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* [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork()
@ 2026-04-04  8:49 Mickaël Salaün
  2026-04-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1 Mickaël Salaün
  2026-04-07  7:30 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Günther Noack
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-04-04  8:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Günther Noack
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, linux-security-module, stable

hook_cred_transfer() only copies the Landlock security blob when the
source credential has a domain.  This is inconsistent with
landlock_restrict_self() which can set log_subdomains_off on a
credential without creating a domain (via the ruleset_fd=-1 path): the
field is committed but not preserved across fork() because the child's
prepare_creds() calls hook_cred_transfer() which skips the copy when
domain is NULL.

This breaks the documented use case where a process mutes subdomain logs
before forking sandboxed children: the children lose the muting and
their domains produce unexpected audit records.

Fix this by unconditionally copying the Landlock credential blob.
landlock_get_ruleset(NULL) is already a safe no-op.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ead9079f7569 ("landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 security/landlock/cred.c                      |  6 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 0cb3edde4d18..cc419de75cd6 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -22,10 +22,8 @@ static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new,
 	const struct landlock_cred_security *const old_llcred =
 		landlock_cred(old);
 
-	if (old_llcred->domain) {
-		landlock_get_ruleset(old_llcred->domain);
-		*landlock_cred(new) = *old_llcred;
-	}
+	landlock_get_ruleset(old_llcred->domain);
+	*landlock_cred(new) = *old_llcred;
 }
 
 static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
index 46d02d49835a..20099b8667e7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
@@ -279,6 +279,94 @@ TEST_F(audit, thread)
 				&audit_tv_default, sizeof(audit_tv_default)));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Verifies that log_subdomains_off set via the ruleset_fd=-1 path (without
+ * creating a domain) is inherited by children across fork().  This exercises
+ * the hook_cred_transfer() fix: the Landlock credential blob must be copied
+ * even when the source credential has no domain.
+ *
+ * Phase 1 (baseline): a child without muting creates a domain and triggers a
+ * denial that IS logged.
+ *
+ * Phase 2 (after muting): the parent mutes subdomain logs, forks another child
+ * who creates a domain and triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
+ */
+TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_fork)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+	};
+	struct audit_records records;
+	int ruleset_fd, status;
+	pid_t child;
+
+	ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 1: forks a child that creates a domain and triggers a denial
+	 * before any muting.  This proves the audit path works.
+	 */
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, kill(getppid(), 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+		_exit(0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+	/* The denial must be logged (baseline). */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd, getpid(),
+					NULL));
+
+	/* Drains any remaining records (e.g. domain allocation). */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+
+	/*
+	 * Mutes subdomain logs without creating a domain.  The parent's
+	 * credential has domain=NULL and log_subdomains_off=1.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(
+			     -1, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 2: forks a child that creates a domain and triggers a denial.
+	 * Because log_subdomains_off was inherited via fork(), the child's
+	 * domain has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED.
+	 */
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, kill(getppid(), 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+		_exit(0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+	/* No denial record should appear. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					      getpid(), NULL));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
 FIXTURE(audit_flags)
 {
 	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1
  2026-04-04  8:49 [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-04-04  8:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2026-04-07  8:25   ` Günther Noack
  2026-04-07  7:30 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Günther Noack
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-04-04  8:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Günther Noack
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, linux-security-module, stable

LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC does not allow
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with ruleset_fd=-1, preventing
a multithreaded process from atomically propagating subdomain log muting
to all threads without creating a domain layer.  Relax the fd=-1
condition to accept TSYNC alongside LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, and update the
documentation accordingly.

Add flag validation tests for all TSYNC combinations with ruleset_fd=-1,
and audit tests verifying both transition directions: muting via TSYNC
(logged to not logged) and override via TSYNC (not logged to logged).

