int slot;
 	int ret;
 #endif
@@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
 		if (!name) {
 			ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
-			if (ret)
+			if (ret < 0)
 				goto err;
+
+			name_size_alg = ret;
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (name) {
@@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	}
 
 	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
-	if (name) {
-		ret = name_size(name);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto err;
-
-		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret);
-	}
+	if (name)
+		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
 #endif
 	return 0;
 

[PATCH 6.12.y] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 ]

tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does
not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA
payload.

Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return
name and name size for all handle types back to the caller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
[ different semantics around u8 name_size() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c      |  3 ++
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index dfdcbd009720..5c525987ff65 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -11,8 +11,11 @@
  * used by the kernel internally.
  */
 
+#include "linux/dev_printk.h"
+#include "linux/tpm.h"
 #include "tpm.h"
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
 
 static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
 module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index cf0b83154044..a10db4a4aced 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -156,47 +156,60 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
 	return size_map[alg] + 2;
 }
 
-static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
 {
-	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
 	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
-	u32 val;
-
-	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
-	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-
-	/* skip public */
-	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-	if (val > tot_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	offset += val;
-	/* name */
-	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-	if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
-	/* forget the rest */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
-{
-	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	int rc;
+	u8 name_size_alg;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+
+	if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
+	    mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+		memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+		return sizeof(u32);
+	}
 
 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
-	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
-		rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
 
-	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+	}
 
-	return rc;
+	/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
+	offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
+	 * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes).
+	 */
+	if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+	name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]);
+
+	if (rc != name_size_alg) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc);
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	return name_size_alg;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
 
@@ -229,6 +242,7 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
 	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
 	int slot;
+	int ret;
 #endif
 
 	if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
@@ -251,8 +265,11 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
 	    mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
 	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
-		if (!name)
-			tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+		if (!name) {
+			ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto err;
+		}
 	} else {
 		if (name)
 			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
@@ -261,6 +278,10 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
 	if (name)
 		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
+	return;
+
+err:
+	tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
 #endif
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
-- 
2.51.0

Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon, Dec 29, 2025 at 01:34:07PM +0100, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> 
> The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
> If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> 
> To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
> 
> git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
> git checkout FETCH_HEAD
> git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872
> # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
> git commit -s
> git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
> 
> Possible dependencies:
> 
> 
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 
> ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
> 
> From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks
> 
> tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does
> not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA
> payload.
> 
> Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return
> name and name size for all handle types back to the caller.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@
>   * used by the kernel internally.
>   */
>  
> +#include "linux/dev_printk.h"
> +#include "linux/tpm.h"
>  #include "tpm.h"
>  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> +#include <linux/unaligned.h>
>  
>  static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
>  module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
>  {
> -	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> +	u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
>  	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> -	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
> -	int ret;
> -	u32 val;
> -
> -	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
> -	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> -
> -	/* skip public */
> -	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> -	if (val > tot_len)
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -	offset += val;
> -	/* name */
> -	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> -	ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]);
> -	if (ret < 0)
> -		return ret;
> -
> -	if (val != ret)
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
> -	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
> -	/* forget the rest */
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
> -{
> +	int rc, name_size_alg;
>  	struct tpm_buf buf;
> -	int rc;
> +
> +	if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
> +	    mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
> +		memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
> +		return sizeof(u32);
> +	}
>  
>  	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
>  	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
> -	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
> -	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
> -		rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
>  
> -	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
> +	if (rc) {
> +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +		return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
> +	}
>  
> -	return rc;
> +	/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
> +	offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
> +	 * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes).
> +	 */
> +	if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
> +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
> +	name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]);
> +
> +	if (name_size_alg < 0)
> +		return name_size_alg;
> +
> +	if (rc != name_size_alg) {
> +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
> +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc);
> +	return name_size_alg;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
>  
> @@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
>  	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
>  	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
> +	u16 name_size_alg;
>  	int slot;
>  	int ret;
>  #endif
> @@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>  	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
>  		if (!name) {
>  			ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
> -			if (ret)
> +			if (ret < 0)
>  				goto err;
> +
> +			name_size_alg = ret;
>  		}
>  	} else {
>  		if (name) {
> @@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>  	}
>  
>  	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
> -	if (name) {
> -		ret = name_size(name);
> -		if (ret < 0)
> -			goto err;
> -
> -		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret);
> -	}
> +	if (name)
> +		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
>  #endif
>  	return 0;
>  
> 

