* [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
@ 2026-04-07 10:21 Kai Zen
2026-04-07 10:26 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-04-07 10:42 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kai Zen @ 2026-04-07 10:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: edwin.peer, Eric Dumazet, davem, kuba, pabeni, horms, stable,
security
rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:
struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
__u8 broadcast[32];
};
The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:
memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
The pattern used elsewhere in this file for the regular IFLA_BROADCAST
attribute also avoids the issue by sending only dev->addr_len bytes
rather than a fixed-size struct, but for IFLA_VF_BROADCAST the wire
format is the fixed 32-byte struct, so the right fix is to zero the
struct before the partial memcpy.
Reachability and impact
-----------------------
The leak is reachable by any unprivileged local process. AF_NETLINK
with NETLINK_ROUTE requires no capabilities. The only environmental
requirement is that the host has at least one SR-IOV-capable
interface present (a parent device with VFs), which is the common
case for cloud, datacenter and HPC hosts.
Trigger: send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute whose
value has the RTEXT_FILTER_VF bit set. The kernel will then walk
each VF and emit IFLA_VFINFO_LIST, including IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
which carries the 26 bytes of uninitialised stack per VF.
Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses
(useful as a KASLR / function-pointer disclosure primitive) and
transient sensitive data left over by whatever ran on the same
kernel stack just prior. KASAN with stack instrumentation, or
KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
Reproducer (unprivileged):
import socket, struct
IFLA_EXT_MASK = 29
RTEXT_FILTER_VF = 1
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_NETLINK, socket.SOCK_RAW,
socket.NETLINK_ROUTE)
s.bind((0, 0))
hdr = struct.pack('=IHHII', 0, 18, 0x301, 0, 0)
ifi = struct.pack('=BxHiII', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
attr = (struct.pack('=HH', 8, IFLA_EXT_MASK) +
struct.pack('=I', RTEXT_FILTER_VF))
msg = hdr + ifi + attr
msg = struct.pack('=I', len(msg)) + msg[4:]
s.send(msg)
data = s.recv(65536)
# Parse IFLA_VF_BROADCAST from the response. Bytes 7..32 of the
# broadcast[] field are uninitialised kernel stack on Ethernet.
Fix
---
Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function.
Reported-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
---
Note for reviewers: this is v1. I have not yet identified the
exact introducing commit for the Fixes: tag and would appreciate
a pointer, or I will resend as v2 once I have run git blame on a
local checkout. The bug is present at least as far back as the
introduction of struct ifla_vf_broadcast in net-next.
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int
rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
+ memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
2026-04-07 10:21 [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo Kai Zen
@ 2026-04-07 10:26 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-04-07 10:42 ` Greg KH
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2026-04-07 10:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kai Zen; +Cc: netdev, edwin.peer, davem, kuba, pabeni, horms, stable, security
On Tue, Apr 7, 2026 at 3:22 AM Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
> without initialisation:
>
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
>
> The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
>
> /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
> __u8 broadcast[32];
> };
>
> The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
> as the length:
>
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
>
> On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
> dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
> written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
> the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
>
> nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
>
> leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
> RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
>
> The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
> for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
> vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
> vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
>
> The pattern used elsewhere in this file for the regular IFLA_BROADCAST
> attribute also avoids the issue by sending only dev->addr_len bytes
> rather than a fixed-size struct, but for IFLA_VF_BROADCAST the wire
> format is the fixed 32-byte struct, so the right fix is to zero the
> struct before the partial memcpy.
>
> Reachability and impact
> -----------------------
>
> The leak is reachable by any unprivileged local process. AF_NETLINK
> with NETLINK_ROUTE requires no capabilities. The only environmental
> requirement is that the host has at least one SR-IOV-capable
> interface present (a parent device with VFs), which is the common
> case for cloud, datacenter and HPC hosts.
>
> Trigger: send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute whose
> value has the RTEXT_FILTER_VF bit set. The kernel will then walk
> each VF and emit IFLA_VFINFO_LIST, including IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> which carries the 26 bytes of uninitialised stack per VF.
