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From: Tyllis Xu <livelycarpet87@gmail.com>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, arnd@arndb.de
Cc: kees@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	ychen@northwestern.edu, Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>,
	Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 11:53:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260314165355.548119-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com> (raw)

The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly
count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the
buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to
get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout().

Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size,
data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause
get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation,
triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds
memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor.

Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct
dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data
reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared
by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures
all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c b/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c
index f68a8957b98f..dfdfa9ba4747 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuff, s
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (count == 0 || count > IBMASM_CMD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
 		return 0;
+	if (count < sizeof(struct dot_command_header))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (*offset != 0)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -319,6 +321,11 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuff, s
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
+	if (count < get_dot_command_size(cmd->buffer)) {
+		command_put(cmd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
 	if (command_data->command) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
-- 
2.43.0


                 reply	other threads:[~2026-03-14 16:54 UTC|newest]

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