This will apply on top of https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/aV-kD5iKi9fwluU0@kernel.org/T/#t

BR, Jarkko

Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

[Greg KH]

On Thu, Jan 08, 2026 at 02:35:57PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 29, 2025 at 01:34:07PM +0100, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > 
> > The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
> > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> > 
> > To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
> > 
> > git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
> > git checkout FETCH_HEAD
> > git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872
> > # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
> > git commit -s
> > git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
> > 
> > Possible dependencies:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > greg k-h
> > 
> > ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
> > 
> > From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200
> > Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks
> > 
> > tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does
> > not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA
> > payload.
> > 
> > Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return
> > name and name size for all handle types back to the caller.
> > 
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> > Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@
> >   * used by the kernel internally.
> >   */
> >  
> > +#include "linux/dev_printk.h"
> > +#include "linux/tpm.h"
> >  #include "tpm.h"
> >  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> > +#include <linux/unaligned.h>
> >  
> >  static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
> >  module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> > @@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
> >  	}
> >  }
> >  
> > -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> > +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
> >  {
> > -	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> > +	u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
> >  	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> > -	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
> > -	int ret;
> > -	u32 val;
> > -
> > -	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
> > -	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> > -
> > -	/* skip public */
> > -	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> > -	if (val > tot_len)
> > -		return -EINVAL;
> > -	offset += val;
> > -	/* name */
> > -	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> > -	ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]);
> > -	if (ret < 0)
> > -		return ret;
> > -
> > -	if (val != ret)
> > -		return -EINVAL;
> > -
> > -	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
> > -	/* forget the rest */
> > -	return 0;
> > -}
> > -
> > -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
> > -{
> > +	int rc, name_size_alg;
> >  	struct tpm_buf buf;
> > -	int rc;
> > +
> > +	if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
> > +	    mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
> > +		memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
> > +		return sizeof(u32);
> > +	}
> >  
> >  	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
> >  	if (rc)
> >  		return rc;
> >  
> >  	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
> > -	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
> > -	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
> > -		rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
> >  
> > -	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
> > +	if (rc) {
> > +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +		return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
> > +	}
> >  
> > -	return rc;
> > +	/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
> > +	offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
> > +	 * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes).
> > +	 */
> > +	if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
> > +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +		return -EIO;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
> > +	name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]);
> > +
> > +	if (name_size_alg < 0)
> > +		return name_size_alg;
> > +
> > +	if (rc != name_size_alg) {
> > +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +		return -EIO;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
> > +		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +		return -EIO;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc);
> > +	return name_size_alg;
> >  }
> >  #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
> >  
> > @@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> >  	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
> >  	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
> > +	u16 name_size_alg;
> >  	int slot;
> >  	int ret;
> >  #endif
> > @@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> >  	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
> >  		if (!name) {
> >  			ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
> > -			if (ret)
> > +			if (ret < 0)
> >  				goto err;
> > +
> > +			name_size_alg = ret;
> >  		}
> >  	} else {
> >  		if (name) {
> > @@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
> > -	if (name) {
> > -		ret = name_size(name);
> > -		if (ret < 0)
> > -			goto err;
> > -
> > -		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret);
> > -	}
> > +	if (name)
> > +		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
> >  #endif
> >  	return 0;
> >  
> > 
> 
> This will apply on top of https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/aV-kD5iKi9fwluU0@kernel.org/T/#t

Already in the last 6.12.y release.

thanks,

greg k-h