public inbox for stable@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	stable@kernel.org, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18.y] nsfs: tighten permission checks for ns iteration ioctls
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:02:24 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260317200224.272095-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026031747-sweat-levitate-59b2@gregkh>

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit e6b899f08066e744f89df16ceb782e06868bd148 ]

Even privileged services should not necessarily be able to see other
privileged service's namespaces so they can't leak information to each
other. Use may_see_all_namespaces() helper that centralizes this policy
until the nstree adapts.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260226-work-visibility-fixes-v1-1-d2c2853313bd@kernel.org
Fixes: a1d220d9dafa ("nsfs: iterate through mount namespaces")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v6.12+
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/nsfs.c                 | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/ns_common.h |  2 ++
 kernel/nscommon.c         |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/nsfs.c b/fs/nsfs.c
index 79b026a36fb62..f22c2a636e8f3 100644
--- a/fs/nsfs.c
+++ b/fs/nsfs.c
@@ -194,6 +194,17 @@ static bool nsfs_ioctl_valid(unsigned int cmd)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool may_use_nsfs_ioctl(unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	switch (_IOC_NR(cmd)) {
+	case _IOC_NR(NS_MNT_GET_NEXT):
+		fallthrough;
+	case _IOC_NR(NS_MNT_GET_PREV):
+		return may_see_all_namespaces();
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
 static long ns_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
 			unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -209,6 +220,8 @@ static long ns_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
 
 	if (!nsfs_ioctl_valid(ioctl))
 		return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+	if (!may_use_nsfs_ioctl(ioctl))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(filp));
 	switch (ioctl) {
diff --git a/include/linux/ns_common.h b/include/linux/ns_common.h
index 71a5e28344d11..f3c52904343e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/ns_common.h
+++ b/include/linux/ns_common.h
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns);
 
 #define ns_common_free(__ns) __ns_common_free(to_ns_common((__ns)))
 
+bool may_see_all_namespaces(void);
+
 static __always_inline __must_check bool __ns_ref_put(struct ns_common *ns)
 {
 	return refcount_dec_and_test(&ns->__ns_ref);
diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c
index c1fb2bad6d729..22b5c5d0385f5 100644
--- a/kernel/nscommon.c
+++ b/kernel/nscommon.c
@@ -75,3 +75,9 @@ void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns)
 {
 	proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
 }
+
+bool may_see_all_namespaces(void)
+{
+	return (task_active_pid_ns(current) == &init_pid_ns) &&
+	       ns_capable_noaudit(init_pid_ns.user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
-- 
2.51.0


      reply	other threads:[~2026-03-17 20:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-17 10:19 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nsfs: tighten permission checks for ns iteration ioctls" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
2026-03-17 20:02 ` Sasha Levin [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260317200224.272095-1-sashal@kernel.org \
    --to=sashal@kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox