From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev,
Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>,
Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>,
Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18 06/13] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 21:03:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260312200326.479881563@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260312200326.246396673@linuxfoundation.org>
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream.
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on
the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly
tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest
them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.
Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.
Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include "label.h"
#include "policy.h"
+/* Match max depth of user namespaces */
+#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32
/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace
* @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(stru
AA_BUG(!name);
AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock));
+ if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name);
if (!ns)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-12 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-12 20:03 [PATCH 6.18 00/13] 6.18.18-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 01/13] net/sched: act_gate: snapshot parameters with RCU on replace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 02/13] net/sched: Only allow act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress qdiscs and shared blocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 03/13] apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 04/13] apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 05/13] apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 07/13] apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 08/13] apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 09/13] apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 10/13] apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 11/13] apparmor: fix differential encoding verification Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 12/13] apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 13/13] apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:41 ` [PATCH 6.18 00/13] 6.18.18-rc1 review Brett A C Sheffield
2026-03-13 3:23 ` Shuah Khan
2026-03-13 5:24 ` Ron Economos
2026-03-13 10:56 ` Barry K. Nathan
2026-03-13 16:16 ` Jon Hunter
2026-03-13 16:40 ` Mark Brown
2026-03-13 18:03 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-03-13 21:15 ` Miguel Ojeda
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