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 42fc7e6543f6 ("landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |   4 +-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |  14 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c |  74 ++++++
 4 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index f88fa1f68b77..d37603efc273 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
  *     ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
  *     future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
  *     with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
- *     domain.
+ *     domain.  When combined with %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC and a
+ *     @ruleset_fd value of -1, this configuration is propagated to all threads
+ *     of the current process.
  *
  * The following flag supports policy enforcement in multithreaded processes:
  *
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 0d66a68677b7..a0bb664e0d31 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -512,10 +512,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 
 	/*
 	 * It is allowed to set LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with
-	 * -1 as ruleset_fd, but no other flag must be set.
+	 * -1 as ruleset_fd, optionally combined with
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to propagate this configuration to all
+	 * threads.  No other flag must be set.
 	 */
 	if (!(ruleset_fd == -1 &&
-	      flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
+	      (flags & ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) ==
+		      LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
 		/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
 		ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
 		if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
@@ -537,9 +540,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 
 	/*
 	 * The only case when a ruleset may not be set is if
-	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set and ruleset_fd is -1.
-	 * We could optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag
-	 * was already set, but it is not worth the complexity.
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set (optionally with
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) and ruleset_fd is -1.  We could
+	 * optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag was
+	 * already set, but it is not worth the complexity.
 	 */
 	if (ruleset) {
 		/*
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
index 20099b8667e7..a193d8a97560 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 struct thread_data {
 	pid_t parent_pid;
 	int ruleset_fd, pipe_child, pipe_parent;
+	bool mute_subdomains;
 };
 
 static void *thread_audit_test(void *arg)
@@ -367,6 +368,238 @@ TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_fork)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Thread function: runs two rounds of (create domain, trigger denial, signal
+ * back), waiting for the main thread before each round.  When mute_subdomains
+ * is set, phase 1 also mutes subdomain logs via the fd=-1 path before creating
+ * the domain.  The ruleset_fd is kept open across both rounds so each
+ * restrict_self call stacks a new domain layer.
+ */
+static void *thread_sandbox_deny_twice(void *arg)
+{
+	const struct thread_data *data = (struct thread_data *)arg;
+	uintptr_t err = 0;
+	char buffer;
+
+	/* Phase 1: optionally mutes, creates a domain, and triggers a denial. */
+	if (read(data->pipe_parent, &buffer, 1) != 1) {
+		err = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (data->mute_subdomains &&
+	    landlock_restrict_self(-1,
+				   LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
+		err = 2;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (landlock_restrict_self(data->ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+		err = 3;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kill(data->parent_pid, 0) != -1 || errno != EPERM) {
+		err = 4;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (write(data->pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
+		err = 5;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Phase 2: stacks another domain and triggers a denial. */
+	if (read(data->pipe_parent, &buffer, 1) != 1) {
+		err = 6;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (landlock_restrict_self(data->ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+		err = 7;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kill(data->parent_pid, 0) != -1 || errno != EPERM) {
+		err = 8;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (write(data->pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
+		err = 9;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	close(data->ruleset_fd);
+	close(data->pipe_child);
+	close(data->pipe_parent);
+	return (void *)err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with
+ * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC and ruleset_fd=-1 propagates log_subdomains_off
+ * to a sibling thread, suppressing audit logging on domains it subsequently
+ * creates.
+ *
+ * Phase 1 (before TSYNC) acts as an inline baseline: the sibling creates a
+ * domain and triggers a denial that IS logged.
+ *
+ * Phase 2 (after TSYNC) verifies suppression: the sibling stacks another domain
+ * and triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
+ */
+TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_tsync)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+	};
+	struct audit_records records;
+	struct thread_data child_data;
+	int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
+	char buffer;
+	pthread_t thread;
+	void *thread_ret;
+
+	child_data.parent_pid = getppid();
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_child = pipe_child[1];
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_parent = pipe_parent[0];
+	child_data.ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child_data.ruleset_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+
+	/* Creates the sibling thread. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_sandbox_deny_twice,
+				    &child_data));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 1: the sibling creates a domain and triggers a denial before
+	 * any log muting.  This proves the audit path works.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
+
+	/* The denial must be logged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
+
+	/* Drains any remaining records (e.g. domain allocation). */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+
+	/*
+	 * Mutes subdomain logs and propagates to the sibling thread via TSYNC,
+	 * without creating a domain.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(
+			     -1, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
+					 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 2: the sibling stacks another domain and triggers a denial.
+	 * Because log_subdomains_off was propagated via TSYNC, the new domain
+	 * has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
+
+	/* No denial record should appear. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					      child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &thread_ret));
+	EXPECT_EQ(NULL, thread_ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC without
+ * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF overrides a sibling thread's
+ * log_subdomains_off, re-enabling audit logging on domains the sibling
+ * subsequently creates.
+ *
+ * Phase 1: the sibling sets log_subdomains_off, creates a muted domain, and
+ * triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
+ *
+ * Phase 2 (after TSYNC without LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF): the sibling stacks another
+ * domain and triggers a denial that IS logged, proving the muting was
+ * overridden.
+ */
+TEST_F(audit, tsync_override_log_subdomains_off)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+	};
+	struct audit_records records;
+	struct thread_data child_data;
+	int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
+	char buffer;
+	pthread_t thread;
+	void *thread_ret;
+
+	child_data.parent_pid = getppid();
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_child = pipe_child[1];
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_parent = pipe_parent[0];
+	child_data.ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child_data.ruleset_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+
+	child_data.mute_subdomains = true;
+
+	/* Creates the sibling thread. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_sandbox_deny_twice,
+				    &child_data));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 1: the sibling mutes subdomain logs, creates a domain, and
+	 * triggers a denial.  The denial must not be logged.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					      child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
+
+	/* Drains any remaining records. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+
+	/*
+	 * Overrides the sibling's log_subdomains_off by calling TSYNC without
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(child_data.ruleset_fd,
+					    LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC));
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 2: the sibling stacks another domain and triggers a denial.
+	 * Because TSYNC replaced its log_subdomains_off with 0, the new domain
+	 * has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
+
+	/* The denial must be logged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &thread_ret));
+	EXPECT_EQ(NULL, thread_ret);
+}
+
 FIXTURE(audit_flags)
 {
 	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
index 2b9ad4f154f4..abc290271a1a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
@@ -247,4 +247,78 @@ TEST(tsync_interrupt)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 }
 
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(tsync_without_ruleset) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(tsync_without_ruleset)
+{
+	const __u32 flags;
+	const int expected_errno;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, tsync_only) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
+	.expected_errno = EBADF,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off_same_exec_off) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
+	.expected_errno = EBADF,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off_new_exec_on) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
+	.expected_errno = EBADF,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, all_flags) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
+	.expected_errno = EBADF,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
+		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
+	.expected_errno = 0,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(tsync_without_ruleset)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tsync_without_ruleset)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F(tsync_without_ruleset, check)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = landlock_restrict_self(-1, variant->flags);
+	if (variant->expected_errno) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_errno, errno);
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork()
  2026-04-04  8:49 [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Mickaël Salaün
  2026-04-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1 Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-04-07  7:30 ` Günther Noack
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-04-07  7:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, stable

Hello!

On Sat, Apr 04, 2026 at 10:49:57AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> hook_cred_transfer() only copies the Landlock security blob when the
> source credential has a domain.  This is inconsistent with
> landlock_restrict_self() which can set log_subdomains_off on a
> credential without creating a domain (via the ruleset_fd=-1 path): the
> field is committed but not preserved across fork() because the child's
> prepare_creds() calls hook_cred_transfer() which skips the copy when
> domain is NULL.
> 
> This breaks the documented use case where a process mutes subdomain logs
> before forking sandboxed children: the children lose the muting and
> their domains produce unexpected audit records.
> 
> Fix this by unconditionally copying the Landlock credential blob.
> landlock_get_ruleset(NULL) is already a safe no-op.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: ead9079f7569 ("landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>  security/landlock/cred.c                      |  6 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index 0cb3edde4d18..cc419de75cd6 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -22,10 +22,8 @@ static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new,
>  	const struct landlock_cred_security *const old_llcred =
>  		landlock_cred(old);
>  
> -	if (old_llcred->domain) {
> -		landlock_get_ruleset(old_llcred->domain);
> -		*landlock_cred(new) = *old_llcred;
> -	}
> +	landlock_get_ruleset(old_llcred->domain);
> +	*landlock_cred(new) = *old_llcred;

This fix looks correct for the hook_cred_prepare() case (and of
course, hook_cred_prepare() calls hook_cred_transfer() in Landlock).


But I'm afraid I might have spotted another issue here:

If I look at the code in security/keys/process_keys.c, where
security_tranfer_creds() is called, the "old" object is actually
already initialized, and if we are not checking for that, I think we
are leaking memory.

I would suggest to use the helper landlock_cred_copy() from cred.h for
that.  This one is anyway supposed to be the central place for this
copying logic, and it is safe to use with zeroed-out target objects
(because the put is safe for the NULL-pointer).

Maybe this is worth updating while we are at it?


>  }
>  
>  static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> index 46d02d49835a..20099b8667e7 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> @@ -279,6 +279,94 @@ TEST_F(audit, thread)
>  				&audit_tv_default, sizeof(audit_tv_default)));
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Verifies that log_subdomains_off set via the ruleset_fd=-1 path (without
> + * creating a domain) is inherited by children across fork().  This exercises
> + * the hook_cred_transfer() fix: the Landlock credential blob must be copied
> + * even when the source credential has no domain.
> + *
> + * Phase 1 (baseline): a child without muting creates a domain and triggers a
> + * denial that IS logged.
> + *
> + * Phase 2 (after muting): the parent mutes subdomain logs, forks another child
> + * who creates a domain and triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
> + */
> +TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_fork)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> +		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
> +	};
> +	struct audit_records records;
> +	int ruleset_fd, status;
> +	pid_t child;
> +
> +	ruleset_fd =
> +		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 1: forks a child that creates a domain and triggers a denial
> +	 * before any muting.  This proves the audit path works.
> +	 */
> +	child = fork();
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
> +	if (child == 0) {
> +		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
> +		ASSERT_EQ(-1, kill(getppid(), 0));
> +		ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
> +		_exit(0);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> +	/* The denial must be logged (baseline). */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd, getpid(),
> +					NULL));
> +
> +	/* Drains any remaining records (e.g. domain allocation). */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Mutes subdomain logs without creating a domain.  The parent's
> +	 * credential has domain=NULL and log_subdomains_off=1.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(
> +			     -1, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 2: forks a child that creates a domain and triggers a denial.
> +	 * Because log_subdomains_off was inherited via fork(), the child's
> +	 * domain has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED.
> +	 */
> +	child = fork();
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
> +	if (child == 0) {
> +		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
> +		ASSERT_EQ(-1, kill(getppid(), 0));
> +		ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
> +		_exit(0);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> +	/* No denial record should appear. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
> +					      getpid(), NULL));
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> +}
> +
>  FIXTURE(audit_flags)
>  {
>  	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
> -- 
> 2.53.0
> 

Test looks fine.

While I do still think we should investigate the memory leak, this
commit is, as it is, already a strict improvement over what we had
before, so:

Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>

–Günther

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1
  2026-04-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1 Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-04-07  8:25   ` Günther Noack
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-04-07  8:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, stable

Hello!

On Sat, Apr 04, 2026 at 10:49:58AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC does not allow
> LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with ruleset_fd=-1, preventing
> a multithreaded process from atomically propagating subdomain log muting
> to all threads without creating a domain layer.  Relax the fd=-1
> condition to accept TSYNC alongside LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, and update the
> documentation accordingly.
> 
> Add flag validation tests for all TSYNC combinations with ruleset_fd=-1,
> and audit tests verifying both transition directions: muting via TSYNC
> (logged to not logged) and override via TSYNC (not logged to logged).
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 42fc7e6543f6 ("landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |   4 +-
>  security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |  14 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c |  74 ++++++
>  4 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index f88fa1f68b77..d37603efc273 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
>   *     ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
>   *     future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
>   *     with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
> - *     domain.
> + *     domain.  When combined with %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC and a
> + *     @ruleset_fd value of -1, this configuration is propagated to all threads
> + *     of the current process.
>   *
>   * The following flag supports policy enforcement in multithreaded processes:
>   *
> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> index 0d66a68677b7..a0bb664e0d31 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> @@ -512,10 +512,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * It is allowed to set LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with
> -	 * -1 as ruleset_fd, but no other flag must be set.
> +	 * -1 as ruleset_fd, optionally combined with
> +	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to propagate this configuration to all
> +	 * threads.  No other flag must be set.
>  	 */
>  	if (!(ruleset_fd == -1 &&
> -	      flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
> +	      (flags & ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) ==
> +		      LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {

Well spotted, thanks!


>  		/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
>  		ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
>  		if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
> @@ -537,9 +540,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * The only case when a ruleset may not be set is if
> -	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set and ruleset_fd is -1.
> -	 * We could optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag
> -	 * was already set, but it is not worth the complexity.
> +	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set (optionally with
> +	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) and ruleset_fd is -1.  We could
> +	 * optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag was
> +	 * already set, but it is not worth the complexity.
>  	 */
>  	if (ruleset) {
>  		/*
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> index 20099b8667e7..a193d8a97560 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
> @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
>  struct thread_data {
>  	pid_t parent_pid;
>  	int ruleset_fd, pipe_child, pipe_parent;
> +	bool mute_subdomains;
>  };
>  
>  static void *thread_audit_test(void *arg)
> @@ -367,6 +368,238 @@ TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_fork)
>  	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Thread function: runs two rounds of (create domain, trigger denial, signal
> + * back), waiting for the main thread before each round.  When mute_subdomains
> + * is set, phase 1 also mutes subdomain logs via the fd=-1 path before creating
> + * the domain.  The ruleset_fd is kept open across both rounds so each
> + * restrict_self call stacks a new domain layer.
> + */
> +static void *thread_sandbox_deny_twice(void *arg)
> +{
> +	const struct thread_data *data = (struct thread_data *)arg;
> +	uintptr_t err = 0;
> +	char buffer;
> +
> +	/* Phase 1: optionally mutes, creates a domain, and triggers a denial. */
> +	if (read(data->pipe_parent, &buffer, 1) != 1) {
> +		err = 1;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (data->mute_subdomains &&
> +	    landlock_restrict_self(-1,
> +				   LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
> +		err = 2;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (landlock_restrict_self(data->ruleset_fd, 0)) {
> +		err = 3;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (kill(data->parent_pid, 0) != -1 || errno != EPERM) {
> +		err = 4;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (write(data->pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
> +		err = 5;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Phase 2: stacks another domain and triggers a denial. */
> +	if (read(data->pipe_parent, &buffer, 1) != 1) {
> +		err = 6;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (landlock_restrict_self(data->ruleset_fd, 0)) {
> +		err = 7;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (kill(data->parent_pid, 0) != -1 || errno != EPERM) {
> +		err = 8;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (write(data->pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
> +		err = 9;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	close(data->ruleset_fd);
> +	close(data->pipe_child);
> +	close(data->pipe_parent);
> +	return (void *)err;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Verifies that LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with
> + * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC and ruleset_fd=-1 propagates log_subdomains_off
> + * to a sibling thread, suppressing audit logging on domains it subsequently
> + * creates.
> + *
> + * Phase 1 (before TSYNC) acts as an inline baseline: the sibling creates a
> + * domain and triggers a denial that IS logged.
> + *
> + * Phase 2 (after TSYNC) verifies suppression: the sibling stacks another domain
> + * and triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
> + */
> +TEST_F(audit, log_subdomains_off_tsync)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> +		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
> +	};
> +	struct audit_records records;
> +	struct thread_data child_data;

The child_data.mute_subdomains field stays uninitialized in this
function (and maybe others).  Please fix.

   struct thread_data child_data = {};


