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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	stable@kernel.org, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.12.y] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
Date: Mon,  9 Mar 2026 07:38:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260309113852.824750-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026030936-underrate-petty-47b7@gregkh>

From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab ]

The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen
implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP
features were added to the kernel.

In its abundant precaution, commit

  8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")

included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking
guests from using the feature.

Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as
the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.

Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
[ merged missing SECURE_AVIC into RESERVED_BITS18_22 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c   | 1 +
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c         | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index a93e363388669..25601e65b387b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT |		\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 |		\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 |		\
+				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS18_22 |	\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index de1df0cb45dab..d5329211b1a7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT_BIT]		= "IBSVirt",
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT]	= "VMSARegProt",
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT]		= "SMTProt",
+	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT]	= "IBPBOnEntry",
 };
 
 /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index b67280d761f63..7604161a77851 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -691,7 +691,10 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT	17
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
-#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT		18
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS18_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 18)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT	23
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT		24
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)
 
 #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL	0xc001011f
-- 
2.51.0


      reply	other threads:[~2026-03-09 11:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-09 10:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree gregkh
2026-03-09 11:38 ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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