From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9AAC94266AE; Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:54:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774976052; cv=none; b=nC0VVZTZMTv88ykBki2nXATCeMk8pl+HVBCu909olTRUazMnGymgSbsy5qgQEKYsaLcOweG+z/ORGmjL110ouDSyBYrKIMPKVfdW3coVmnmmeZg3EyG+KUJ8kEJEQx4gluxmNKpPdd1ZZrpM43CLXVLItMtHUXTuDAVg2YzcU98= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774976052; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Ww2SI/DaN1rnysx0J+bB1VTjwjOZK3oQ2C6Vp9nBoL8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=CxNM+/6uCf38UBvXy0Qa8kAyn79iK7kY+sNr6T2QVmOqfszlbfKCaH2hBff2WBnFC/qek8Zy22n/jjUkWhx2yZSG5DuxAvwwwBnWvyWmWQhKZPxM0S9G+UiFrU42FunWPxAzelO8bhIjvGJUcVO5ypfIKDy40NezRgEyjBRPk1E= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=SQXxIfMJ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="SQXxIfMJ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 30EF2C19423; Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:54:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1774976052; bh=Ww2SI/DaN1rnysx0J+bB1VTjwjOZK3oQ2C6Vp9nBoL8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SQXxIfMJLYgyzT+8XDtOZGGR8LQTef+jfypwIRDGsRvrVUju1hDeFGJVUDAxnAhyZ IJRCi6RHha9Epq6TCMXL6Cc//ILlugYiXrh+D7XrsqXwy0wJMFRKwZ6vP+MkAFZFxk Au2sZLaVdI2d4vGvWBMOm2V86J4kBybMTaD8thdw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, syzbot+04c4e65cab786a2e5b7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Tejas Bharambe , Theodore Tso , stable@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 6.12 189/244] ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 18:22:19 +0200 Message-ID: <20260331161748.735786831@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260331161741.651718120@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260331161741.651718120@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tejas Bharambe commit 2acb5c12ebd860f30e4faf67e6cc8c44ddfe5fe8 upstream. ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before accessing path[k].p_idx->ei_block, there is no validation that p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that level. If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read. Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return -EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent tree code. Reported-by: syzbot+04c4e65cab786a2e5b7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c4e65cab786a2e5b7e Signed-off-by: Tejas Bharambe Link: https://patch.msgid.link/JH0PR06MB66326016F9B6AD24097D232B897CA@JH0PR06MB6632.apcprd06.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -1739,6 +1739,13 @@ static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(hand err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + k); if (err) return err; + if (unlikely(path[k].p_idx > EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[k].p_hdr))) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, + "path[%d].p_idx %p > EXT_LAST_INDEX %p", + k, path[k].p_idx, + EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[k].p_hdr)); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border; err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + k); if (err) @@ -1751,6 +1758,14 @@ static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(hand err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + k); if (err) goto clean; + if (unlikely(path[k].p_idx > EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[k].p_hdr))) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, + "path[%d].p_idx %p > EXT_LAST_INDEX %p", + k, path[k].p_idx, + EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[k].p_hdr)); + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto clean; + } path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border; err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + k); if (err)