> +	int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
> +	char buffer;
> +	pthread_t thread;
> +	void *thread_ret;
> +
> +	child_data.parent_pid = getppid();
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
> +	child_data.pipe_child = pipe_child[1];
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
> +	child_data.pipe_parent = pipe_parent[0];
> +	child_data.ruleset_fd =
> +		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, child_data.ruleset_fd);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> +
> +	/* Creates the sibling thread. */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_sandbox_deny_twice,
> +				    &child_data));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 1: the sibling creates a domain and triggers a denial before
> +	 * any log muting.  This proves the audit path works.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
> +
> +	/* The denial must be logged. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
> +					child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
> +
> +	/* Drains any remaining records (e.g. domain allocation). */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Mutes subdomain logs and propagates to the sibling thread via TSYNC,
> +	 * without creating a domain.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(
> +			     -1, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
> +					 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 2: the sibling stacks another domain and triggers a denial.
> +	 * Because log_subdomains_off was propagated via TSYNC, the new domain
> +	 * has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
> +
> +	/* No denial record should appear. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
> +					      child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &thread_ret));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(NULL, thread_ret);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Verifies that LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC without
> + * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF overrides a sibling thread's
> + * log_subdomains_off, re-enabling audit logging on domains the sibling
> + * subsequently creates.
> + *
> + * Phase 1: the sibling sets log_subdomains_off, creates a muted domain, and
> + * triggers a denial that is NOT logged.
> + *
> + * Phase 2 (after TSYNC without LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF): the sibling stacks another
> + * domain and triggers a denial that IS logged, proving the muting was
> + * overridden.
> + */
> +TEST_F(audit, tsync_override_log_subdomains_off)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> +		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
> +	};
> +	struct audit_records records;
> +	struct thread_data child_data;
> +	int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
> +	char buffer;
> +	pthread_t thread;
> +	void *thread_ret;
> +
> +	child_data.parent_pid = getppid();
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
> +	child_data.pipe_child = pipe_child[1];
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
> +	child_data.pipe_parent = pipe_parent[0];
> +	child_data.ruleset_fd =
> +		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, child_data.ruleset_fd);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> +
> +	child_data.mute_subdomains = true;
> +
> +	/* Creates the sibling thread. */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_sandbox_deny_twice,
> +				    &child_data));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 1: the sibling mutes subdomain logs, creates a domain, and
> +	 * triggers a denial.  The denial must not be logged.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(-EAGAIN, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
> +					      child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
> +
> +	/* Drains any remaining records. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Overrides the sibling's log_subdomains_off by calling TSYNC without
> +	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(child_data.ruleset_fd,
> +					    LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Phase 2: the sibling stacks another domain and triggers a denial.
> +	 * Because TSYNC replaced its log_subdomains_off with 0, the new domain
> +	 * has log_status=LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
> +
> +	/* The denial must be logged. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
> +					child_data.parent_pid, NULL));
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &thread_ret));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(NULL, thread_ret);
> +}
> +
>  FIXTURE(audit_flags)
>  {
>  	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
> index 2b9ad4f154f4..abc290271a1a 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c
> @@ -247,4 +247,78 @@ TEST(tsync_interrupt)
>  	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>  }
>  
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE(tsync_without_ruleset) {};
> +/* clang-format on */
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(tsync_without_ruleset)
> +{
> +	const __u32 flags;
> +	const int expected_errno;
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, tsync_only) {
> +	/* clang-format on */
> +	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
> +	.expected_errno = EBADF,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off_same_exec_off) {
> +	/* clang-format on */
> +	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
> +	.expected_errno = EBADF,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off_new_exec_on) {
> +	/* clang-format on */
> +	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
> +	.expected_errno = EBADF,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, all_flags) {
> +	/* clang-format on */
> +	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
> +	.expected_errno = EBADF,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tsync_without_ruleset, subdomains_off) {
> +	/* clang-format on */
> +	.flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
> +		 LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC,
> +	.expected_errno = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(tsync_without_ruleset)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tsync_without_ruleset)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F(tsync_without_ruleset, check)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = landlock_restrict_self(-1, variant->flags);
> +	if (variant->expected_errno) {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
> +		EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_errno, errno);
> +	} else {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> +	}
> +}

We are not setting the no_new_privs flag in this test, as we do in the
others.

no_new_privs or CAP_SYS_ADMIN are required in the implementation, even
when ruleset_fd == -1 and passing
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF.

> +
>  TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
> -- 
> 2.53.0
> 

Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>

But please fix the flaky test.

–Günther

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-07  8:25 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-04-04  8:49 [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1 Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-07  8:25   ` Günther Noack
2026-04-07  7:30 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] landlock: Fix log_subdomains_off inheritance across fork() Günther Noack

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