public inbox for stable@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
To: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: "Jia Yao" <jia.yao@intel.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, "Shuicheng Lin" <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>,
	"Mathew Alwin" <alwin.mathew@intel.com>,
	"Michal Mrozek" <michal.mrozek@intel.com>,
	"Matthew Brost" <matthew.brost@intel.com>,
	"Matthew Auld" <matthew.auld@intel.com>,
	"José Roberto de Souza" <jose.souza@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 1/2] drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 06:19:50 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260415061951.427699-2-jia.yao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260415061951.427699-1-jia.yao@intel.com>

Add validation in xe_vm_madvise_ioctl() to reject PAT indices with
XE_COH_NONE coherency mode when applied to CPU cached memory.

Using coh_none with CPU cached buffers is a security issue. When the
kernel clears pages before reallocation, the clear operation stays in
CPU cache (dirty). GPU with coh_none can bypass CPU caches and read
stale sensitive data directly from DRAM, potentially leaking data from
previously freed pages of other processes.

This aligns with the existing validation in vm_bind path
(xe_vm_bind_ioctl_validate_bo).

v2(Matthew brost)
- Add fixes
- Move one debug print to better place

v3(Matthew Auld)
- Should be drm/xe/uapi
- More Cc

v4(Shuicheng Lin)
- Fix kmem leak issues by the way

v5
- Remove kmem leak because it has been merged by another patch

v6
- Remove the fix which is not related to current fix

v7
- No change

v8
- Rebase

Fixes: ada7486c5668 ("drm/xe: Implement madvise ioctl for xe")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18
Cc: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>
Cc: Mathew Alwin <alwin.mathew@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Acked-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
index 66f00d3f5c07..f6e4a44db654 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
@@ -621,6 +621,43 @@ static int xe_madvise_purgeable_retained_to_user(const struct xe_madvise_details
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool check_pat_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe,
+				    struct xe_vmas_in_madvise_range *madvise_range,
+				    u16 pat_index)
+{
+	u16 coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, pat_index);
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using coh_none with CPU cached buffers is not allowed.
+	 * Otherwise CPU page clearing can be bypassed, which is a
+	 * security issue. GPU can directly access system memory and
+	 * bypass CPU caches, potentially reading stale sensitive data
+	 * from previously freed pages.
+	 */
+	if (coh_mode != XE_COH_NONE)
+		return true;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < madvise_range->num_vmas; i++) {
+		struct xe_vma *vma = madvise_range->vmas[i];
+		struct xe_bo *bo = xe_vma_bo(vma);
+
+		if (bo) {
+			/* BO with WB caching + COH_NONE is not allowed */
+			if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, bo->cpu_caching == DRM_XE_GEM_CPU_CACHING_WB))
+				return false;
+			/* Imported dma-buf without caching info, assume cached */
+			if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, !bo->cpu_caching))
+				return false;
+		} else if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, xe_vma_is_cpu_addr_mirror(vma) ||
+					    xe_vma_is_userptr(vma)))
+			/* System memory (userptr/SVM) is always CPU cached */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static bool check_bo_args_are_sane(struct xe_vm *vm, struct xe_vma **vmas,
 				   int num_vmas, u32 atomic_val)
 {
@@ -750,6 +787,14 @@ int xe_vm_madvise_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *fil
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (args->type == DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PAT) {
+		if (!check_pat_args_are_sane(xe, &madvise_range,
+					     args->pat_index.val)) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_vmas;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (madvise_range.has_bo_vmas) {
 		if (args->type == DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_ATOMIC) {
 			if (!check_bo_args_are_sane(vm, madvise_range.vmas,
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-15  6:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20260129000147.339361-1-jia.yao@intel.com>
2026-01-30 22:07 ` [PATCH v3] drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise Jia Yao
2026-02-03  2:54   ` Lin, Shuicheng
2026-02-04 15:13   ` Souza, Jose
2026-02-03 15:48 ` [PATCH v4] " Jia Yao
2026-02-03 16:38   ` Matthew Auld
2026-02-03 16:59     ` Yao, Jia
2026-03-10 14:50   ` Mrozek, Michal
2026-03-16  7:22 ` [PATCH v5 0/2] drm/xe: PAT index validation for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR and Jia Yao
2026-03-16  7:22   ` [PATCH v5 1/2] drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise Jia Yao
2026-03-16 10:59     ` Matthew Auld
2026-03-16 15:29       ` Lin, Shuicheng
2026-03-16  7:22   ` [PATCH v5 2/2] drm/xe: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR Jia Yao
2026-03-16 11:40     ` Matthew Auld
2026-03-16 16:42 ` [PATCH v5 0/2] drm/xe: PAT index validation for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR and madvise Jia Yao
2026-03-16 16:42   ` [PATCH v6 1/2] drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise Jia Yao
2026-03-16 16:42   ` [PATCH v6 2/2] drm/xe: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR Jia Yao
2026-03-17 10:45     ` Matthew Auld
2026-03-19 11:58 ` [PATCH v7 0/2] drm/xe: PAT index validation for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR and madvise Jia Yao
2026-03-19 11:58   ` [PATCH v7 1/2] drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise Jia Yao
2026-03-19 11:58   ` [PATCH v7 2/2] drm/xe: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR Jia Yao
2026-04-15  6:19 ` [PATCH v8 0/2] drm/xe: Reject unsafe PAT indices for CPU cached memory Jia Yao
2026-04-15  6:19   ` Jia Yao [this message]
2026-04-15  6:19   ` [PATCH v8 2/2] drm/xe: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU_ADDR_MIRROR Jia Yao
2026-04-15 12:15     ` Matthew Auld

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260415061951.427699-2-jia.yao@intel.com \
    --to=jia.yao@intel.com \
    --cc=alwin.mathew@intel.com \
    --cc=intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org \
    --cc=jose.souza@intel.com \
    --cc=matthew.auld@intel.com \
    --cc=matthew.brost@intel.com \
    --cc=michal.mrozek@intel.com \
    --cc=shuicheng.lin@intel.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox