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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org,gechangwei@live.cn,heming.zhao@suse.com,jlbec@evilplan.org,junxiao.bi@oracle.com,mark@fasheh.com,piaojun@huawei.com,stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 14:13:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026041351-barbecue-conductor-c8e7@gregkh> (raw)


The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 7bc5da4842bed3252d26e742213741a4d0ac1b14
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026041351-barbecue-conductor-c8e7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 7bc5da4842bed3252d26e742213741a4d0ac1b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on
a loop device.  The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode
block buffer, not a true use-after-free.  The write overflows into an
adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk
id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data.  On a
corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data
capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260403063830.3662739-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62c1793956716ea8b28a
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 03a51662ea8e..a2ccd8011706 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",


             reply	other threads:[~2026-04-13 12:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-13 12:13 gregkh [this message]
2026-04-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] ocfs2: add inline inode consistency check to ocfs2_validate_inode_block() Sasha Levin
2026-04-13 15:35   ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read Sasha Levin
2026-04-13 15:35   ` [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline Sasha Levin

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