From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: maz@kernel.org, oliver.upton@linux.dev, joey.gouly@arm.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, tabba@google.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM guests
Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2026 14:38:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260213143815.1732675-4-tabba@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260213143815.1732675-1-tabba@google.com>
In protected mode, the hypervisor maintains a separate instance of
the `kvm` structure for each VM. For non-protected VMs, this structure is
initialized from the host's `kvm` state.
Currently, `pkvm_init_features_from_host()` copies the
`KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` flag from the host without the
underlying `id_regs` data being initialized. This results in the
hypervisor seeing the flag as set while the ID registers remain zeroed.
Consequently, `kvm_has_feat()` checks at EL2 fail (return 0) for
non-protected VMs. This breaks logic that relies on feature detection,
such as `ctxt_has_tcrx()` for TCR2_EL1 support. As a result, certain
system registers (e.g., TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, POR_EL1) are not
saved/restored during the world switch, which could lead to state
corruption.
Fix this by explicitly copying the ID registers from the host `kvm` to
the hypervisor `kvm` for non-protected VMs during initialization, since
we trust the host with its non-protected guests' features. Also ensure
`KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` is cleared initially in
`pkvm_init_features_from_host` so that `vm_copy_id_regs` can properly
initialize them and set the flag once done.
Fixes: 41d6028e28bd ("KVM: arm64: Convert the SVE guest vcpu flag to a vm flag")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 12b2acfbcfd1..59a010221818 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const struc
/* No restrictions for non-protected VMs. */
if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)) {
hyp_vm->kvm.arch.flags = host_arch_flags;
+ hyp_vm->kvm.arch.flags &= ~BIT_ULL(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED);
bitmap_copy(kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
host_kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
@@ -471,6 +472,35 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h
return ret;
}
+static int vm_copy_id_regs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+ struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu);
+ const struct kvm *host_kvm = hyp_vm->host_kvm;
+ struct kvm *kvm = &hyp_vm->kvm;
+
+ if (!test_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &host_kvm->arch.flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &kvm->arch.flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(kvm->arch.id_regs, host_kvm->arch.id_regs, sizeof(kvm->arch.id_regs));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+ else
+ ret = vm_copy_id_regs(hyp_vcpu);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm,
struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
@@ -490,8 +520,9 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.cflags);
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mp_state.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED;
- if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
- kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+ ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(hyp_vcpu);
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_traps(hyp_vcpu);
if (ret)
--
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-13 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-13 14:38 [PATCH v2 0/4] KVM: arm64: Fix guest feature sanitization and pKVM state synchronization Fuad Tabba
2026-02-13 14:38 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] KVM: arm64: Hide S1POE from guests when not supported by the host Fuad Tabba
2026-02-13 14:38 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: arm64: Optimise away S1POE handling when not supported by host Fuad Tabba
2026-02-13 14:38 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-02-13 14:38 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: arm64: Remove redundant kern_hyp_va() in unpin_host_sve_state() Fuad Tabba
2026-02-13 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] KVM: arm64: Fix guest feature sanitization and pKVM state synchronization Marc Zyngier
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