public inbox for stable@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Qiliang Yuan <realwujing@gmail.com>
To: realwujing@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	lihuafei1@huawei.com, mingo@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sunshx@chinatelecom.cn,
	thorsten.blum@linux.dev, wangjinchao600@gmail.com,
	yangyicong@hisilicon.com, yuanql9@chinatelecom.cn,
	zhangjn11@chinatelecom.cn, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] watchdog/hardlockup: Fix UAF in perf event cleanup due to migration race
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2026 00:24:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260122052442.667394-1-realwujing@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260122042717.657231-1-realwujing@gmail.com>

During the early initialization of the hardlockup detector, the
hardlockup_detector_perf_init() function probes for PMU hardware availability.
It originally used hardlockup_detector_event_create(), which interacts with
the per-cpu 'watchdog_ev' variable.

If the initializing task migrates to another CPU during this probe phase,
two issues arise:
1. The 'watchdog_ev' pointer on the original CPU is set but not cleared,
   leaving a stale pointer to a freed perf event.
2. The 'watchdog_ev' pointer on the new CPU might be incorrectly cleared.

This race condition was observed in console logs (captured by adding debug printks):

[23.038376] hardlockup_detector_perf_init 313 cur_cpu=2
...
[23.076385] hardlockup_detector_event_create 203 cpu(cur)=2 set watchdog_ev
...
[23.095788] perf_event_release_kernel 4623 cur_cpu=2
...
[23.116963] lockup_detector_reconfigure 577 cur_cpu=3

The log shows the task started on CPU 2, set watchdog_ev on CPU 2,
released the event on CPU 2, but then migrated to CPU 3 before the
cleanup logic (which would clear watchdog_ev) could run. This left
watchdog_ev on CPU 2 pointing to a freed event.

Later, when the watchdog is enabled/disabled on CPU 2, this stale pointer
leads to a Use-After-Free (UAF) in perf_event_disable(), as detected by KASAN:
[26.539140] ==================================================================
[26.540732] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in perf_event_ctx_lock_nested.isra.72+0x6b/0x140
[26.542442] Read of size 8 at addr ff110006b360d718 by task kworker/2:1/94
[26.543954]
[26.544744] CPU: 2 PID: 94 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.19.90-debugkasan #11
[26.546505] Hardware name: GoStack Foundation OpenStack Nova, BIOS 1.16.3-3.ctl3 04/01/2014
[26.548256] Workqueue: events smp_call_on_cpu_callback
[26.549267] Call Trace:
[26.549936]  dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb
[26.550731]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
[26.551688]  kasan_report+0x179/0x2c0
[26.552519]  ? perf_event_ctx_lock_nested.isra.72+0x6b/0x140
[26.553654]  ? watchdog_disable+0x80/0x80
[26.553657]  perf_event_ctx_lock_nested.isra.72+0x6b/0x140
[26.556951]  ? dump_stack+0xa0/0xbb
[26.564006]  ? watchdog_disable+0x80/0x80
[26.564886]  perf_event_disable+0xa/0x30
[26.565746]  hardlockup_detector_perf_disable+0x1b/0x60
[26.566776]  watchdog_disable+0x51/0x80
[26.567624]  softlockup_stop_fn+0x11/0x20
[26.568499]  smp_call_on_cpu_callback+0x5b/0xb0
[26.569443]  process_one_work+0x389/0x770
[26.570311]  worker_thread+0x57/0x5a0
[26.571124]  ? process_one_work+0x770/0x770
[26.572031]  kthread+0x1ae/0x1d0
[26.572810]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
[26.573821]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[26.574638]
[26.575178] Allocated by task 1:
[26.575990]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[26.576814]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x1e0
[26.577732]  perf_event_alloc.part.89+0xb5/0x12b0
[26.578700]  perf_event_create_kernel_counter+0x1e/0x1d0
[26.579728]  hardlockup_detector_event_create+0x4e/0xc0
[26.580744]  hardlockup_detector_perf_init+0x2f/0x60
[26.581746]  lockup_detector_init+0x85/0xdc
[26.582645]  kernel_init_freeable+0x34d/0x40e
[26.583568]  kernel_init+0xf/0x130
[26.584428]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[26.584429]
[26.584430] Freed by task 0:
[26.584433]  __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
[26.584436]  kfree+0x90/0x1a0
[26.589641]  rcu_process_callbacks+0x2cb/0x6e0
[26.590935]  __do_softirq+0x119/0x3a2
[26.591965]
[26.592630] The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110006b360d500
[26.592630]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
[26.592633] The buggy address is located 536 bytes inside of
[26.592633]  2048-byte region [ff110006b360d500, ff110006b360dd00)
[26.592634] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[26.592637] page:ffd400001acd8200 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ff11000107c0e800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[26.600959] flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head)
[26.601891] raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ff11000107c0e800
[26.603541] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[26.605546] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[26.606788]
[26.607351] Memory state around the buggy address:
[26.608556]  ff110006b360d600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[26.610565]  ff110006b360d680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[26.610567] >ff110006b360d700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[26.610568]                             ^
[26.610570]  ff110006b360d780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[26.610573]  ff110006b360d800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[26.618955] ==================================================================

