[PATCH 6.19 40/86] X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions

Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-13T16:04:47Z

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>

commit d702c3408213bb12bd570bb97204d8340d141c51 upstream.

Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with
empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of
the extension is read before checking its length. Fix it.

The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a
specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API.
Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly
disclosed off-list.

Fixes: 30eae2b037af ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA")
Fixes: 567671281a75 ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage")
Reported-by: Leo Lin <leo@depthfirst.com> # off-list
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.4+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -584,10 +584,10 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context
* 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string
* 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string
*/
- if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
- return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen < 4)
return -EBADMSG;
+ if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
+ return -EBADMSG;
if (v[2] >= 8)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[3] & 0x80)
@@ -620,10 +620,10 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context
* (Expect 0xFF if the CA is TRUE)
* vlen should match the entire extension size
*/
- if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
- return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen < 2)
return -EBADMSG;
+ if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+ return -EBADMSG;
if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
return -EBADMSG;
/* Empty SEQUENCE means CA:FALSE (default value omitted per DER) */