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[68.48.65.54]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id af79cd13be357-8e4eed6eef3sm297805585a.2.2026.04.15.20.19.19 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:19:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Michael Bommarito To: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner , Xin Long Cc: "David S . Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net] sctp: fix OOB write to userspace in sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 23:19:03 -0400 Message-ID: <20260416031903.1447072-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks() checks that the caller's optval buffer is large enough for the peer AUTH chunk list with if (len < num_chunks) return -EINVAL; but then writes num_chunks bytes to p->gauth_chunks, which lives at offset offsetof(struct sctp_authchunks, gauth_chunks) == 8 inside optval. The check is missing the sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) = 8-byte header. When the caller supplies len == num_chunks (for any num_chunks > 0) the test passes but copy_to_user() writes sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) = 8 bytes past the declared buffer. The sibling function sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks() at the next line already has the correct check: if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks) return -EINVAL; Align the peer variant with its sibling. Reproducer confirms on v7.0-13-generic: an unprivileged userspace caller that opens a loopback SCTP association with AUTH enabled, queries num_chunks with a short optval, then issues the real getsockopt with len == num_chunks and sentinel bytes painted past the buffer observes those sentinel bytes overwritten with the peer's AUTH chunk type. The bytes written are under the peer's control but land in the caller's own userspace; this is not a kernel memory corruption, but it is a kernel-side contract violation that can silently corrupt adjacent userspace data. Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 05fb00c9c335..f5d442753dc9 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -7033,7 +7033,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len, /* See if the user provided enough room for all the data */ num_chunks = ntohs(ch->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); - if (len < num_chunks) + if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks) return -EINVAL; if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, num_chunks)) -- 2.53.0