>
> Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses
> (useful as a KASLR / function-pointer disclosure primitive) and
> transient sensitive data left over by whatever ran on the same
> kernel stack just prior. KASAN with stack instrumentation, or
> KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
>
> Reproducer (unprivileged):
>
> import socket, struct
> IFLA_EXT_MASK = 29
> RTEXT_FILTER_VF = 1
> s = socket.socket(socket.AF_NETLINK, socket.SOCK_RAW,
> socket.NETLINK_ROUTE)
> s.bind((0, 0))
> hdr = struct.pack('=IHHII', 0, 18, 0x301, 0, 0)
> ifi = struct.pack('=BxHiII', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
> attr = (struct.pack('=HH', 8, IFLA_EXT_MASK) +
> struct.pack('=I', RTEXT_FILTER_VF))
> msg = hdr + ifi + attr
> msg = struct.pack('=I', len(msg)) + msg[4:]
> s.send(msg)
> data = s.recv(65536)
> # Parse IFLA_VF_BROADCAST from the response. Bytes 7..32 of the
> # broadcast[] field are uninitialised kernel stack on Ethernet.
>
> Fix
> ---
>
> Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
> existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
> function.
>
> Reported-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Note for reviewers: this is v1. I have not yet identified the
> exact introducing commit for the Fixes: tag and would appreciate
> a pointer, or I will resend as v2 once I have run git blame on a
> local checkout. The bug is present at least as far back as the
> introduction of struct ifla_vf_broadcast in net-next.
Fixes: 75345f888f70 ("ipoib: show VF broadcast address")
>
> net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> @@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
> port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
>
> memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
> + memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
> vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
> vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
> --
> 2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
2026-04-07 10:21 [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo Kai Zen
2026-04-07 10:26 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2026-04-07 10:42 ` Greg KH
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2026-04-07 10:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kai Zen
Cc: netdev, edwin.peer, Eric Dumazet, davem, kuba, pabeni, horms,
stable, security
On Tue, Apr 07, 2026 at 01:21:57PM +0300, Kai Zen wrote:
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
> without initialisation:
>
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
>
> The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
>
> /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
> __u8 broadcast[32];
> };
>
> The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
> as the length:
>
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
>
> On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
> dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
> written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
> the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
>
> nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
>
> leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
> RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
>
> The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
> for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
> vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
> vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
>
> The pattern used elsewhere in this file for the regular IFLA_BROADCAST
> attribute also avoids the issue by sending only dev->addr_len bytes
> rather than a fixed-size struct, but for IFLA_VF_BROADCAST the wire
> format is the fixed 32-byte struct, so the right fix is to zero the
> struct before the partial memcpy.
>
> Reachability and impact
> -----------------------
>
> The leak is reachable by any unprivileged local process. AF_NETLINK
> with NETLINK_ROUTE requires no capabilities. The only environmental
> requirement is that the host has at least one SR-IOV-capable
> interface present (a parent device with VFs), which is the common
> case for cloud, datacenter and HPC hosts.
>
> Trigger: send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute whose
> value has the RTEXT_FILTER_VF bit set. The kernel will then walk
> each VF and emit IFLA_VFINFO_LIST, including IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> which carries the 26 bytes of uninitialised stack per VF.
>
> Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses
> (useful as a KASLR / function-pointer disclosure primitive) and
> transient sensitive data left over by whatever ran on the same
> kernel stack just prior. KASAN with stack instrumentation, or
> KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
>
> Reproducer (unprivileged):
>
> import socket, struct
> IFLA_EXT_MASK = 29
> RTEXT_FILTER_VF = 1
> s = socket.socket(socket.AF_NETLINK, socket.SOCK_RAW,
> socket.NETLINK_ROUTE)
> s.bind((0, 0))
> hdr = struct.pack('=IHHII', 0, 18, 0x301, 0, 0)
> ifi = struct.pack('=BxHiII', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
> attr = (struct.pack('=HH', 8, IFLA_EXT_MASK) +
> struct.pack('=I', RTEXT_FILTER_VF))
> msg = hdr + ifi + attr
> msg = struct.pack('=I', len(msg)) + msg[4:]
> s.send(msg)
> data = s.recv(65536)
> # Parse IFLA_VF_BROADCAST from the response. Bytes 7..32 of the
> # broadcast[] field are uninitialised kernel stack on Ethernet.
>
> Fix
> ---
>
> Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
> existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
> function.
>
> Reported-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Note for reviewers: this is v1. I have not yet identified the
> exact introducing commit for the Fixes: tag and would appreciate
> a pointer, or I will resend as v2 once I have run git blame on a
> local checkout. The bug is present at least as far back as the
> introduction of struct ifla_vf_broadcast in net-next.
>
> net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> @@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
> port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
>
> memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
> + memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
> vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
> vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
Nice catch, but your patch is corrupted and can't be applied as the tabs
were converted to spaces and the commit is line-wrapped :(
With that fixed, feel free to resubmit and add:
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thanks,
greg k-h
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2026-04-07 10:21 [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo Kai Zen
2026-04-07 10:26 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-04-07 10:42 ` Greg KH
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