From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
To: security@kernel.org
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, shuah@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Sebastián Alba Vives" <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] usbip: validate iso_frame_desc offset and length in usbip_recv_iso()
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2026 07:17:37 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260329131810.522006-2-sebasjosue84@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260329131810.522006-1-sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
From: Sebastián Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
usbip_recv_iso() receives isochronous packet descriptors from the
network and unpacks them into urb->iso_frame_desc[] via
usbip_pack_iso(). The offset and actual_length fields in each
descriptor come directly from the remote peer without validation.
These fields are subsequently used by usbip_pad_iso() in memmove
operations:
memmove(urb->transfer_buffer + iso_frame_desc[i].offset,
urb->transfer_buffer + actualoffset,
iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length);
A malicious USB/IP server can craft iso frame descriptors with
offset and/or actual_length values exceeding the transfer buffer
bounds, causing an out-of-bounds memmove that corrupts kernel heap
memory. This is exploitable over the network without authentication.
This is a separate vulnerability from the number_of_packets
validation issue. Even with a valid number_of_packets, the
individual descriptor fields can still cause OOB access.
Add validation that each iso_frame_desc entry's offset +
actual_length falls within the transfer buffer bounds. Return
-EPROTO and trigger a connection reset if any entry is invalid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastián Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index f1eeab3a5..8b6ca8f83 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -711,6 +711,34 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
kfree(buff);
+ /*
+ * Validate each iso_frame_desc entry. The offset and actual_length
+ * come from the network and must not exceed the transfer buffer.
+ * Without this check, a malicious server could craft iso descriptors
+ * with out-of-bounds offset/length values, causing usbip_pad_iso()
+ * to perform memmove operations beyond the transfer buffer, leading
+ * to heap buffer overflow.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < np; i++) {
+ unsigned int offset = urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset;
+ unsigned int length = urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length;
+
+ if (offset > urb->transfer_buffer_length ||
+ length > urb->transfer_buffer_length - offset) {
+ dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+ "iso frame %d: offset %u + length %u > buffer %u\n",
+ i, offset, length,
+ urb->transfer_buffer_length);
+
+ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB || ud->side == USBIP_VUDC)
+ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+ else
+ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+ }
+
if (total_length != urb->actual_length) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
"total length of iso packets %d not equal to actual length of buffer %d\n",
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-29 13:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-29 12:53 [SECURITY] usbip: vhci: heap buffer overflow via crafted number_of_packets in RET_SUBMIT Sebastian Josue Alba Vives
2026-03-29 12:53 ` [PATCH] usbip: vhci: validate number_of_packets in RET_SUBMIT response Sebastian Josue Alba Vives
2026-03-29 13:25 ` Greg KH
2026-03-29 13:17 ` [SECURITY] usbip: iso_frame_desc OOB memmove via crafted offset/length Sebastian Josue Alba Vives
2026-03-29 13:17 ` Sebastian Josue Alba Vives [this message]
2026-03-29 13:24 ` [SECURITY] usbip: vhci: heap buffer overflow via crafted number_of_packets in RET_SUBMIT Greg KH
2026-03-29 13:34 ` Sebastián Alba
2026-03-29 13:50 ` Greg KH
2026-03-29 13:53 ` Sebastián Alba
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