Fix this by making the probe logic stateless. Use a local variable for the
perf event and avoid accessing the per-cpu 'watchdog_ev' during initialization.
This ensures that the probe event is always properly released regardless of
task migration, and no stale global state is left behind.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shouxin Sun <sunshx@chinatelecom.cn>
Signed-off-by: Junnan Zhang <zhangjn11@chinatelecom.cn>
Signed-off-by: Qiliang Yuan <realwujing@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qiliang Yuan <yuanql9@chinatelecom.cn>
---
v2:
- Add Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org tag.
---
 kernel/watchdog_perf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/watchdog_perf.c b/kernel/watchdog_perf.c
index d3ca70e3c256..5066be7bba03 100644
--- a/kernel/watchdog_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/watchdog_perf.c
@@ -264,18 +264,38 @@ bool __weak __init arch_perf_nmi_is_available(void)
 int __init watchdog_hardlockup_probe(void)
 {
 	int ret;
+	struct perf_event_attr *wd_attr = &wd_hw_attr;
+	struct perf_event *evt;
+	unsigned int cpu;
 
 	if (!arch_perf_nmi_is_available())
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	ret = hardlockup_detector_event_create();
+	/*
+	 * Test hardware PMU availability. Avoid using
+	 * hardlockup_detector_event_create() to prevent migration-related
+	 * stale pointers in the per-cpu watchdog_ev during early probe.
+	 */
+	wd_attr->sample_period = hw_nmi_get_sample_period(watchdog_thresh);
+	if (!wd_attr->sample_period)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (ret) {
+	/*
+	 * Use raw_smp_processor_id() for probing in preemptible init code.
+	 * Migration after reading ID is acceptable as counter creation on
+	 * the old CPU is sufficient for the probe.
+	 */
+	cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	evt = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(wd_attr, cpu, NULL,
+					       watchdog_overflow_callback, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(evt)) {
 		pr_info("Perf NMI watchdog permanently disabled\n");
+		ret = PTR_ERR(evt);
 	} else {
-		perf_event_release_kernel(this_cpu_read(watchdog_ev));
-		this_cpu_write(watchdog_ev, NULL);
+		perf_event_release_kernel(evt);
+		ret = 0;
 	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.51.0


       reply	other threads:[~2026-01-22  5:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20260122042717.657231-1-realwujing@gmail.com>
2026-01-22  5:24 ` Qiliang Yuan [this message]
2026-01-22 21:59   ` [PATCH v2] watchdog/hardlockup: Fix UAF in perf event cleanup due to migration race Andrew Morton
2026-01-23  2:39     ` Doug Anderson
2026-01-23  6:34       ` [PATCH v3] " Qiliang Yuan
2026-01-24  0:01         ` Doug Anderson
2026-01-24  6:57           ` Qiliang Yuan
2026-01-24 23:36             ` Doug Anderson
2026-01-26  3:30               ` Qiliang Yuan
2026-01-27  1:14                 ` Doug Anderson
2026-01-27  2:16                   ` [PATCH v4] " Qiliang Yuan
2026-01-27 21:37                     ` Doug Anderson
2026-01-28  2:37                       ` Qiliang Yuan
2026-01-24  7:08           ` Qiliang Yuan

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260122052442.667394-1-realwujing@gmail.com \
    --to=realwujing@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=lihuafei1@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sunshx@chinatelecom.cn \
    --cc=thorsten.blum@linux.dev \
    --cc=wangjinchao600@gmail.com \
    --cc=yangyicong@hisilicon.com \
    --cc=yuanql9@chinatelecom.cn \
    --cc=zhangjn11@chinatelecom.cn \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox