* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree
@ 2026-03-09 10:16 gregkh
2026-03-09 11:38 ` [PATCH 6.12.y] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-03-09 10:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kim.phillips, bp, nikunj, thomas.lendacky; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026030936-underrate-petty-47b7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2026 16:24:03 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen
implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP
features were added to the kernel.
In its abundant precaution, commit
8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking
guests from using the feature.
Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as
the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.
Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index 46b54720d91d..e468476e9e4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 907981b94c40..7ed3da998489 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC",
+ [MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry",
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index da5275d8eda6..6673601246b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -740,7 +740,10 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT 18
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT)
-#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 19
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL 0xc0010138
#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_EN_BIT 0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.12.y] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
2026-03-09 10:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-03-09 11:38 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-03-09 11:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Kim Phillips, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Nikunj A Dadhania,
Tom Lendacky, stable, Sasha Levin
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
[ Upstream commit 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab ]
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen
implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP
features were added to the kernel.
In its abundant precaution, commit
8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking
guests from using the feature.
Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as
the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.
Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
[ merged missing SECURE_AVIC into RESERVED_BITS18_22 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 1 +
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index a93e363388669..25601e65b387b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS18_22 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index de1df0cb45dab..d5329211b1a7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT_BIT] = "IBSVirt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt",
+ [MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry",
};
/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index b67280d761f63..7604161a77851 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -691,7 +691,10 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT 17
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
-#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 18
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS18_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 18)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2026-03-09 10:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree gregkh
2026-03-09 11:38 ` [PATCH 6.12.y] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests Sasha Levin
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